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In this thesis, I address White Cherokee identity, the historical trajectory it emerges from, 
and some of its political consequences. White Cherokee identity comes from social 
arrangements, place relationships, and governmental policy in the United States of America, 
each part of settler colonialism's ongoing effects. White Cherokees are not unique in the fact that 
other tribes certainly have White members. Instead, they are a specific example for exploring 
membership, place relationships, cultural practices, identity, race, ethnicity, and subjectivity. My 
family serves as a case study for my analysis, and I supplement it by engaging with other 
scholars. I focus my research on Oklahoma because the formation of Indian Territory, and 
subsequently the State of Oklahoma, is key to the building of White Cherokees. Beginning with 
the role of place-relationships, I establish that they are fundamental to developing White 
Cherokee identities. They help develop personal and familial histories closely tied to Indigeneity, 
oftentimes stories of removal.  
Furthermore, the social and cultural changes in thinking about identity from the 19th century 
to the present have also made a White Cherokee identity possible and coherent to claim. This is 
partly due to the ways biological race was understood in the past and how those viewpoints were 
written into scientific practices and public policy. Race’s legislation through blood quantum and 
technological advancements in genetics have allowed for new personal ethnic explorations for 
American consumers. While the changes in this thinking are essential, looking at them and the 
ways Indigenous identities have been politically and legally defined by both Indigenous and non-
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When I was growing up, my family would go to Papa’s every few months. My maternal 
grandfather, Papa, lives in Paoli, Oklahoma, a small town about 7 miles north of Paul’s Valley, 
the closest city. However, for my family, it was an hour and a half drive made for holidays and 
some reserved weekend days when my parents wanted to see him, Granny, and any other family 
down there. When I was little, my siblings and I would all get into the back of our family’s car 
with my parents, and we would make the trip down. 
Nowadays, we take that trip less often, and fewer of us take it. My parents go down less 
frequently than they did when my siblings and I were young, but they still make a point to see 
him. After the death of my maternal grandmother, Papa’s first wife, my mom grew much closer 
with him. My little sisters and I had some excitement to see him when we were younger, but 
eventually, the trips became less exciting. Papa was socially and politically conservative, and as I 
grew older, seeing him would stir some hurt feelings in my heart about how he viewed the world, 
his place in it, and how he believed his children and grandchildren should fit into it. 
The pilgrimage to Papa’s, as I have come to see it today, is a calming drive. To avoid traffic, 
I leave my home in Edmond either before noon or shortly after the lunch traffic has ended. The 
first 40 minutes or so is spent on I-35 south surrounded by never-ending construction, strip 
malls, a short pass over the Oklahoma River, and the occasional police officer trying to catch 
drivers going just fast enough to pull them over. After passing the Riverwind casino, and the 
Norman city limits shortly thereafter, the landscape changes considerably. Trees line the 
highway, and I enjoy the feeling of driving over hills in comparison to the relatively flat roads of 
suburbia.   Once I am past Norman, the highway’s two lanes are rarely crowded, with 18-
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wheelers being the main companions as I continue my drive south. When we were young, this 
part of the drive always felt longer for my siblings and me due to the lack of familiar sights. 
However, that lack was comforting as I visited Papa more and more for fieldwork. En route, it 
allowed me to anticipate what questions I had, think about what Papa and I would do and talk 
about, and brace myself for the awkwardness and discomfort I would undoubtedly experience. 
Afterward, it allowed me a brief respite to unpack and think through what I had experienced. 
I exit I-35 when I see the gaming center, convenience store, and truck stop (all in one 
building) that has served as the marker of “we’re almost there” my entire life. Once off the 
highway, it is only a 10-minute drive past scattered houses and cattle, downtown Paoli, and then 
a bit further on to Granny and Papa’s. When I turn onto their property, going past the first cattle 
guard, I drive onto a gravel road. To the right is their old house, which has been renovated and is 
now home for my uncle and his family. There are a couple of hundred feet until the second cattle 
guard, which marks the beginning of where Granny and Papa’s residential space is, consisting of 
their house, which is connected to the enclosed barn, a raised gazebo-like structure that hosts 
more chairs than intended, an open-air barn, a small garden, the chicken coop, and goat pen.  
However, as you enter the residential area, you begin to see who Papa and Granny, Papa’s 
second wife, are by the symbols outside, although they reflect Papa more than Granny for me. 
Right past the second cattle guard is a tall flagpole from which they fly the flag of the United 
States of America right above the flag of the Cherokee Nation. The flags are usually in a semi-
tattered state, with some discoloration, rips, tears, or other blemishes readily visible due to their 
being in the elements at all times. Every few years or so, when the flags have finally met their 
end, somebody, usually one of my aunts or uncles, gifts Papa new flags for Father’s Day, 
Christmas, his birthday, or any other holiday that could justify handing him two new flags to fly 
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in front of his home. In a way, the flags showcase his pride and heritage, a pride and heritage he 
bestowed on his children, one they have tried to pass on to their children, and one they reaffirm 
in gifting him new flags. 
When parking at Papa’s, everybody usually parks in the grass and then walks across the 
stretch of gravel driveway towards the house.  To walk into the house, most enter through the 
barn and then into the house through the connecting door. Part of this is due to proximity, but 
also because Papa is usually outside waiting for us. Outside of the house door is a wall of signs, 
road signs, crosses, and miscellaneous wall décor. Among these is a stone slab that is engraved 
and painted with the seal of the Cherokee Nation and a piece of plywood that has the Ten 
Commandments written on it in permanent marker. Two of Papa’s clearest identities are his 
being Cherokee and his being Christian, Baptist specifically, and these identities are clearly 
communicated to any who happen to be invited to his home. 
When I arrive, Papa is typically already outside waiting for me, alerted by the buzzer he had 
installed at the first cattle guard to tell him when somebody is coming. On the first Christmas, 
after he got the buzzer, he pulled me aside after it rang and said to me, “Now Evan, you know 
why I have that buzzer?” 
“I assume it’s to let you know somebody is coming?” I replied, wondering what other usage it 
could have. 
“It’s so the White man doesn’t sneak up on me.” 
I laughed with him about his joke; I thought it was funny, and it was not an uncommon sort of 
joke of his to make about him being the Indian and the ways “White folk” had disenfranchised, 
oppressed, and otherwise related to Indians since 1492. However, as I look at myself and my 
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family, I see several White faces among his children and grandchildren, my aunts, uncles, and 
cousins. 
… 
At its core, this thesis is based on my experiences and thoughts regarding my relationship 
with Papa. My fieldwork with him, alongside experiences and conversations with my mother, 
have shaped my understandings of myself but also my analytical approach. To that end, this 
thesis is focused on what I call “White Cherokees.” White Cherokees, as I understand them from 
my own experience, are Cherokees who are phenotypically and culturally White while also 
identifying as Cherokee.  
In this thesis, I focus on the historical, social, and political developments that made White 
Cherokees a possibility in the contemporary. Theoretically, this means questioning what 
Whitening as a social process means, how racial categories are products of history, and how 
White Cherokees complicate understandings of Indigeneity. By Whitening, I refer to the process 
by which certain Cherokees become socially understood as White (Roediger 1999). While this 
does refer to physically looking White, however, I am more concerned with people who are 
Cherokee that can socially present as White and benefit from Whiteness.  
While my focus is on Cherokees, a majority of what I discuss is far from unique to 
Cherokees. The ability for people to identify as and with Indigeneity despite benefitting from 
Whiteness and appearing White is not limited to Cherokees. Many of the policies, if not all, that 
were implemented by the United States were designed to affect other Indigenous people. 
Likewise, the social processes that I discuss are also not unique to Cherokees, as Cherokees are 
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also in contact with other Indigenous peoples. The insights here are not limited to Cherokees 
alone, but other Indigenous peoples as well. 
In discussing Cherokees as a legal and social group, there are multiple kinds of 
Cherokees that I discuss throughout. First, there are citizen Cherokees, who are members of one 
of the three federally recognized Cherokee tribes. The three “tribes,” a legal and political term in 
this instance, are the Cherokee Nation and United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians, both in 
Tahlequah, Oklahoma, and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. The United Keetowah Band 
was the original Cherokee tribe to secure federal recognition in Oklahoma, but the Cherokee 
Nation split off from the United Keetowah Band in the 1970s, when the Cherokee Nation 
constitution was ratified and accepted by the federal government. The Eastern Band is made up 
of Cherokee Indians who did not migrate during removal, and their tribe is headquartered in 
Cherokee, North Carolina. For the purposes of this thesis, I focus primarily on the Cherokee 
Nation, with mentions of the Eastern Band and the United Keetowah Band as appropriate. This is 
a choice based on access to resources, as the Cherokee Nation is more well-known due to being 
the second-largest tribe in the United States with almost 400,000 citizens. I am also a citizen of 
the Cherokee Nation.  
In addition to there being citizen Cherokees, there are also “recognized Cherokees.” 
Recognized Cherokees are not legally members of the tribe but are recognized as Cherokees 
within their communities. There is no issue of membership socially, only legally. I do not discuss 
recognized Cherokees much, but their existence does complicate the role of legality in defining 
membership. There are also the Freedmen. The Freedmen are descendants of those enslaved by 
Cherokees and were granted citizenship through the treaties written after the Civil War. 
Freedmen are highly associated with being non-blood citizens as well as being racially Black. 
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This has complicated citizenship for them significantly due to the ways Cherokeeness is 
conceptualized and applied to certain types of citizens. I discuss the controversy of the 
Freedmen’s citizenship in chapter 5. Across these types of Cherokees, there are different social 
and legal parameters by which membership is accepted or contested. This is part of the basis for 
this thesis, as I seek to understand how White Cherokee’s membership is contested, validated, or 
even rejected due to the ambiguities of granting membership to people who are legally members 
despite being White in many ways. However, I did not come to these questions at the beginning 
of fieldwork.  
When I first began to conceptualize my fieldwork, I imagined myself working closely 
with Papa on his ranch, where he lives. It is not a large operation but is something that he 
developed as a form of part-time work while he worked full-time as a mail carrier in Moore and 
later in rural Oklahoma. One of my uncles, who lives near Papa, as well as my father, also 
participated in this kind of part-time cattle ranching. Although my father has since stopped, my 
uncle continues to run cattle. I wanted to explore the role of cattle-ranching in producing certain 
kinds of classed masculinities within the context of Oklahoma as a state with core narratives 
regarding cattle, cowboy culture, and the valuing of industries that are environmentally costly. 
This project took shape around my interests in food production, labor, and gender, as well as my 
childhood experiences of being brought to my dad’s part-time ranch and my experiences with 
Papa as well. 
However, that plan was altered for a variety of reasons. As I spent time with my 
grandfather doing fieldwork in early 2020, I noticed that there were other things occurring with 
my relationship with him regarding race. Although gender was still problematized in our 
relationship, race came to be felt differently for me as my grandfather identified me, his 
7 
 
grandchild, as Cherokee. I did not reject this classification, but it felt problematic for several 
reasons.  On what basis was I considered Cherokee? With my blue eyes and blonde hair, I did 
not look Cherokee by any means, but what did I expect Cherokeeness to look like? Although 
Cherokees are famously mixed, and I am far from an outlier in appearance, I did not appear 
“Native” and thus did not feel as though I look Cherokee. I had a Certificate Degree of Indian 
Blood (CDIB) card, but my quantum was so low it felt insignificant; nevertheless, the Cherokee 
Nation claims me, and I am a citizen in the eyes of the law. My relationship to my own Cherokee 
identity became increasingly problematized as I continued to work with and build a deeper 
relationship with Papa, who helped me to realize many things about my own relationship to and 
understanding of Indigeneity and how that differed from my understandings of Indigeneity 
within the broader context of Oklahoma, and within the greater United States. 
This series of questions and revelations shifted my thinking on my project to an extent, 
and I began to pursue something related to my family in a more intimate manner over the course 
of my early fieldwork. However, this was further challenged by the COVID-19 pandemic, which 
forced an end to in-person fieldwork. Because of this, I am largely focused on engaging what it 
means to be a White Cherokee and using my familial and personal history as a means of 
ethnographic inquiry. COVID-19, despite its challenges, also allowed me to pursue a project that 
I may not have engaged with had I continued to do fieldwork and insisted on a thesis focused on 
classed masculinities and labor with part-time cattle ranching.  
Because I have chosen to write about my family, I also recognize that the ability to do so 
is part of a historical moment in anthropological writing. My ability to write vulnerably in an 
academic-oriented text is the result of feminist ethnographers’ and anthropologists’ works. 
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Specifically, the works of Lila Abu-Lughod and Ruth Behar have shaped my work and my 
decision to work with and write about myself and my family in such a manner.  
In “Writing Against Culture,” Lila Abu-Lughod addresses the relationship, namely the 
boundary between self and other, within anthropological practices. This relationship has 
historically been based on an assumed difference, in which certain kinds of differences are 
highlighted or repressed, in favor of narratives that are based on a Western self that is studying 
non-Western others. This relationship is built on a constructed self that is studying a distinct 
other (Abu-Lughod 1991). The way in which anthropologists position themselves in relation to 
their work is key, Abu-Lughod argues because anthropologists are at all moments embedded in 
the power relations that have constructed the “other” that is to be studied. When we question the 
self-other dichotomy, specifically by looking at anthropologists that work with their own society, 
we come to understand that it is a simplification and fallacy. Namely, the issue of objectivity 
arises. As a White Cherokee writing about myself, my family, and Indigenous people more 
broadly, I find the question of objectivity a null point but a thought-provoking one when 
considering perspective.  
Objectivity is not something I could ever obtain when I am writing about myself; I am 
always going to be partial in some manner. However, my perspective as a White Cherokee gives 
me a position that is not necessarily in line with neither White anthropologists working with 
Cherokees nor necessarily racially Native Cherokees. In writing about my position, I must also 
address the power dynamics that come with being able to selective embrace or reject, being 
understood as White when one does not consider themselves so or solely so. By understanding 
how this became a possibility through political and social change, as well as forced removal and 
dispossession, it is my hope that my position is explicated throughout this work. Furthermore, I 
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address the question of power as it relates to claiming a White Cherokee identity in my final 
chapters. My self and my other are both inside and outside; I weave through social categories 
that understand and define me in certain ways that may not necessarily match with my own self-
definition. Understanding the ambiguities in such a position and what it affords me is based on 
understanding power relations.  
However, in choosing to write about the way power relations work regarding myself and 
my family, I found writing vulnerably to be necessary, both from a personal and academic 
position. In writing vulnerably and revealing myself, I do so not just to write in a way that 
connects with my readers but also to give my insights context and depth so that my insights are 
understood as being intimately related to lived experiences, both my own and others. I am 
inspired by the work of Ruth Behar in The Vulnerable Observer, as she blends ethnography and 
autobiography into a genre that gives her insights greater meaning, and in turn, makes it easier 
for her readers to understand what she does (Behar 1996). I know what I do about being a White 
Cherokee because, in my 22 years of experience, I have been one. I have, however, also been 
denied my Cherokeeness and had it take center stage for my identity by the people around me. It 
is a position fraught with ambiguities and paradoxes. I defend my claim so that I may be 
understood as both. It is a strange position to occupy, and I doubt the strangeness will ever 
disappear.  
Therefore, my thesis is organized with this in mind. Beginning with the Cherokee 
removal in the 19th century, I first recount the history of removal, resettlement, and contemporary 
efforts at land relationships in the Cherokee Nation across chapters two, three, and four. These 
chapters also look at the role of land in defining Indigenous identities, specifically at place-
making processes, and how policies aimed at assimilation took that into account. Throughout 
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these chapters is my family history. I am eternally grateful to Papa’s cousin, Jack Seabolt, whom 
I have not met but feel fortunate to have heard his words through a family history that he 
researched and wrote in 1982. His voice shines through his text, and he gives life to family 
members I could have never possibly met if not for him. Although I was familiar with my 
family’s story, his research gave me clarity in moments otherwise obscure.  
Chapters five through ten are focused on social and legal parameters of membership. I switch 
between ethnographic moments and reflection in chapters six, eight, and ten and more detailed 
analysis in chapters five, seven, and nine. Chapter five focuses on the ways biological modes of 
thinking have impacted Cherokee metrics of membership since the 19th century, whereas chapter 
seven is focused on legal means of defining membership and how documentation serves a role in 
verifying identity claims. Chapter nine is focused on the ethics and politics of identifying as a 
White Cherokee. This thesis is not about deciding a definitive way of being White Cherokee, but 
rather about seeking an understanding of identity categories in the United States from the 
margins of Indigenous and White identity.  
 
2. Removal and Reestablishment: Early 1800s through the Civil War 
Prior to the removals that took place from 1836-1839, the Cherokee people held and lived 
on the land in the region now occupied by the states of Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Alabama. The Cherokee homelands were valuable spiritually, culturally, and 
economically to Cherokees, but two key industries brought Cherokee land rights and sovereignty 
into conflict with Georgian and National economic interests: the Georgia gold rush in 1828 and 
the amount of cotton produced and processed by Native peoples in the American southeast. As 
Cherokee cotton production and refining increased, anxiety about the Cherokee's economic threat 
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to settler society developed. The Georgia gold rush would further exacerbate tensions as settlers 
increasingly encroached on Cherokee lands to mine for gold.  
 In the Cherokee Nation census of 1835, the last census before removal, the Nation 
documented that in almost every family, one or more people could spin and weave cotton. 
Although much of this was used internally by Cherokees, external demand helped expand cotton 
production. Much of this was the same for the Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, with the U.S. 
government distributing 500 spinning wheels to the Creeks alone in 1810. By 1830, the crop had 
become a significant income source for these four tribes, with labor supplied in part by enslaved 
peoples.  On the 1835 census, the Cherokees documented 1,592 Slaves within the Cherokee 
Nation (Perdue and Green 2005). Importantly, the economic development of the tribes in the 
American southeast worked alongside the development of the American economy, and both 
depended on the labor of enslaved peoples, a practice that carried over into the post-removal 
economy.  
Cotton production was in part possible because of this labor but also because of the 
fertility of the land on which it was grown. The land is in the ideal climate for growing cotton 
and had the necessary 200 frost-free days for growing cotton. Unlike the operations of settler 
society, which were centralized around the labor of enslaved peoples on plantations, Cherokee 
production was smaller scale. Cherokee homesteads consisted of several buildings clustered 
around smaller plazas, where families lived in the same home across generations. Because 
Cherokees were traditionally matrilineal, residents of a house consisted of women, their 
husbands, their daughters, and their husbands if married, their daughter’s children, and 
unmarried sons. Together, these women would work fields together, moving from one family’s 
section to another (Perdue and Green 2005). Within Cherokee families, most did not own slaves, 
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and of those that had slaves, an overwhelming majority were mixed blood, which altered their 
position within Cherokee society, something I explore more in chapter 4. Slavery was not the 
primary means by which Cherokee cotton production occurred, but it is nonetheless part of how 
many Cherokees utilized slave labor and participated in the economy of the American south. 
Because Cherokees were not producing cotton at the same rate as the White settlers around them, 
they were viewed as not taking full advantage of the land, which fanned the flames of Georgian 
expansion as they sought to incorporate Cherokee lands into the state.  
 Alongside the expanding cotton industry, gold prospectors flocked to Georgia in the 
early 19th century to capitalize on the discovery of gold.  The Macon Telegraph reported that in 
“the winter of 1829 and 30, when the precious metals having been discovered in great abundance 
upon our Cherokee soil, great numbers of people from Georgia and other States rushed to the 
Territory in search of its treasures” (Williams 1993, 25). Much of the gold found in Georgia was 
under the Cherokee's control, resulting in many prospectors trespassing into Cherokee territory to 
mine the gold., which was mainly done through placer mining in the alluvial beds of streams. 
Placer mining, while less intrusive and disrupting to the environment than many other forms of 
mining, still would disrupt the local environment via sediments and pollution. However, the 
Cherokees largely framed their obstinance to settler intrusions through sovereignty and land 
rights, not environmental degradation. In 1830, the Philadelphia Mint received $212,000 in gold 
from Georgia, which adjusted for inflation is worth just over six million dollars in today’s 
currency. Gold provided another lucrative opportunity for the country and the state of Georgia 
and contributed to Cherokee land being seen as desirable for economic development.  Hence, 
Cherokee land rights were seen as problematic by people seeking to profit off the booming 
cotton and gold industries at the time. Not only were industries that boomed in settler society not 
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taking off within the practices of Cherokee land and labor systems, which did not rely heavily on 
slave labor nor intensive operations in water sources, but they were actively preventing settler 
society from expanding their own means of production and wealth accumulation.  
The desire on the part of state and federal government and private industry to remove 
Indigenous peoples from Georgia and other states has been a force during much of this country’s 
history. In 1802, the State of Georgia agreed to cede the land that is now Alabama and 
Mississippi to the United States in exchange for $1,250,000 and the extinguishment of Indian 
land titles in Georgia, which subsequently established the modern-day borders of Georgia. The 
Cherokees, however, declined to move. In 1825, the Cherokee Nation was established by 
Principal Chief John Ross and Major Ridge, the speaker of the Cherokee National Council, and 
they then established a constitution in 1827. An election was held, and Principal Chief John Ross 
became the leader and representative of the tribe.  In 1828 the tribe established a “Blood Law” 
that stated that any who sold even a foot of land to a White man would pay for it with their lives. 
Removal was not an option, nor was willingly ceding lands to White men.  
 In 1830 the Indian Removal Act was authorized by Congress and gave President Andrew 
Jackson the authority to negotiate removal treaties. Two court cases set the precedents for the 
removal of Cherokees and other Indigenous peoples in the United States: Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia in 183 and Worcester v. the State of Georgia in 1832. In the first case, the Supreme 
Court of the United States ruled that the Cherokee were not a sovereign and independent nation. 
However, in the 1832 case, they ruled that Georgia could not impose its laws in Cherokee 
territory; only the federal government had authority in Indian affairs, which consequentially built 
the basis for sovereignty. President Jackson ignored the second decision, which invalidated the 
Indian Removal Act and instead pressured Cherokees into signing a removal treaty.  
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 It is key to note that the treaty was signed by a minority political party within the 
Cherokee Nation. Originally known as the Ridge party, it was headed by Major Ridge, his son 
John Ridge, and nephews Elias Boudinot and Stand Watie. The party believed that it was 
favorable for the Cherokee Nation to establish friendly relationships with the United States 
government before White squatters and state governments made matters more violent. John 
Ridge began to meet with the Jackson administration in the late 1820s, although the State of 
Georgia had been holding lotteries for dividing Cherokee land as early as 1805. For the Ridge 
party, removal was inevitable for the Cherokee people.  
 In 1835, the treaty was signed by 21 proponents of Cherokee removal, including Major 
Ridge and the younger brother of Principal Chief John Ross. Principal Chief Ross refused to sign 
the document, and it was rejected by the Cherokee National Council. The treaty, as signed, 
agreed to the terms of $5 million to be disbursed per capita, half a million dollars for education, 
compensation for all property left, title in perpetuity to an equal amount of land given up in 
Indian Territory, and 160 acres of land along with citizenship for Cherokees who desired to 
remain to remain in the states where they resided. The granting of citizenship and land to those 
who remained was struck by President Jackson, and the treaty was sent to Congress, where it was 
ratified on May 23, 1836 (Perdue and Green 2005).  
 The Ridge party became the treaty party, and they were considered by many to be traitors 
of the Cherokee people, the majority of whom were outraged and opposed to removal.  The 
treaty party and those who volunteered to leave left with government support in the two years 
following the signing of the treaty. In 1838, the Army was deployed, and forced removal began.  
Over the course of three weeks, thousands of Cherokees were removed from their homes at 
gunpoint and forced into concentration camps in Tennessee and Alabama. Evan Jones, a Baptist 
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missionary who worked among Cherokees in North Carolina, accompanied the Cherokees he 
worked with as they were removed from their homes and sent westward. In his letters from May 
to December of 1838, he recalls what happened around him. In his letter on June 16th, writing 
from Camp Hetzel, near Cleveland, he speaks on the horrors that have been enacted on the 
Cherokees at the hands of the United States:  
The Cherokees are nearly all prisoners. They have been dragged from their houses and 
encamped at the forts and military posts, all over the nation. In Georgia, especially, 
multitudes were allowed no time to take any thing with them, except the clothes they had 
on…The property of many has been taken, and sold before their eyes for almost nothing 
– the sellers and buyers, in many cases, being combined to cheat the poor Indians… 
Many of the Cherokees, who, a few days ago, were in comfortable circumstances, are 
now victims of abject poverty. Some, who have been allowed to return home, under 
passport, to inquire after their property, have found their cattle, horses, swine, farming-
tools, and house furniture all gone. And this is not a description of extreme cases. It is 
altogether a faint representation of the work which has been perpetrated on the 
unoffending, unarmed and unresisting Cherokees. (Perdue and Green 2005, 172). 
Although he is writing from the group of Cherokees that he accompanied during the Army-led 
removals of 1838, Jones goes to great length to document the abuses experienced and their 
normalcy. Of the 2,836 Cherokees who departed in the four groups led by the U.S. Army, 1854 
are documented to have arrived, with the second group’s arrival being undocumented. After 
these groups were removed, General Scott ordered the suspension of removal efforts and 
awarded a contract to Principal Chief Ross to remove the remaining Cherokees.  
 Principal Chief Ross organized removal in the form of 12 wagon trains, led by full-blood 
tribal leaders or educated mixed-bloods. Each train was assigned physicians, interpreters, 
commissaries, wagon masters, teamsters, and gravediggers. His brother, Lewis Ross, was the 
main contractor for furnishing forage, rations, and clothing for the trains. Although this was an 
improvement from the Army-led removals, estimates range from 2000 to 6000 Cherokee people 
died, with 4000 being the most accepted estimate (Perdue and Green 2005). They left in the fall 
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after the severe heat and drought of the summer of 1838 had passed. More than one Cherokee 
person died for every quarter mile traveled during the removal process. In Cherokee, it is called 
Nunna Daul Tsuny, loosely meaning the Trail Where We Cried, which we now know as the Trail 
of Tears in English (Perdue and Green 2005).  
 My great-great-great-grandmother, Nancy Hair, was part of the 12 wagon trains that 
came to Indian Territory. She left with her family when she was 8 or 9 years old (she was six at 
the time of the census in 1835) over the course of the five-month, 5043-mile journey from her 
homeland in Georgia. She lost her mother as she marched towards Indian territory, and her 
father, Jefferson Hair, embittered by the loss of his wife, was unable to raise Nancy, and she was 
taken in by the Brown family.   
Nancy settled with her adoptive family in Sequoyah District, Cherokee Nation, Indian 
Territory, just 15 miles from where my great-great-great-grandfather, Joseph Seabolt, lived, 
whose own grandfather, John Seabolt, had relocated to Indian Territory prior to removal. 
Between their two houses was the home of Sequoyah, a Cherokee scholar who was important 
politically and culturally, who created the Cherokee syllabary, and whose home served as a 
meeting place for many community members. Family stories often speculate that the two met as 
children in Sequoyah’s home during a community meeting. The two lived in the house Nancy 
grew up in alongside her foster mother, Susanah Brown, who was widowed. Nancy inherited the 
homestead upon Susanah’s death in 1866.  
 Stories of removal bring with them histories of loss. Loved ones, property, feelings of 
security, health, and more suffered as thousands of Indigenous peoples were forcibly removed 
from their homelands and relocated to Indian Territory. The loss of practical knowledge about 
how to relate to one’s local environment was felt heavily as well. The knowledge Cherokees had 
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about the American Southeast would not serve them as well in Northeastern Indian Territory. 
Thus, left traumatized and dispossessed following removal, Cherokees had to forge a new 
relationship with the land they inhabited. Indian Territory, later the State of Oklahoma, would 
come to operate as a distinct place in which meanings for Indigenous identity could be found.  
 In his ethnography Wisdom Sits in Places (1996), Anthropologist Keith Basso presents a 
detailed account of place-making stories shared across generations by Western Apaches. These 
stories act as a means of building place worlds. Place-making acts, however, are not detached 
from the cultural and social worlds that reproduce them. Place-making does not just reproduce 
narratives of how places are and how we relate to them, but it also actively revises them in every 
instantiation as the wisdom of stories and place come to relate to the present. Place-making, then, 
is not just a way of doing history, but “it is also a way of construction social traditions and, in the 
process, personal and social identities” (Basso 1996, 18). We come to know who we are, in part, 
through the relationships that forge our belonging not just to groups of people but also to the 
places around us.  
 This leads Basso to develop his understanding of sensing of place as a means of place-
making. Basso describes this as a kind of imaginative experience in which our involvement with 
the natural and social environment comes to appropriate portions of the earth (Basso 1996). In 
appropriating portions of the earth, it makes place-making an every day, non-mystical, 
reoccurring event in which subjects come to experience a relationship with a place. These 
relationships are themselves part of the process of sense of place and differ across the person. 
One’s sense of place is inflected by their subject position and is further changed to reflect their 
relationship to another’s. Although Basso does not state it outright, I find his conceptualizing of 
the sense of place to be important in understanding the way place-making occurs over 
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generations. As experiences and personal sensibilities to places are accrued by one generation, it 
is also passed down to the next, and so on. Our understandings of place are never solely 
individual but come out of those who taught us how to relate to that place. Honing this sense 
comes with time as one relates to a place out of their own experience.  
 In my understanding of what is now the State of Oklahoma as a culturally significant 
place to White Cherokee identity production, I focus on two narrative threads: the “official” 
history that encompasses policy and events that are often retold through the history books in 
classrooms and public consciousness, and the personal narratives of and from family. Familial 
narratives help ground a cultural understanding of oneself as belonging to a tribe (in my case, 
Cherokee), while the “official” history of removal, the Trail of Tears, the Dawes Act, the Indian 
Reorganization Act, and more all help one understand how the United States federal government 
has continued to implement policies aimed at assimilating Indigenous people. What comes with 
this understanding is that Oklahoma is not just another state within a union of states but is unique 
in the way it has operated as an inheritor of Indian Territory. As Indigenous people came to 
understand and build new relationships with one another on new lands, they also gave meaning 
to the places they were now settled on. Family histories give contours to the official history; they 
breathe life into a Western mode of history that takes for granted certain understandings of how 
people have existed, how they have related to the lands they inhabit, and how Indigenous people 






3.  The Dawes Act and a New Era of Assimilation Policy  
 The Cherokee Nation remade itself as it grieved the losses from the Trail of Tears and 
sought revenge for their losses from the Treaty Party, which led to the assassinations of Major 
Ridge, John Ridge, Elias Boudinot, and Stand Watie. All four belonged to the elite mixed-blood 
slaveholding class of the Cherokee Nation, and all were assassinated except for Stand Watie, 
who evaded his would-be executioners (Starr 1979). The Cherokee Nation was in disarray, with 
three distinct factions, the Old Settlers, Treaty Party, and National Party, all co-existing on the 
same lands in Indian Territory. The Treaty Party and Old Settlers had aligned when the Treaty 
Party arrived in 1835 and consisted of about 5,000 Cherokees. They became a minority of the 
Cherokee population in Indian Territory when the Eastern Cherokees arrived in 1838, numbering 
14,000. Principal Chief John Ross refused to recognize the Treaty of New Echota that caused 
their removal, thinking it would undermine Cherokee sovereignty and permanently separate the 
Cherokee people from their homeland. However, in 1846, Ross accepted the treaty, and the 
Treaty Party and Old Settlers accepted the Eastern Cherokees’ leadership (Sturm 2002, 66). The 
tensions between the Treaty Party, Old Settlers, and Eastern Cherokees/National Party reflected 
in part the tension between national and self-interest, reflecting the believed influence of blood 
on one’s connection with the nation. Full bloods, conceptualized as the Eastern Cherokees who 
held out in defiance of the treaty and eventually traveled on the Trail of Tears, were in opposition 
to the mixed bloods and “White Indians” (Wardell 1977), who were English-speaking Christians. 
Blood gave a means of interpreting one’s social position in terms of proximity to Euro-American 
society, but also one’s politics regarding the Cherokee Nation.  
 When the Civil War began in 1861, these tensions exacerbated as Stand Watie, and the 
Treaty Party supported the Confederacy because of their position on slavery, whereas Principal 
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Chief Ross saw advantages in aligning with the Union, although he stayed neutral for much of 
the War. It is worth noting, however, that the Confederacy also offered greater sovereignty to the 
Cherokee Nation, and Principal Chief Ross signed a treaty with the Confederacy in 1861, due in 
part to pressure from surrounding Tribes that had allied with the Confederacy (Perdue 2005). 
Principal Chief Ross was taken captive by Union forces in 1862 and paroled shortly after, and 
then left for Philadelphia and Washington D.C., where he would spend his time for the rest of his 
war. Stand Watie, upon Principal Chief Ross’s departure, declared the seat of Principal Chief 
vacant, assumed the position and replaced governmental officials with his supporters. Watie 
passed a conscription law, forcing Cherokees who hoped to remain neutral into hiding in order to 
avoid fighting, which left their families without valuable labor and led to an increase in poverty 
(Perdue 2005). Dissenters, however, met in council and continued to view John Ross and 
Principal Chief. Dissenters revoked the Confederate treaty and emancipated Cherokee Slaves. 
However, most would have to fight their way to freedom, as the 13th Amendment was two years 
away, and many slave-holding Cherokees would not willingly free them and had relocated their 
slaves to the Choctaw Nation or northern Texas (Perdue 2005).  
 When speaking about the Civil War, my great-great-great-grandmother Nancy would tell 
a story to her children and grandchildren regarding conscription while her husband Joseph was 
away at war. It is unknown if he served for the Confederacy or the Union, as family documents 
and stories offer contradictory evidence. Some stories say that he served the Union at Fort 
Gibson, others say he served under Stand Watie in the Confederacy (Seabolt 1982), and I have 
been unable to locate any evidence to support one more strongly than the other. Her sons, Josiah 
and James, were too young to serve, but she would hide men who were avoiding being forcibly 
drafted into the Confederacy. One day, Nancy was protecting three teenagers avoiding 
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conscription. They ran out her backdoor upon hearing the soldier’s arrival but were shot dead as 
they ran. Out of fear of being targeted next, Nancy waited several hours until the dead of night. 
Then, she and some of the women who lived near her harnessed their horses and hitched them to 
a wagon. Together, they brought the teenagers’ bodies to the Seabolt Cemetery and buried them. 
All that is known of these young men now is that one was named Rainwater, and the other two 
names are unknown. There are also stories of her bringing food to the young men who hid in 
caves north of her home (Seabolt 1982).  
 However, these stories of aiding resistance to the Confederacy contradict another part of 
the family history: the reality that Nancy and Joseph owned enslaved people. Although they did 
not enslave them after the Civil War, seeing as how it was then illegal, the family history speaks 
of it briefly and in a way that would have it seem as though they were benevolent. As much I 
would like to absolve my ancestors of some of the horrors of slavery, doing so would be 
irresponsible and, more likely than not, untrue. It is unknown how many they had enslaved, but 
Nancy stayed in contact with Rose, an elderly woman who she had formerly enslaved. I believe 
her last name was Walker, but the two names are brought up separately in the family history and 
without a clear connection (Seabolt 1982). She would visit Rose in Fort Smith, Arkansas, with 
gifts, often meats and other food, saying that she “could not bear to see her in poverty status” 
(Seabolt 1982). Not much else is known regarding Nancy and Joseph’s enslaving of others; 
partly, I am sure due to the desire of my ancestors to purge the family history of an awful part of 
American history that they had a hand in.  
 After the Civil War ended with the defeat of the Confederacy, Reconstruction continued 
to impact U.S.-Indian relationships well after it had ended for other areas of the country. Two 
influences, the Homestead Act of 1862 and its effects, as well as “philanthropists” who 
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advocated assimilation, would come to allow for the passage of the Dawes Act. The passage of 
the Homestead Act in 1862 gained increased importance in post-Civil War Indian territory, as 
lands ceded by tribes in negotiations would be flooded with White Settlers (Perdue 2005). 
Laborers also came to Indian Territory to work on the railroad system’s expansion. However, 
alongside laborers and settlers, many outlaws sought a haven in Indian Territory as they were not 
subject to Tribal law. This turmoil led to increased support for extending U.S. law over Indian 
Territory (Perdue 2005). 
 “Philanthropists” regarded themselves as “friends of the Indian” and positioned 
themselves as such. These philanthropists expressed great concern that Indigenous troubles 
would not be solved without U.S. intervention and argued that privatizing land ownership to 
individuals would aid in the assimilation of Indigenous people (Perdue 2005). It is hard to view 
their work as philanthropic from an Indigenous point of view then and now. The dissolution of 
Indian Nations at the end of the 19th century is in part because many Tribal governments rested 
on a policy of land held in commune. Together, these two decisions and their subsequent 
instantiations in various forms of legislation made the assimilation of Indians into the national 
whole of the United States the goal of State policy.  
 This had many consequences but is probably most easily recognized in the creation of 
allotments and establishment of the rules of blood quantum, both written into law through the 
Dawes Act, first passed in 1887, but later extended to the Cherokees, as well as other groups, in 
1893 when Congress directed President Cleveland to appoint commissioners for negotiating with 
tribes (Perdue 2005). This policy ended the creation of reservations within Indian Territory and 
the implementation of different provisions by which land was allotted to Indigenous people. The 
Dawes Act provided for the head of a family to receive 160 acres, a single person or orphan over 
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18 to receive 80 acres, and persons under the age of 18 to receive 40 acres. Cherokees refused to 
cooperate with the Dawes Commission throughout the 1890s. However, in 1898 the Curtis Act 
ended Indian land ownership without consent (Perdue 2005). In the Burke Act of 1906, the 
Dawes Act was amended to include that the Secretary of the Interior could force an allottee to 
accept title for the land and that with the receipt of land allotment came United States 
citizenship. The Burke Act, like the Dawes Act, was aimed at further assimilating Indigenous 
people into White society, using land as a means of citizenship (Tatro “Burke Act”). 
 Allotment land was generally not enough for economic viability, nor was the land suited 
to consistently growing crops in a volume that would support a family. Upon the death of a land 
holder, allotment lands were divided up amongst heirs, and the land became increasingly 
fractionalized. After 25 years, the allotment lands could be sold, and most were sold to White 
Settlers at bargain prices. Land that did not get claimed by Indigenous people through allotment 
was opened to White settlers, and profits were invested in programs to aid Native Americans. 
Since the passing of the Dawes Act, Native Americans lost 90 million acres, about two-thirds of 
the land that they held in 1887 (Washburn 2016). 
 Nancy and Joseph’s allotment was located in the Sequoyah District of Indian Territory 
but later was incorporated as part of Sequoyah County in the East of the State of Oklahoma. 
There they farmed and ran a small mail stop and way station on the Butterfield Overland Stage 
Line that ran from St. Louis to San Francisco (Seabolt 1982). My great-great-grandfather 
Josiah’s allotment was southwest of his mother’s allotment, with my great grandfather’s just east 
of his. However, Josiah and his family lived in the house that Nancy and Joseph lived in. It is 
unclear what happened to their allotment and its relationship to Nancy’s. Josiah married a full-
blooded Cherokee woman named Cynthia, and in 1875 they had a daughter. Cynthia died the 
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following year. Josiah later married Ellen Ruth Johns and had nine children, one of which was 
my great-grandfather Daniel Henry Seabolt.  
 Josiah was a councilman of the Cherokee Nation representing Sequoyah district from 
1883 to 1887. He served as a Sheriff of Sequoyah district from 1889 until his death. He also 
worked as a farmer on his land during that time. He is described as always working towards the 
betterment of the tribe, and to that end, he would tell the children to avoid speaking in Cherokee 
as English was the language that they would need in the future. Josiah passed in 1908 from 
pneumonia. Josiah’s story is one that reflects how even though he was Cherokee and actively 
involved in Cherokee social and political life, he nonetheless was impacted by  
 Unlike some of his siblings, my great-grandfather, Daniel Henry, did not get along with 
his mother. When Josiah died, he was just 6-7 years old, and at the age of 13, he left home and 
moved between his siblings, mainly his older sisters. Eventually, he left Sequoyah County, 
moving to central Oklahoma, where he raised his children: my grandfather Phillip Michael 
(Papa) and his sisters Anita and Diane., Having been under 18 and not an orphan at the time of 
allotment, Papa’s father did not have his name officially attached to an allotment, which meant 
that with the land from Josiah was lost after his son, Lawrence Seabolt, died in 1959, the 
allotment land was no longer within the family (Seabolt 1982). In the family document written 
by Papa’s cousin Jack, this fact is not made clear. According to stories I have heard from Papa 
and my mother, Papa’s grandmother, Ellen, remarried after Josiah’s death. Her new husband was 
a White man with children from his previous marriage. Papa had said that some of these children 
took over the land when Ellen died. However, this does not follow according to the record left by 
Jack Seabolt. Most of Josiah’s children had left eastern Oklahoma over the course of their lives. I 
believe that many did not wish to inherit and manage the land following either Ellen or 
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Lawrence’s death, as their lives were established elsewhere. My family has recounted the stories 
of this land, though with a feeling of unfairness, that something left family hands that shouldn’t 
have; specifically, it left the hands of Cherokees and now belonged to a White family.  
Throughout his 40-page narrative, Jack Seabolt weaves in and out of time periods. 
Oftentimes his writing left me rereading and returning as I tried to make sense of my family 
history through a new medium and a messenger I have never met yet am connected to. His 
stories are often oriented through his relationships to family and place, specifically the Seabolt 
lands that were inherited from generation to generation. For him, eastern Oklahoma seemed to 
occupy a sense of home. Despite the fact that he is writing after the loss of this land, he writes in 
anticipation of the annual Seabolt reunion, which at the time was still occurring and took place 
near the family land: “Oklahoma’s red clay soil is symbolic of the blood that was spilled for 
long-forgotten causes. Five generations of Seabolts are buried on that beautiful, forested hilltop 
above the serene, clear flowing Lee’s Creek. Our Cherokee fathers and mothers who endured so 
much suffering, yet trusted in the “Great Father,” merely lie in state” (Seabolt 1982, 34). Land 
and family have been made inseparable. The suffering of ancestors and family members is read 
into their new home, whose red clay welcomes the dead and provides for the living.  
Policies of assimilation enacted by the United States, namely the Dawes Act and 
subsequent legislation that expanded its provisions, have continually sought to integrate 
Indigenous people into the majority White body politic. Although I discuss the impact of blood 
quantum in later chapters, I wish to focus right now on how forced privatization via land 
allotments changed the relationship between Indigenous people, governance, and land rights. 
Specifically, by shifting to privately held land that dissolved Indigenous governments, the United 
States government was successfully able to alter the way Indigenous people operated as a 
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politically distinct group. Furthermore, this was done towards the end of extracting labor and 
land from Indigenous people in a way that would benefit the United States government, 
economy, as well as westward-moving settlers.  
In her book A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None, Kathryn Yusoff argues that the 
language and practices of geology occupy a central role in world-making projects, being used to 
define and understand ages of human and material history, often towards ends that the field itself 
does not recognize nor reconcile with. Specifically, the use of geologic knowledge and language 
in creating extractive economies does not grapple with the way it produces categories of human 
and inhuman and how those categories are reflective of the material relations of settler-
colonialism. Specifically, racialization itself is a form of material categorization that renders 
specific people (per context) inhuman for the purposes of extraction (Yusoff 2018). For Yusoff, 
this means that the processes by which gold is understood materially to possess value deeming 
its extraction are like the processes by which Black people were, and are, dehumanized for the 
purposes of extracting them as a labor source. This made it possible to convert gold into slaves 
and vice versa. The slave trade depended on the geologic language of humans and non-human 
and communicating values as such. In the present, her concern is with the way this language is 
used alongside the idea of the Anthropocene, as a distinct geologic age in which humans are the 
defining force of geologic change. This conception creates a false humanism, she argues, that 
obscures legacies of colonial relationships that have continually dehumanized particular people 
and have maintained unequal relations of power that result in unequal exposure to the 
environmental shifts that come with climate change (Yusoff 2018). Definitions of human and 
inhuman arise out of relations of power towards extractive ends that favor the dominator, who is 
defining these categories.  
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To this end, Yusoff states that “the semiotics of White Geology creates atemporal 
materiality dislocated from place and time – a mythology of disassociation in the formation of 
matter independent of its languages of description and the historical constitution of its social 
relations” (Yusoff 2018, 4). This is to say that White Geology espouses a false view in which 
materiality is not socially constructed and is universal. In a most sinister form, the failure to 
consider the way in which materiality is socially constructed allows us to overlook the ways 
people are dehumanized and made into material goods to be dominated and controlled. This is 
relevant in considering settler colonialism, especially in the Americas, as both Black and 
Indigenous peoples were made into nonhumans to take something from them. For Black slaves, 
it was labor, and for Indigenous people, it was land. This is specifically important in discussing 
the logic of race as it pertains to creating categories of human and inhuman. For the purposes of 
property and land rights, considering the ways in which spatial dispossession of land and the 
dispossessions of people as a form of spatial extraction brings clarity to understandings of race, 
materiality, and their intersections (Yusoff 2018). Spatial dispossession of the land refers 
specifically to how the land itself is understood as possessing valuable resources and how those 
resources justify the disruption of an ecosystem for their extraction. Likewise, Yusoff argues that 
the dispossession of people as a form of extraction can be seen as deeming certain kinds of 
people value for their labor and extracting them from the land they are on. In both cases, the 
extraction of “materials” from space is done according to (dehumanizing) discourses of 
materiality and value.  
Although Yusoff mentions the ways her conceptual framework interacts with Indigenous 
people, her primary focus is on the way it has specifically related to Black peoples. I would like 
to extend her argument to consider the ways that discourses of materiality and extraction are 
28 
 
applied to Indigenous people in the United States. Concerning the dispossession of land, settler 
colonialism is predicated on land being deemed useful to settlers' needs, based on an 
understanding of that land providing material resources that are useful in providing for settler 
society. This requires that Indigenous people are no longer on that land so that the resources 
benefit settlers and not Indigenous people. Therefore, Indigenous people are seen as an obstacle 
to obtaining resources and thus must be removed so that settler society can take full advantage of 
the land it seeks to obtain.  
However, I wish to focus on the unique arrangement that becomes clear when looking at 
the creation of allotment land. Although this new way of managing land and Indigenous people 
also gave large amounts of land to White settlers moving into Indian Territory, it also still left 
land in the private ownership of Indigenous people who “required” assimilating into the White 
body politic. The land left to Indigenous people was specifically so that they would become 
citizens through imposed land ownership and that owning and laboring on land would bring them 
closer to White society. As a form of governance, the land was a means by which the United 
States could impose its sovereignty over Indigenous people. Instead of Indigenous people being 
allowed to operate as part of a Nation that held its own land and borders, Indigenous people were 
dispossessed of the ability to politically organize based on the borders of the land that they 
controlled. The Cherokee Nation could no longer organize based on land ownership within 
borders but instead was fractured with the creation of private property for its citizens, who were 
now made into citizens of the United States.  
 Taking away a means by which Indigenous people could politically organize as 
distinct would not make them White, though. This is why it is crucial to look at the way land 
ownership and labor are reconfigured in the arrangement of private property. Lacking the support 
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of tribal governments and left to their allotments to provide for their family, Indigenous people 
either had to produce enough to support their family, suffer through poverty on their land, or sell 
their land to move somewhere they could better provide for their family. In most cases, 
unfortunately, the latter two happened. Allotments forced a labor relationship that made it easier 
for the United States to further dispossess Indigenous people through economic means. The land 
would continually leave Indigenous hands and enter those of White settlers. In both cases, the 
land was being used in an extractive way that favored settler society. It reconfigured land 
ownership among Indigenous people in a way that prevented large amounts of land from being 
unified under a distinct sovereign nation while also incorporating Indigenous people into the 
economy of settler society via land sale and relocation or production through their allotment 
land. The relationship to the land that defined Indigeneity was what made Indigenous people 
intelligible through definitions of materiality that constructed them as obstacles to extraction and 
non-members of White (settler) society. Indigenous people were to be made White through 
relationships of extracting land and labor. 
 
4.  Inheriting Land Relationships: Place-Making and Difference 
My connection to land starts with my grandfather, who I call Papa. Papa grew up in 
Edmond, then briefly Del City, and eventually settled in Moore, sometime around middle school. 
All three of these cities are located within the general metropolitan area of Oklahoma City and 
grew into larger cities over the following decades. While he was alive, Daniel Henry, His father, 
and my great grandfather would visit eastern Oklahoma often, going back to Sequoyah County to 
see his siblings, nephews, and nieces. My great grandfather would also take his children to 
Tahlequah, the Capitol of the Cherokee Nation, as part of their upbringing. This trip would come 
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to be replicated by Papa for his children and my mother for her older three prior to having my 
younger sisters and me.  
As I grew up, I learned about Papa’s life bit by bit. However, when I began to do 
fieldwork for this project, my early interviews at the beginning of 2020 focused on collecting a 
more comprehensive life history. Specifically, I did this to learn more about his relationship with 
his father. I had an interest at the time in masculinity and cattle labor and was keen to see how he 
and his father spent time together and what else he did in his youth. I knew he lived in Edmond 
early on, as we would occasionally drive past Russel Dougherty Elementary, and my mom would 
inform us (almost every time) that was where Papa went to elementary school. Not much is 
known of the two years he lived in Del City, and during interviews, he mainly reflected on his 
time in Moore. I would spend time with Papa about once weekly during this period of fieldwork 
from the middle of January to the middle of March when the COVID-19 virus started spreading 
rapidly.  
Whenever I went to see Papa, it was always refreshing to see the things that had not 
changed: the rows of round hay bales that I would jump on with my cousins despite Papa telling 
us not to, and the old derelict barn that I avoided going in alone because it seemed to be from a 
horror movie, dark inside even during the brightest of days. There was a small front where Papa 
used to put cattle at times, although now it is largely unused.  
That February, the yellow grass of winter was still lying dormant, and the cold Oklahoma 
wind was easily heard over the music I was playing as I pulled into the driveway. When I left 
Norman, I had given Papa a call that I was coming, and he let me know he’d be waiting for me. 
As I parked in front of the house on the gravel driveway, he was waiting for me in front of the 
barn door.  
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I don’t remember Papa being particularly affectionate early in my life, but I could’ve 
been taking for granted the affection he showed me, my siblings, and cousins. He wouldn’t show 
it in many ways, but he would always tell us how lonesome he had been for us. It didn’t matter if 
it had been only a few days, weeks, or even months. He always missed us and would never fail to 
embrace us upon our reunion. His hugs were nice, even if he no longer towered above me as 
when I was a child, and I now stood over a half-foot above him.  
“Well, how’ve ya been, Evan? I’ve been real lonesome for you, so I’m glad you’ve come 
down today. Granny’ll like to see ya too.”  
“I’ve missed y’all too, and I’m glad I was able to come down today!” I said, with my 
generally upbeat intonation, although I feel as though I take on a bit of a drawl in conversation 
with him. I often maintained this style of talking with him and Granny so that I matched their 
general mood. There weren’t many times that the two would show sadness or negativity; they 
were often in good spirits and felt blessed with the day, an attitude I found reflected in much of 
their lives.  
Their house is warm, even when it isn’t. The fabrics of the couch and blankets are heavy, 
textured, and dark-colored. The wall is adorned with many crosses, fashioned from various 
materials but mainly darker metals. The kitchen is the brightest part of the house, with its white 
cabinets and Granny’s antique scale collection lined up on top of them. Every time I visited, I 
would hear some sports game on TV, usually football or basketball, depending on the season. 
Occasionally an old Western film would be on instead, and rarely much else. Granny preferred to 
watch TV in their bedroom during the day, so Papa would set himself down in his recliner and 
enjoy the television by himself. When I walked in today, the house retained much of its usual 
warmth, aided by the unusually warm February sun.  
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“So, what would you like to do today?” Papa asked me.  
“If there’s anything you’re burning to do, we can do that, but I do want to ask you about 
your dad and your relationship with him.”  
“We can do that! Let me get this TV shut off, and we can talk over in the kitchen.” After 
shutting off the TV, Papa and I took sat on opposing barstools at the kitchen island. When 
talking to Papa, I usually start with a guiding question or two and then follow wherever Papa 
takes me during these long talks; that day wasn’t any different.  
He began talking about his early childhood. He remembers his family being rather poor, 
and they would do their own work on their house. His father couldn’t fit under the house to reach 
the pipes from the well, so he would have Papa get down there and do the work with his 
guidance. Being a young boy at the time, Papa was terrified of the scorpions and snakes that he 
knew were under the house, despite never running into one himself. At the time, Moore wasn’t 
very developed. “The section we lived in was two houses, maybe. Most of the people out there 
were working people, you couldn’t really say it was farming country.” 
Papa spent his leisure time in various ways, but he was mostly outside with other boys 
who lived around him.  
My dad bought me a horse when I was… pretty young, let’s see, now what was her name, 
anyhow? I had a horse, my friends didn’t have a horse, but I had another friend about 2 or 
3 miles, and he had a horse, and we’d go riding them horses mostly at night, we’d ride at 
night. We’d ride at night because it was ol’ country roads, dirt roads, and it was desolate, 




In addition to spending time with his neighbors, he would often go hunting with his dad and 
uncle in an area that wasn’t too far from where he lived.  
I remember one time probably when I was 14? 15? My dad got me some beagles, some 
little beagle hounds. And my uncle had gotten me a 4-10 shotgun, and boy I used to love 
to go rabbit hunting with those beagles, it was a lot of fun. I did that till the beagles, I 
can’t remember if the beagles got too old to go or if I got too old… 
His time hunting wasn’t his only experience with animals and the reality of death for food. His 
family would have different “adventures,” as he called them, and the task of raising and 
butchering chickens was one of them.  
“Living out there, ya know, we had different adventures like, one time we bought a bunch 
of chickens, and once they got big enough to butcher, we had a big day of wringing 
chickens’ necks and cleaning chickens. ‘Course, we only did that one time ‘cause my 
sisters, they couldn’t stand it - us wringing those chickens’ necks. So, as time went on 
and they got over all that, we got rabbits, and you know how rabbits are, they multiplied 
fast. We had a day of killing and cleaning rabbits, rabbits good to eat! We ate a lot of 
rabbit back then when I was growing up, I’d shoot them rabbits and bring ‘em hone and 
clean ‘em. Well, that didn’t work either. Sisters couldn’t stand that. Us killing them 
rabbits and butchering ‘em. 
Papa spent much of his childhood not just outdoors but intimately so. He would go out and 
actively become acquainted with the land he lived on and was, in a sense, guided by his father in 
doing so. As he got older, Moore would continue to develop, eventually becoming one of the 
largest cities in Oklahoma, with a population of just over 63,000. His interests would shift, and 
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he became more involved in sports. He worked at his uncle’s gas station, where he met my 
grandmother, who would come around and have him pump her gas a bit at a time so that she 
could see him more often.  
 After he graduated high school, Papa went to college in Colorado on a baseball 
scholarship, but after intense homesickness and watching one of his teammates die from getting 
hit by a baseball in the head, he returned to Moore. He began to work in Moore for the United 
States Postal Service (USPS) and continued to work for them until his retirement. He married my 
grandmother, Alice Jean, in the early 1960s and had my mother in 1963 and my Uncle Mike 
shortly thereafter. The two divorced, and Papa married Linda Miller, who we call “Granny,” 
within the following decade.  
 Papa got into raising cattle for beef through his new father-in-law, who my mother 
mainly called “Grandpa Miller.” He ran cattle himself and taught Papa much of what he knew. 
Papa got interested in doing so partially out of his desire to own land as his father had and 
because he enjoyed the lifestyle of raising cattle part-time. At first, he and Granny ran what Papa 
called a “primitive grocery store,” which sold some groceries, gas, feed for animals, and beer. 
When my aunt Staci was born, they sold the store and bought a mobile home and lived in it on 
five acres that they bought behind his parents’ property. A few miles down the road was a brick 
house that a developer wanted to have moved so that he could build on the property. Papa bought 
the house, sold the mobile home, and they lived in the house while Papa took off the brick on the 
outside and then had it lifted off the foundation and moved to their five acres, where he had laid 
a new foundation for it. He had to remove the bricks because the house was too heavy with them. 
After moving the house, Papa put the bricks back on the house, one by one.  
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 After a few years of living in this house, Granny looked at Papa and said, “We’re gonna 
build us a house. I’m not living in this place anymore.” This began the process of Papa and 
Granny moving to Paoli. At first, they lived in a little house they had bought in Paoli, and 
Granny ran a daycare out of it. Eventually, though, after two years and three weeks, they moved 
into the little house they built on their current land in Paoli, where Uncle Dan and his family live 
now, although they’ve renovated the place. Granny and Papa built a new house on the same 
property, further up the drive, and live there to this day. During the period that the house was 
being built, while working as a rural postman in Paul’s Valley, Papa began to build his herd.  
 His herd started small, with only a handful of cattle and grew significantly with time and 
is now small again, numbering less than 30, on account of his age. He would invest extra money 
in cattle, and when expenses came up, he would sell some cows. It wasn’t a big money-making 
project; he spent about two-thirds of his revenue on expenses. This cycle has continued, with his 
equipment progressively improving, and he doesn’t do nearly as much as he used to. He retired 
from the USPS in 1992 after over 30 years of service as a letter carrier and then did some odd 
jobs alongside my Uncle Dan transporting equipment to oil companies in Oklahoma, Texas, and 
Kansas primarily, but sometimes as far as Louisiana and New Mexico. After two years of this, he 
quit: “it got down to being about October, and I still hadn’t put no hay up, which I usually do in 
June or July. So, I quit. I was tired of the road and stayed home. It was interesting. Got to see a 
lot of things, things I’d never seen before.” After quitting, he “loafed” around for a while and 
eventually worked with a man at his church, Melton, on his cattle stocker operation. They would 
work the cattle, castrating and vaccinating them, since they usually came from sale barns or 
ranches where they had never been “worked” before. This is because stocker operations usually 
purchase cattle after the weaning period has ended, while they are still young, and work on 
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raising the cattle to about 650 pounds, and then they are sold to feedlot operations, the next stage 
of the supply chain. He continued to do this for five to six years and then quit when Melton 
passed away. After this, he leased more land, increased the number of cattle he “ran,” and 
worked part-time doing that. This slowed down as he aged, and he eventually leased less land 
and ran fewer cattle, and now he has a herd of about 20-30 cows, 10-20 goats, and some 
chickens.  
 Although the nature and scope of his operations have changed, Papa has nonetheless had 
attachments to land since he was a child living in Moore with his father. Prior to Moore, though, 
there is a long history within the family of living in Sequoyah County, just north of Sallisaw, a 
few miles from Sequoyah’s house. Even tracing back to Nancy Hair and her journey from 
Georgia to Indian Territory on the Trail of Tears, we see land and its grounding effects of both 
family history, as well as a larger understanding of how history has played out. History itself is 
constructed through a relationship to place, locating people in places within narratives of how 
things happened, to whom, why they made the choices they did, and what that means for where 
we are now, both physically and metaphorically. These narratives are not just constructed and 
maintained but also revised over time. Family histories become a way of understanding the 
relationships of socio-historical processes through narratives that have been used to locate 
themselves and their kin within a given place world. Place-making is not just attaching meaning 
to a place and giving it significance within a narrative but is also locating oneself within the past 
and present, and at times, projecting that relationship into the future.  It is simultaneously a 
spatial and temporal relationship in which beliefs, practices, and systems are reproduced, altered, 
and projected into the future or are disrupted to prevent that process. The future is itself an 
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important location for place-making and identity formation. It is an intersection for the two as 
relationships between people and place are projected forth.  
I find the Cherokee Nation Seed Bank to be an incredible example of the relationship 
between space, time, and identity. I was fortunate enough to interview Pat Gwin, the Cherokee 
Nation’s Senior Director of Environmental Resources, and Feather Smith, a cultural biologist, 
over the phone, as the Cherokee Nation was under lockdown due to COVID. The two work 
together in carrying out the operations of the Seed Bank, which works as a project intersecting 
goals of culture, language, health, and environmental knowledge. Both grew up in Tahlequah, 
although Director Gwin also grew up in Broken Arrow, a city just outside of Tulsa, Oklahoma. 
Both described their childhood as growing up outdoors, in environments that were rather clean 
and without pollution, which is part of what influenced them to get involved with environmental 
work as they got older.  
The Seed Bank started in 2006 and was originally a collaborative effort between the 
Cherokee Nation and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, although the partnership only lasted 
for two years. Inspired by the Global Seed Vault in Norway, Director Gwin began looking for 
seeds that Cherokees planted historically. In working with the Eastern Band and various 
Cherokees in and outside of Oklahoma, the Seed Bank was able to start and grow its collection 
of seeds over the years. However, the Seed Bank is not just a repository of seeds but also 
reproduces and distributes them amongst Cherokees. Today, over 30 seeds are offered, a mix of 
corn, beans, gourds, tobacco, etc. Seeds come from those that made the Trail of Tears with 
Cherokees, some were adopted upon arrival, and others come from the Eastern Band. In 
distributing these seeds, they serve as a means by which Cherokees can acquire a material form 
of cultural heritage while also participating in culturally oriented gardening that connects one to 
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being Cherokee in the present. In another interview with NPR, Director Gwin reflected on the 
relationship between Cherokees and plants, saying, “You can’t be Cherokee without Cherokee 
plants. And without Cherokee plants, there can be no Cherokee” (Danovich 2019).  
Many of the crops are grown in the Cherokee Heirloom Garden in Tahlequah, which also 
serves as a location for education about these plants. The garden’s signage is all in Cherokee, 
“their true names,” as Feather Smith referred to them, followed by their Latin names in binomial 
nomenclature.  The garden serves as a place for Cherokee language learning, but also is involved 
with the Medicine Keepers group, which is a group of Cherokee elders who share knowledge of 
plants, and their myriad uses, especially their medicinal value, with younger Cherokees and 
Cherokee medical students. The Heirloom Garden operates in tandem with the Seed Bank to 
reproduce seeds for cultural use, but also as a vehicle for knowledge transmission as Cherokees 
learn Cherokee, gardening, and the uses for traditional plants.  
Lastly, the Heirloom Garden and Seed Bank also work with community health and 
education so that Cherokee citizens are more conscious about opportunities for growing their 
own food and how that food can contribute to a more balanced diet. Demonstrations around 
harvesting and cooking what has been harvested serve as a mix between public health outreach 
and Cherokee ethnohistory. These events are oriented to both children and adults, as the Seed 
Bank and Heirloom Garden ultimately hope for Cherokees to being gardening in earnest to 
connect Cherokees to their culture and history and bring that relationship into the present in 
hopes that Cherokees use that knowledge to take care of their community’s health and education.  
The Seed Bank is an intersection of Cherokee persistence despite the effects, past and 
present, of settler-colonialism. In reckoning with the effects of settler-colonialism, gardening 
culturally significant plants is a means by which the past is brought into the present. Yet, this 
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gardening is meant to be a means of community building, knowledge reproduction, and language 
learning. In orienting itself to these goals, the Seed Bank and Heirloom Garden build stronger 
bonds between the Cherokees of today and their ancestors in a way that encourages a 
relationship with the land. Being Cherokee is constructed in the past, and the present, by a 
relationship with the land that is meant to be socially and linguistically known in Cherokee. The 
names of plants are in Cherokee, they are a part of Cherokee ethnohistory, and that is sustained 
today through this project.  
Furthermore, this relationship is projected into the future through efforts of education and 
inclusion of Cherokees of all ages. Land relationships in this configuration differ from the ones I 
discussed in the previous chapter. Instead of being oriented around labor for purposes of 
dispossession and assimilation, they are towards maintaining a long relationship that is grounded 
in social interaction and cultural knowledge. Furthermore, they are inherently agentic in nature 
as gardening is based on a set of choices aimed at Cherokee lifeways rather than being imposed 
upon via private land ownership. This has consequences in place-making, as gardening becomes 
a means of infusing Cherokeeness into land relationships. Framed within both biological and 
cultural knowledge, crops are planted in specific configurations to prevent cross-pollination, 
preserving the original breeds of the crops. Although practically useful for producing specific 
plants, it also serves as a means by which the Cherokeeness imbued in such plants is protected 
and reproduced, to be planted again in the following season. As a means of being Cherokee, land 
relationships are vital; they continue to breathe meaning into Cherokee lifeways across time.  
The land relationships promoted by the Cherokee Nation through the Seed Bank and 
Heirloom Garden are responses to the relationships imposed by the federal government in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, which were carried out to dispossess and assimilate Indigenous 
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people. Reconnecting Cherokees to traditional knowledge and practices as related to land, I 
would argue, is part of redefining land relationships as distinctly ethnic, and that the land on 
which those relationships take place is itself constructed as relating to those who occupy, extract 
from, or tend to, it. In expanding this from Cherokees to Indigenous people more broadly, it 
becomes a racial means by which Indigenous knowledge is promoted and disseminated across 
community members who have varying levels of proximities to knowledge and practices.  
Although she is focused on the relationship between architecture, technology, time, and 
space, philosopher Elizabeth Grosz provides insights on the relationship between the 
construction of a city and those who inhabit it. Grosz argues that a city operates as a collective 
boundary that takes (imaginary) forms defined by its inhabitants while also shaping and 
regulating the bodies of its inhabitants. Furthermore, this cuts across social categories of class, 
sex, gender, race, ethnicity, etc., as well as the geographic, economic, and political 
understandings of the city itself. This, for Grosz, means considering the ways that bodies and 
cities are “highly complex and thoroughly saturated with behavioral, regulative, psychical, legal, 
and communitarian components, nonetheless the corporeality of cities and materiality of bodies – 
the relations of exchange and production, habit, conformity, breakdown, and upheaval, have yet 
to be adequately thought as corporeal” (Grosz 2001, 50). In extending Grosz’s argument about 
cities to the formation of larger spatially defined political entities, namely the State of Oklahoma, 
I find her argument useful for understanding the complex ways that social-spatial arrangements 
redefine the material understanding of space. Because of land relationships that are themselves 
being understood as racially particular, space becomes understood as possessing a different form 
than it would have had had it been under different stewardship.  
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In considering my relationship with Papa, I take his relationship with the land to come, in 
part, from his Cherokeeness. Having been raised on land, with a relationship to the land that was 
inherited by his father and his father before him, I understand it as a generational understanding 
of the importance of land in maintaining a sense of Cherokeeness. Although cattle are being run 
and crops are not being grown, there is still an understanding of Oklahoman land providing for 
his livelihood. Furthermore, being Cherokee is a given; it is infused into his being and his 
relationship with me, my cousins, my aunts and uncles, and others. His association with the land 
as a Cherokee person taught me how I should relate to the land; something passed down across 
generations.  
Being in Oklahoma is not just being in any other state. It is the state that was designed to 
assimilate Indigenous people within the same state borders as White settlers. Furthermore, it is 
also in the state that Indigenous people constantly contest their legal rights to land, water, and 
sovereignty. Oklahoma has, and will always be, in contestation with the tribes that are now 
located here. 
For White Cherokees, this spatial relationship is in part reflected in their ambiguity. 
Being both White and Cherokee puts one at the intersection of two sovereignties, but one’s 
position is not clarified by simply being in Oklahoma or reckoning with the status of multiple 
sovereignties. Rather, I would argue, land relationships are a means by which one can arrive at a 
particular understanding of their position. This does not mean that having a relationship with the 
land through certain forms of labor (for social or commercial reasons) reveals one political 
orientation or another, but that land relationships are significant in the ways that those governing 
powers operate. Cherokees seek to reproduce a land relationship that is distinct from the State of 
Oklahoma, as it tries to maintain difference and refuse assimilation. At the core of land, 
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relationships are the ways that forms of governance are enacted and understood for people of 
different identities. Place-making is, at every step, about creating certain types of places for 
certain people.  
As I shift my focus towards social and cultural changes in identity thinking (Jackson 
2019), I find it helpful to illuminate the role of subjectivity, why I use it at moments and not at 
others, and what it means to consider subjectivity alongside identity. Jackson defines identity 
thinking by its operations: it binds people together into discrete groups, blinding us to the way 
these categories are constructions that have changed in meaning over time. Furthermore, he also 
argues that it is crucial to the administration of life by obscuring differences within groups, 
highlighting superficial similarities, and, for Jackson, is a precondition to violence (Jackson 
2019). Identity thinking is much more focused on the creation and administration of a group. I 
take subjectivity to refer to the experiences, that is what happens, within a person’s life, what 
they do, what they do not do, their regrets and desires, their conversations, and more, and how 
they coalesce around an understanding of a person, from both internal and external sources 
(Kleinman and Fitz-Henry 2007). This image is, crucially, neither defined by the self nor others, 
but is instead “encompasses all the identifications that can be formed by, discovered in, or 
attributed to the person” (Biehl 2013 [2005], 137). Subjectivity allows for a more creative 
conceptualizing of personhood than identity categories. Rarely, especially outside of academic 
writing, is identity thinking discussed as something fluid, non-rigid, and always changing. 
Subjectivity, however, is more readily positioned at this moment in time to engage in questions 
of stability and time. Furthermore, because subjectivity is at all times concerned with people and 
their experiences, history, and memory can be seen as fundamental to understanding subject 
formation and subjectivity – that is how one comes to be understood, from various viewpoints, 
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across various moments of one’s life, and what one does to challenge, affirm, or otherwise 
engage one’s position.  
In discussing history and memory, I find Kamala Visweswaran’s discussion on subject 
refusal in Fictions of Feminist Ethnography (1994) to be excellent in considering the relationship 
between history and memory, specifically as it applies to subjectivity. In recounting her work in 
India with female freedom fighters, specifically with a woman she calls “M,” who refused to be a 
subject of her research unless it was on her terms, Visweswaran discusses the relationships 
between subject formation and how that positions subjects within history and memory. M’s 
refusal did not take an overt form but instead was the result of reflecting on M’s dodging of calls 
and visits that were not centered around her current work running an orphanage. M’s refusal to 
be profiled as only a freedom fighter was, Visweswaran argues, part of her recognizing that her 
subjectivity may be used towards political projects that she would not necessarily support. Part 
of her emphasizing the orphanage, and the work still to be done after freedom, was also part of 
her belief that it is the responsibility now of the younger generations to continue the work began 
by Gandhi and the freedom fighters, to “carry out the task of social uplift left uncompleted at 
Independence, to fight against the graft and corruption that characterized modern India” 
(Visweswaran 1994, 65). What M does is refuse to have her experiences historicized; instead, 
she puts them in the present in the memory of Visweswaran, but in direct relationship to the 
future goals, her goals, the goals of Visweswaran, the goals of the children at the orphanage, and 
what she believes should be the goals of the Nation.  
Memory, Visweswaran argues, is what connects the individual to history. Furthermore, it 
is multiple, varied, collective, and plural, yet always individual. This relationship between 
memories, and histories, is what is fundamental to understanding subjectivity in my work here 
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about White Cherokees. Because memory is at all times multiple and varied, and never universal, 
and always at risk of being lost to erosion, distortion, mistakes, and even lying.  History serves as 
a means of compiling memory – rendering it “complete” and as a representation of a subject, be 
that ideas or people. It is a narrative by which we understand where we stand in relation to those 
that came before and those that come after. Memory, however, does not necessarily agree with 
history, it does not automatically validate, nor does it necessarily contradict or critique the 
position of a given history.  
Subjectivity, in the way I use it in this thesis, is about the relationship between self and 
other, and memory and history, and the ways these conceptions intersect with one another. The 
memories I have of growing up, of interacting with friends, strangers, and loved ones, have all 
shaped my understanding of Cherokeeness. Papa’s memory of growing up, his interactions, trips, 
jobs, etc., all also shape his understanding of his Cherokeeness. However, being outside of tribal 
borders and not participating in “traditional” tribal activities put us at odds with most 
conceptions of what it means to be Indigenous. If my memories with Papa are what connect me 
to my Indigeneity, what does that mean in relationship to the historical telling of Cherokeeness? 
Subjectivity and identity, history and memory, self and other, each of these give space in the 
middle where subject positions are contested on lines that are not always consistent. The 
parameters for their evaluation are constantly changing. This gives space for ambiguity. This 
ambiguity is part of how White Cherokees came to be, and with it, concerns about what 
Cherokeeness is, where it is located, and who can claim it are brought forward.  
 
5. Inheriting Cherokees: Biogenetic Models of Membership  
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 I was early on in my high school education when my mom and dad decided to have 
commercial ancestry kits done. Despite knowing my father’s maternal ancestry, and my mother’s 
paternal Native ancestry with relative certainty, my parents were nonetheless curious about what 
“answers” the kit would provide. They swabbed their cheeks, put them in the mail, and weeks 
later got an email with a link to view their results. My father’s profile came back as expected; his 
ancestry was a mix of Western European ancestry, with the majority being Irish. My mother’s 
test came back as expected as well to an extent, with the majority being mixed European 
ancestry and then a small percentage of “Native American” ancestry, about 6% or so, which 
corresponds to the blood quantum listed on her CDIB.  
 The number correlated closely with the blood quantum listed on her CDIB, maybe a bit 
more, but when confronted with the percentage, she had two reactions that I remember well. She 
did not necessarily argue with the science behind the test but was not willing to fully agree with 
it either. Additionally, she called forth the family narrative that there is more Cherokee blood in 
us than there is reflected on our CDIB cards. This narrative goes back to Papa’s mother, who was 
mixed White and Cherokee, but neither her parents nor grandparents made it onto the Dawes 
Rolls of 1906.  Our family already had legally verified Cherokee blood, but there is still a 
narrative of there being more blood than is reflected on documents. The missing roll member is 
not necessarily a life-changing narrative within the family; her being Cherokee or not does not 
change anybody’s identity. However, the narrative regarding her presence and her being the 
descendant of a Cherokee (or Cherokees) who refused to be on the Dawes Rolls reflects the 
value of blood in presenting oneself as connected to a Cherokee, or Native, identity. Legal 
recognition of her Cherokee blood would double the quantum of Papa and all his descendants. 
For my siblings and me, that would mean moving from a 1/32 quantum to a 1/16 quantum. 
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Although not changing our identification according to Cherokee Nation rules, if we were on the 
Baker’s Rolls of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, our mother would have membership, but 
we would not.  
 The way in which I interact with Cherokee and Native as terms is not the same. I use 
“Cherokee” to not only specify the tribal, national, and social discourses that are related to 
Cherokee identity but also to keep in mind that “tribal” identities are themselves separate from 
Native as a racial identity. However, the two are deeply entangled and thus can be considered 
alongside one another at many points. First, it is important to understand the relationship 
between identity and blood, as it helps foster a greater understanding of how national and racial 
identities are coproduced with racial science. Furthermore, the coproduction of national and 
racial identities is marked by strategic deployments of essentialism, the consequences of socio-
historical processes on membership, and political engagements with how ethnic and racial 
identities are narrated within historical projects. Altogether, these work to produce the identities 
that I am referring to as White Cherokees. White Cherokees, as I discussed in my introduction, 
are tribal citizens who can access the legal rights that come with tribal membership but 
experience differing levels of social and cultural inclusion in Cherokee life and often appear 
phenotypically White. This is associated with Cherokees more so than other tribes due to the 
Cherokee Nation being the second-largest tribe in the country, but also having notoriously loose 
membership criteria, both now and when the Dawes Roll was first created. Part of understanding 
how the position of White Cherokee came to be means taking into account the racial science that 
helped racialize Indigenous people in the 19th century and the policies of removal and 
dispossession that accompanied 19th-century racial thinking. Putting these policies into dialogue 
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with ways of imagining kinship and identity gives greater insight into how identities that are 
located in the intersections of race, legality, and Indigeneity are constructed.  
 I use the term “coproduction” in accordance with anthropologist Kim Tallbear and her 
use of this term in her book Native American DNA (2013). Drawing on work in science and 
technology studies, the concept of coproduction aims to represent how social and scientific 
processes are mutually constitutive. Society and science work in tandem “to reinforce, shape, or 
disrupt the actions of the other…” (Tallbear 2013, 11). Because power is also held unevenly, the 
social and scientific are often coproduced in a manner that reflects already existing inequalities. 
Blood and genetics are used by non-Natives to produce a biological imagining of what Native 
and Cherokee identities are and how they are reproduced through biogenetic understandings of 
identity, oftentimes detaching Native identity from the social and making it one solely of 
biological inheritance. This becomes complicated when we look at those who refused to be 
counted on the rolls, the Freedmen, and other subject positions complicated by the simultaneous 
biologizing and legalizing of identity.  
By “biologizing,” I refer to the processes by which a social category comes to be 
understood as rooted in biological processes. There is a long history of biologization of identity, 
but most notably in constructions of race that occurred in the 18th and 19th centuries. Racial 
science considered race a scientifically valid object for study and sought to produce it through 
various methods, namely measuring the phenotypic difference. This quantified difference was 
used to characterize racial groups as different on cognitive and civilizational levels (Abu El-Haj 
2007). Although my focus is not on this part of biologized identity, it is important to keep in 
mind the violent history of biological thinking and the way it is understood when dealing with 
blood quantum. Likewise, by “legalizing” I do not mean considering an identity legally valid and 
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permissible, but rather that legalizing identity means that an identity has been shaped by 
interactions with the law, while the law is influenced in turn by the assertion of that identity and 
how it is socially understood. I explore this concept in more depth in chapter seven, with my 
discussion of Jan French’s Legalizing Identities (2009). Together, biologizing and legalizing 
illuminate the intersection of numerous systems through which identity may be proclaimed, 
contested, validated, and authorized. These intersections are what produce the complex 
conditions under which various identities rooted in Indigeneity are articulated.  
 I turn my focus now on the production of a “cohesive” Cherokee identity, one that has 
been shaped since the early 19th century with the creation of the first Cherokee Nation on 
ancestral homelands in the southeastern United States. The Cherokee Nation was in part state 
and nation-building to survive and resist the United States, producing a Cherokee nation in 
which citizens were understood as distinct from the United States and mobilized in resisting 
settler colonialism. In doing so, the Cherokee Nation also engaged with two of the predominant 
racial ideologies of the time, producing a racialized nation that was predicated on ethnic identity, 
cultural heritage, history, and language (Sturm 2002, 52). The first racial ideology that shaped 
how Cherokee identity existed early in the 19th century was predicated on “race” as fundamental 
to the nation. Race, and racial metaphors of blood and kinship, could be used as the basis for 
nation-building (Sturm 2002, 53). The second ideology took shape later in the 19th century and 
centered around the role of blood quantum in defining membership. The shift from 
understanding race through the nation to citizenship through blood quantum is in part due to the 
imposition of blood quantum by the federal government. However, since the initial imposition of 
blood quantum, it has become a culturally salient way of defining membership by both tribal 
members and non-tribal members. Racially, and as a question of national belonging, blood 
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quantum becomes required by both governments and citizens alike in order to make claims of 
membership. Blood being necessary for membership, though, is not novel but has instead 
changed shape as relationships between tribal governments and the United States changed.  
 As the Cherokee Nation developed, preexisting systems of kinship, governance, and labor 
changed in response to changing circumstances of Native people in relation to colonial 
structures. Largely due to Euro-American colonial and cultural influence, the matrilineal clan 
system went out of favor, and patrilineal descent became socially and legally reinforced, and in 
1810 the practice of blood revenge was considered a crime against the nation, not the clan. This 
meant that revenge and recompense were arbitrated by authorities of the Cherokee Nation, not 
those with power in the clan system. Blood belonged to the nation and not the clan, cementing 
the role of blood in building a unified Cherokee Nation (Sturm 2002, Perdue 2005). This meant 
that crimes committed against one’s clansmen were no longer addressed through clan relations 
and processes of revenge or recompense; instead, crimes would be addressed through the 
governmental structures of the nation. This further contributed to the clan systems degradation 
within Cherokee society, and national unity became the preeminent way through which 
Cherokees politically organized. As a nation-building exercise, changing the way blood revenge 
was carried out helped cement the Cherokee Nation as both a political power through which 
Cherokees were now organized and a means by which the clan system was further 
disempowered. The disempowering of the clan system and the emergence of the Cherokee 
Nation were necessary for the construction of a unified Cherokee nation in which citizens 
imagined themselves as all belonging to the same group. Despite divisions within Cherokee 
society, the Cherokee Nation sought to unify all Cherokees to protect Cherokee culture and land.   
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Economic class created divisions in Cherokee society and was understood through blood 
as a metaphor, based in part on ancestry. Rather than being predicated on being White or 
Cherokee, it was instead based on full vs. mixed blood, with the former being of a lower 
economic class position than those who were mixed blood.  This understanding was further 
reinforced as plantation-based economies and the adoption of slavery spread through the 
Cherokees, which were favored by mixed-bloods and not nearly as much by full-bloods. This 
understanding comes from a full-blood point of view, as they often were more culturally 
conservative and refrained from participating in systems that were brought by settlers (Sturm 
2002). The 1835 census showed that only 17 percent of Cherokees had any degree of White 
ancestry, yet the slave-owning wealthier class showed 78 percent claiming White ancestry. This 
is contrasted with the 1 percent of full-blooded Cherokees who owned slaves. This correlation, 
although significant, is also by no means determinant and did not prevent Cherokees from 
participating, or not, in systems of slavery, plantation-based economies, or subsistence farming 
(Sturm 2002, Perdue 2005). One’s status as a full- or mixed-blood Cherokee did not necessarily 
indicate participation in planation-based economies, as many Cherokees still engaged in local 
farming and trading practices amongst networks of Cherokees and White settlers.  
The differences in mixed and full blood status become further clarified when we also 
look at how notions of “traditional” and “progressive” were thought of prior to removal. Being 
fullblood did not necessarily mean one spoke Cherokee, and the same can be said of a mixed-
blood individual knowing English. Religious practices, language, and general participation in 
Euro-American society were not determined by being full or mixed blood. Cherokee identity was 
understood not so much on the role of phenotype and ancestry but instead was impacted by the 
role of blood in proximity to Cherokee and Euro-American practices and society. Blood was not 
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equivalent to race but instead reflected one’s heritage and likelihood to participate in certain 
aspects of society but was by no means self-evident.  
 Indeed, kinship complicates the entire narrative of blood and race. The concepts of blood 
and ancestry contribute to a view of Cherokee identity as biologically bestowed but looking at 
kinship practices makes it less clear. Whereas blood and ancestry are something traced through 
relationships of birth and kinship via biological relationships, kinship extends beyond that to 
include those within one’s immediate social relationships. Clan relationships function as a form 
of kinship relationality and are a means by which Cherokees are related to one another within 
networks of matrilineal relationships. Kinship itself is part of what contested where Cherokee 
identity is located. As Cherokee and White society continued to intermingle, intermarriage 
became increasingly common. Within the clan system, those born to a Cherokee woman and 
White man would, through the rules of matrilineality, be considered Cherokee and belong to the 
clan of their mother. However, as gender roles changed through relations and impositions with 
the dominant colonial society, Cherokee men occupied more prominent positions in Cherokee 
social life, and concerns about intermarriage grew within Cherokee society. As the Cherokee 
Nation became increasingly centralized and clan practices declined in the 1820s and 30s, ideas 
about kinship began to change. In part, because the new Cherokee Nation was largely led by 
men, but also because of the changing gender roles, the Cherokee Nation changed laws so that 
children of White women and Cherokee men would be considered Cherokees. These reforms 
came alongside reorganized inheritance patterns, the creation of a national police force, the 
inability of Cherokee women to vote, and the abolishment of polygamy (Perdue 2005).  Blood, 
ancestry, and kinship were entangled with the clan system. As views of blood and ancestry 
changed to favor bilateral descent that came from both men and women, so did the ways in 
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which the clan system operated in Cherokee society. The clan system did not define citizenship 
as coming from a Cherokee male ancestor, but this changed as Cherokee society adopted ways of 
thinking about kinship from White society. 
However, even considering these reforms, historical views of Cherokee kinship persisted 
for a period of time. Once an enslaved Black person, Molly was given to the Deer Clan by a 
White man, Sam Dent, who had beaten his Cherokee wife to death as a means of saving himself 
from the law of blood being invoked, which would have led to his being killed in revenge. Molly 
was adopted in the Deer Clan, given the Cherokee name Chickaune, and became Cherokee, and 
was no longer enslaved. She took the place of the woman who had died within the clan. Decades 
later, the White man’s family sought to reclaim Molly and her sons and return them to a life of 
enslavement. Brought before the Cherokee supreme court in the 1830s, the court ruled that Molly 
and her sons had become Cherokee by virtue of adoption and were Cherokee regardless of racial 
ancestry (Perdue 2005). The ability of kinship to override racial ancestry complicates an 
understanding of Cherokeeness as located in blood and/or race. (Sturm 2002, Perdue 2005). In 
this case, kinship via clan adoption was prioritized over citizenship being bestowed by biological 
descent. Even though Molly was not biologically Cherokee, she was regarded as a member of the 
Deer Clan and thus was eligible for the rights bestowed upon a Cherokee citizen. This verdict is 
also compelling since many Cherokees were racially prejudiced, held people of African descent 
in slavery, and had even outlawed miscegenation with people of African descent (Perdue 2005). 
Kinship has been a powerful means by which people have located themselves in social 
relationships. In the case of Molly, we see how it even took priority over racial prejudice and 
moved towards valuing blood descent in the 19th century.  
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 After the Civil War ended with the defeat of the Confederacy, Reconstruction would 
complicate and have long-lasting consequences on U.S.-Indian relationships well after 
Reconstruction ended for other areas of the country. This included a statute that gave the 
President of the United States authority to suspend any appropriations (namely money and land, 
but also objects being sold or given to tribes) for any tribe if they are in a “state of hostility” with 
the government of the United States, as well as repeal treaties with those tribes. After the war 
ended, State policies regarding Native peoples changed but were based on two decisions made 
by the United States House Committee on Territories. With the 1887 Dawes Act, we see the 
federal government acting on the idea that Indian removal was not effective enough at dealing 
with Native peoples as a distinct group of people within the United States. The government then 
believed that new policy needed to be directed towards detribalizing and “assimilating” Native 
peoples. The act authorized the Dawes commission to “negotiate” with the Cherokees, 
Choctaws, Creeks, Seminole, and Chickasaws, established blood quantum, allotment era land 
policy, imposed United States citizenship, and overall would have impacts in the ways 
membership and legal status is conceptualized.  
The goal of detribalizing was to disconnect Indigenous people from their Indigeneity and 
assimilate them into the greater body of dominant society. Included in this was the distribution of 
property collectively held by the five tribes to individual members of each tribe. Assimilation in 
this context refers to the policies used by the United States at varying levels to incorporate 
Indigenous peoples into the national body politic. These policies were usually aimed at removing 
Indigenous people from their cultural practices, language, and communities. Although the Dawes 
Act, Dawes commission, and allotment are hallmarks of these policies, Indian boarding schools 
and the Indian Relocation Act of 1956 were fundamental to incorporating Indigenous people into 
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the United States culturally and linguistically. The act came during a period of “termination and 
relocation,” which was billed as allowing Native people to benefit American society as well as 
themselves by becoming “modern citizens” (Fixico 2014, 193). The Dawes Act and Commission 
was merely one of the first in a long series of legislative and policy choices aimed at 
incorporating, modernizing, and terminating Indigenous people’s existence as a distinct 
population within the borders of the United States. 
 Although the 1887 Dawes Act established an allotment land policy, outlawed Native 
cultural and religious practices, forced U.S. citizenship, and actively promoted Christianity and 
Euro-American values through Indian boarding schools. The Dawes Act established a 
commission that would come to define racial purity through a degree of Indian blood, understood 
as blood quantum, the smallest of which on the Cherokee Dawes Roll was 1/256, which is eight 
generations from a full-blood Cherokee ancestor. Prior to the Dawes Act, Cherokee blood 
thinking was not based on a quantified idea of blood through descent, but rather mixed and full-
blood status located in ancestry and cultural, social, and class practices and positions.  However, 
commissioners designated enrollment status based on appearance as well as an individual’s 
proximity to and participation in Euro-American society, giving full-blood status to those who 
were ”poorly assimilated” and mixed-blood status to those who resembled [W]hites (Grande 
2004). Those who did not meet either status were effectively “detribalized” and not enrolled, 
regardless of blood quantum or kinship ties. In contrast to the social qualities of the Cherokee 
concept of blood, the Dawes Commission institutionalized blood differences through a biological 
conception of blood quantum. Blood left the realm of the social and became a biological index of 
identity, which is required to claim the legal rights of being Native.  Accompanied by other ways 
of changing or challenging Native identity formation, the federal government sought to 
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dispossess Native people of their cultural lifeways to incorporate them into the American nation, 
not just their land. The establishment of blood quantum is clearly related to not only federal 
policy (and policing) of Native identity from a legal framework but also helped the federal 
government enact ways of forcibly assimilating Native peoples. This effectively created “pure” 
Native people, and all others had their Nativeness quantified via blood quantum. Although one 
could fully participate in Cherokee society and represent an ideal way of being Cherokee, they 
could be ½, ¼, or another quantum of blood, and thus regarded as less Cherokee by the 
commission. Racial science sought to create typologies of humans and human societies through 
the creation of different human races, often based on phenotypic differences. This was then 
understood as biological evidence for the differences between peoples and their societies. 
Because it is interested in codifying differences in the biological, racial science was useful in 
justifying the creation of blood quantum, as it collapsed metaphor and substance and became the 
essence of Native identity.  
 Based on 19th-century racial science, blood quantum was concerned with the purity of 
race. Rather than being defined as exclusive, it was inclusive; the amount of blood one had 
reflected proximity to tribal practices, culture, and more, instead of being exclusionary as a 
means of alienating an individual from White society by possessing any amount of blood, as the 
rule of hypodescent operated for African Americans. Blood quantum effectively kept track of 
how many Native people still belonged to tribes and how close they were to being incorporated 
into White society. In calling blood semiotic material, I draw on Donna Haraway, who defines 
semiotic material as “the simultaneity of both the facts and explanatory theoretical power and 
also the relentlessly tropic, historically contingent, and practical materiality of science” 
(Haraway 2004, 204). Blood operates in this manner because it comes both from a specific 
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genealogy of thought in which one’s status as mixed- or full-blood reflect their social position, 
but also because blood can operate as a biological material, valid in racial thought, in order to 
explain and position an individual’s racial status. It locates an individual in a series of biological 
relationships of descent that are understood as having different consequences on one’s 
relationship to Cherokee identity based on racial science’s notions of purity and a Cherokee 
notion of proximity and practices. Blood, as a material defined by racial science, brought 
concerns about purity, descent, and heritage into a public way of “knowing” race through 
biology. Blood became a matter of public concern and a means by which Natives could be 
brought closer to White Euro-American society. Furthermore, Haraway characterizes the 
semiotic material of science as revisable from both its practitioners and those it is practiced on; 
“what counts “semiotically” as inside and outside is the result of ongoing work inflected by and 
constitutive of power of all sorts” (Haraway 2004, 204). This is to say that the meanings of blood 
are negotiable by both racial scientists and Native peoples, as they are both directly entangled 
with the social and biological meanings of blood. Thinking of blood as a semiotic material 
allows us to fully appreciate the ways in which blood as material comes to signify a wide range 
of beliefs that are scientifically approved, be it through research that focuses on the ways in 
which blood works biologically or the ways it was used by racial science to consolidate identity 
categories. Blood as a metaphor for membership and kinship became something co-constituted 
as scientific understandings of blood and blood quantum were developed and deployed as tribal 
communities came to their own understandings of quantifiable descent and what that meant for 
tribal membership.  
Indeed, while the Dawes Act intended to detribalize Native people, as Tallbear explains, 
“what has happened in effect is a rearticulated tribalization of Native Americans in blood 
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fractions and through bloodlines” (Tallbear 2013, 47). In becoming a quantified measure of tribal 
identity, blood quantum gives Native people another means by which they can articulate their 
belonging to a tribe. Biological kinship is something measured, and one can pinpoint the 
ancestor(s) whose blood quantum locates them in a series of historical relationships to legal 
policy, cultural practices, kin, language speaking, and so forth. Instead of measuring an 
individual’s proximity to dominant society, it instead reflects resilience in being Native. Blood 
was understood through the relationships that produced one’s blood quantum. The ability to 
identify through descent (although not necessarily patrilineally) from one’s ancestors is what the 
implementation of blood quantum strengthened, and it allowed for tribal membership to be 
articulated in a way that is distinct from other racialized identities in the United States. To 
possess tribal membership, one must not only descend from an ancestor who belonged to that 
group historically but must also prove descent through a rigorous process that involves 
documenting one’s relationship to them, as well as their presence on a particular roll, as 
determined by the tribe one hopes to join. For example, one would have to prove a blood 
relationship to somebody on the 1906 Dawes Roll in order to join the Cherokee Nation, whereas 
one must prove descent from somebody on the 1924 Baker Roll for the Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians, and also possess a minimum of 1/16 blood quantum.  
In the present, blood quantum provokes anxieties in many culturally conservative 
Cherokees around the Whitening of tribes, as is seen clearly in the Cherokee Nation. Because the 
Cherokee Nation does not have a minimum blood quantum standard, anybody who can prove a 
direct line of descent to somebody on the Cherokee Dawes Roll can apply for Cherokee Nation 
citizenship. However, some on the rolls have as low as 1/256th degree of Cherokee blood, and 
just three generations of having children with a non-Cherokee later, descendants would have 
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1/2,048 degree of Cherokee ancestry (Sturm 2002, 89). Tribal enrollment has progressively 
increased over the past 60 years, trending toward a greater population of “White Cherokees.”  
Including all people with Cherokee ancestry, regardless of blood quantum, is controversial. In 
part, this is due to the widely held belief that one’s Cherokee blood quantum truly reflects 
proximity to Cherokee social and cultural life. Once again, blood is a shorthand for 
understanding proximity, though now it has been quantified in a manner that makes it possible to 
quantify whether somebody is close enough to be “truly” Cherokee.  
This is a question that is still being asked, without definitive answers, but the terms of its 
debate are written in part by the political history of Cherokee Nation leadership. In responding to 
a question on the institution of a minimum blood quantum, one Cherokee tribal elder replied to 
Sturm, saying, “I’m hesitant to say that, yes, there is. If they have a tiny amount [of blood], then 
they really don’t have a heritage. They know very little. I’m talking about 1/100 or whatever… 
They wouldn’t know their family or ancestry, and they’d know little about their culture or 
language” (Sturm 2002, 98). Blood quantum is be understood by many Cherokees as reflecting 
not only a degree of separation from a full-blooded Cherokee ancestor but also the cultural 
knowledge of being Cherokee as well, a view that Sturm indicates is commonplace among 
Cherokees embedded in Cherokee Nation social and cultural life with culturally conservative 
views. This understanding does not come from a belief in blood and blood quantum alone; after 
its reinstitution in 1948 and until 1985, the Cherokee Nation was being run by Cherokee tribal 
members who were initially appointed by the federal government and possessed a small fraction 
of Cherokee blood. During that period, Principal Chief Keller (1949-1975) and Principal Chief 
Swimmer (1979-1985) and their administrations were generally thought of by citizens as White 
men running the Cherokee Nation (Sturm 2002). This reflects a continuity from the Treaty Party 
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and during the Civil War, where Cherokees with small amounts of Cherokee blood, oriented 
towards White society, were in leadership positions of the Cherokee Nation. This meant that 
Cherokees associated a lower blood quantum with proximity to and participation in White 
society in a way that was not reflective of many Cherokee's realities as racially Native people, 
who participated in Cherokee social and cultural life.  
However, one’s degree of separation ancestrally does not necessarily mean one has been 
removed from cultural centers of Cherokeeness, where people become Cherokee socially and 
culturally. Blood quantum alone does not define Cherokee identity but rather occupies a 
semiotic-material space in which it is understood as being the location of a Cherokee essence. 
These meanings often coalesce around what blood quantum does for preserving Cherokeeness 
across generations and what must be done to protect and advocate for Cherokee cultural 
citizenship. The US census reveals a trend of increasing numbers of US citizens identifying 
themselves as Cherokee; since 1970, the Cherokee Nation has grown from 40,000 members to 
almost 400,000, with the majority of new enrollments being those considered White Cherokees, 
as indicated by the ever-smaller average blood quantum. White Cherokees come to be 
understood as members who lack the stakes in Cherokee identity that those who are embedded in 
Cherokee social and cultural life have. As Cherokees have incorporated into the dominant White 
society, they occupied the margins of Cherokee society, and at times were not even thought of as 
Cherokee at all, despite legal membership. Concerns around Whitening also consider the ways in 
which the Whiteness of White Cherokees threatens the cultural integrity of difference that the 
Cherokee Nation occupies, which is something that validates the presence of a sovereign nation 
within the borders of the United States. Therefore, concerns about White Cherokees are not just 
about cultural membership criteria but also about how sovereignty can be maintained when so 
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many members are only legally recognized as members and are not necessarily invested in the 
cultural and legal sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation.  
As concerns over descent, Whitening, and cultural citizenship unfold, they must also be 
put into dialogue with the benefits of having so many enrolled Cherokees, even if the majority 
are understood as White due to appearing White, passing as White, or possessing a low blood 
quantum.  Chief among these benefits is the greater amount of federal money that comes with 
more tribal members. A larger amount of money means that the benefits for all tribal members 
increase, including the improvement of tribal services. For Cherokees, this has meant that there 
were more funds to preserve and promote Cherokee culture. The decision to preserve Cherokee 
cultural patrimony is directly related to allowing the enrollment of White Cherokees; “If the 
Nation cannot remain biologically and racially Cherokee, then it is even more essential that it 
remain culturally Cherokee” (Sturm 2002). The presence of White Cherokees is necessary to 
preserve the cultural Cherokeeness from which they are believed to be detached. Ironically, 
because there are so many White Cherokees, Cherokeeness may be better preserved via efforts 
directed at Cherokee language promotion, tribal health provisions, and other efforts at cultural 
preservation and promotion, regardless of whether White Cherokees participate in these 
endeavors. 
 Although the racial science behind the idea of blood quantum has fallen out of favor 
scientifically, it still occupies a powerful position in Native spaces. Likewise, the dramatic 
developments in the field of genetics in the 20th century provided new avenues for understanding 
biogenetic inheritance along racial lines. Blood quantum finds its successor in the idea of percent 
genetic inheritance, allowing new ways of imagining and forging connections to Nativeness to 
emerge. DNA tests are now being used to do what blood quantum once did, which is locate 
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ancestry in the realm of biology; however, their applications have been much more symbolic 
than scientific. Although these connections are largely symbolic in nature, they nonetheless are 
powerful as everyday people try to connect themselves to Nativeness in a manner that they 
believe is biologically credible, even though the concept of biological race does not hold up 
scientifically (Tallbear 2013).  
Tallbear traces the emergence of the idea of Native DNA as a socially meaningful way of 
proving ancestry in the social field in which it is deployed, that is, as a new way of thinking 
about kinship and biogenetic inheritance, picking up where blood and blood quantum left off. 
But also as a way of imagining the workings of molecular anthropology. Molecular anthropology 
has become understood by the general public as a field that is capable of creating bonds between 
social categories and one’s biological inheritance and revealing that “truth” to an individual 
through DNA testing. Part of the issue lies in how genetic information is believed to work by the 
public; the fallacy of DNA to RNA to protein production as a linear causality has produced a 
sense of determinism in how people operate and historically operated. Genetic material 
(deoxyribonucleic acid, DNA) is transported as a single strand of messenger ribonucleic acid 
(compared to the two strands of DNA), RNA, to mitochondria, which then read the genetic 
material that was transported so that it can produce proteins. The general public imagines 
genomes to be 1:1 relationship in which there is a traceable lineage of genetic sequences that 
produce the same thing in each body. Furthermore, this production is inherited from one’s 
parents. Although an admixture of parental genetic material, it is still believed that sections of 
who one is can be traced to one’s biological ancestors.  Like blood, the logic of linear causality 
in popular notions of genetics, that is, uninterrupted production in which one source can only 
cause one effect, seeks to operationalize biology as determining which identity positions one can 
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take. Our genotype is produced through the admixing of our parent’s genetic material, and theirs 
from their parents, and so on. However, if we view this as unidirectional influence, we prevent 
ourselves from considering the role of environments (at both the cellular and multicellular level) 
that influence the activation of certain genes, as well as mutations and their effects (Tallbear 
2013, 39). This logic lends itself to thinking of “pure” Native ancestors to whom we can trace 
our biological lineage and that their genetic information was reproduced unchanged over time. In 
considering the environmental and mutational effects, it becomes much harder to imagine any 
kind of pure genetic sequence onto which an identity may be projected.  
Unlike blood thinking, genetic thinking has to do with genetic markers that are 
identifiable in an individual’s genome that have been associated with certain racialized groups, 
such as Native people. However, it is clear that this technology is unable to isolate any kind of 
marker that indicates a tribal ancestor, only the possibility of Native ancestry. This is different 
from blood, which carries with it tribal and racial meanings. Conflating the two also projects 
genetic thinking into the past, where it was not known nor deployed in understanding ancestry 
and membership. If we project this kind of thinking into the past, it validates contemporary 
efforts at making genetic information valid for membership and further complicates debates 
about membership criteria in ways that may undermine sovereignty. Furthermore, blood has 
some basis in the way Native people imagine themselves and their kin. As Tallbear says, 
“[w]hen I cite those fractions, I think of my grandparents and great-grandparents. I remember 
their names and their parents’ and grandparents’ names. I remember how through both 
dispossession and restricted choices, they came to be on the particular reservations now denoted 
in my blood quantum fractions” (Tallbear 2013, 64).  
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Like Tallbear, I associate my blood quantum with my grandfather, his stories and how he 
locates being Cherokee in his blood, in his parents’ blood, as well as in the specific instances 
when he connects what he does and how he is to the way he imagines being Cherokee should be. 
He does not locate his Cherokeeness in a gene or in his belonging to a certain population 
possessing a kind of haplotype. Blood talk is powerful for representing one’s relationship with 
kin and locating oneself within narratives of removal, dispossession, and genocide. Locating 
oneself in these networks, social processes, and kin helps explain the felt attachments to identity, 
yet also creates anxieties around who is claiming these identities, something I explore in more 
depth later when I discuss Sturm’s work on those she calls “race-shifters,” and Naomi Leite’s 
insights working with those claiming an “urban Marrano” identity in Portugal.  
 Nevertheless, genetic testing is still an important way that people vocalize and understand 
their connections to Native and tribal identities. Part of identifying “Native DNA” is isolating 
sections of the genome and attributing them to a particular racialized population of people. DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) is a molecule that is made up of two polynucleotide chains that form a 
double helix. This double helix carries in it the genetic instructions for the growth, development, 
functioning, and reproduction of all known organisms and some viruses. Each strand of the 
double helix is composed of a series of nucleotides that are made from deoxyribose (a sugar), a 
phosphate group, and a nucleobase of cytosine, guanine, adenine, or thymine. What genetic 
testing does is seek to match series of nucleotides to series that are more prevalent among certain 
populations. There are not unique markers of certain populations, but rather ancestry markers of 
interests occur in differing frequencies in different populations (Tallbear 2013, 82). If we take 
genetic markers to be unique to a population, we grossly oversimplify the relationship between 
genetics and human existence. This gets further complicated by the belief that as data samples 
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grow, the ability to pinpoint genetic markers of tribes may be possible. What this does is 
oversimplify not only human-genome relationships but also the socio-historical processes by 
which tribes have come to set their own membership criteria, which has changed over time. The 
presence of blood quantum minima, originally imposed through colonial order but nonetheless 
altered by tribes to their definition of membership, as well as the incorporation of spouses or 
adopted children into the citizenry of a tribe, reflect that a tribe is, although strongly associated 
with a biological link to a tribal member, may not be necessary for membership. Furthermore, 
many Native people have ancestry in multiple tribes, and the presumption that one can be 
isolated as belonging purely to one tribe is not how tribal membership has worked historically 
nor in the present. Genetic work that presumes the existence of Native DNA and isolates it 
identifies sections of genetic coding as belonging predominantly to a certain group. Likewise, if 
one were to isolate a section of genetic coding as belonging to a tribe, this would collapse legal, 
social, and biological notions of membership, each with complex social and legal histories that 
are also full of contradictions, into one neat sequence of guanine, adenine, cytosine, and thymine.  
 The availability of this kind of ancestry “testing,” so to speak, has opened the possibility 
of gaining legal enrollment in a tribe through genetic testing, although, in most tribes, genetic 
evidence of Native ancestry is not considered evidence for claims (Tallbear 2013). Although 
Tallbear critiques the practices of genetic scientists and the economic market for genetic testing, 
she also addresses how Haraway’s concept of “gene fetishism” is useful for understanding what 
Native DNA allows in identity claims. Derived from Marx’s commodity fetishism, in which 
objects become commodities through a process of detaching them from the social networks that 
produce them, gene fetishism similarly detaches genetic material from the social conditions that 
produced it (Haraway 1997). In the detachment from the social, commodities take on a mystical, 
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almost autonomous quality that removes the consumer from the production of the commodity, 
and in turn, the laborer from their fruits (Marx 1978). Haraway’s gene fetishism critiques the 
objectification of the gene, detaching it from the human and nonhuman actors who contributed to 
it and imbuing it with a particular set of meanings – detached from those that produced it 
(Haraway 1997). What gene fetishism does is effectively allow for identity to be displaced from 
social relations and instead located in biological reality, one that is constructed and presented by 
the scientific technologies that purport to identify those genes, and then racializes them as either 
predominantly, or uniquely, Native (Tallbear 2013, 71).    
 Ultimately though, what blood and genetics exemplify is the fluidity and resilience of 
definitions of ethnic and racial identities. The development of “blood politics,” from full and 
mixed blood to quantifiable blood quantum and their effects on Cherokee nation politics (Sturm 
2002), to the developments in genetic science that oversimplify human-genome relations and 
tribal membership standards, exemplify the interpretative space in determining one’s identity. 
The idea of being Cherokee and being Native have come to rest in the interpretative space that 
exists in the ambiguities of essentialism and physiological characteristics (Stoler 2016). Stoler’s 
conceptualization of the relationship between essentialism and physiological characteristics is 
embedded in a robust analysis of racism and how it is enacted, but it also is helpful in thinking 
about how Native identity functions. Blood comes to function in the way of an essence, as a 
“strategic inclusion of different attributes, of a changing constellation of features and a changing 
weighting of them” (Stoler 2016, 264). Essentialism can be used in a way to define an identity in 
contesting the colonial imposition of other identity constitutions; this is to say that essentialism 
can be used as a tool against colonial identity conceptualizations. Cherokee blood, although 
defined initially by Cherokees as full and mixed for the purposes of locating one within networks 
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of ancestry and society, was colonized by the imposition of blood quantum. Yet, the belief in 
blood as something that can determine one’s ability to claim Cherokeeness also reflects an 
essentialist view of Cherokee identity – one that is selectively deployed in discussing where 
Cherokee identity is located. Simply put, the idea of blood as membership is a kind of strategic 
essentialism (Conklin 1997) that locates Indigeneity in a rejection of the colonial model of blood 
as determining identity. Knowing oneself and being known as pertaining to a certain identity 
may, in fact, require a strategic essentializing of cultural traits to fit in with hegemonic ideas 
surrounding membership (Conklin 1997, Sturm 2002). Strategic essentialism differs from 
essentialism in that it is a politically motivated action to benefit those who are being 
essentialized. Although Conklin’s definition of strategic essentialism comes from the Brazilian 
context, in which Indigenous groups are pressured to maintain outsiders’ understandings of 
cultural “authenticity” in order to attain rights, it may end up forcing them to act 
“inauthentically” in the process of producing the externally defined authenticity (Conklin 1997).  
However, the selective deployment of blood as required is telling when considering the 
experiences of the Freedmen. The Freedmen are those of African descent who were enslaved by 
Cherokees and were freed upon the ending of slavery in the United States, as many Cherokees 
fought with the Confederacy and did not release those they had enslaved prior to the passage of 
the 13th Amendment in 1865. Freedmen and their descendants were listed as Cherokees on the 
Dawes Roll of 1906 under a section dedicated to the Freedmen. Controversy emerged in the 
1980s when the Cherokee Nation changed citizenship rules to require the presence of an ancestor 
that was listed on the “Cherokee by Blood” section of the Rolls, thus stripping the Freedmen of 
their citizenship and right to vote if they did not meet this new requirement. In 2006, the 
Cherokee Supreme Court ruled this exclusion unconstitutional but was overturned in a special 
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election that passed in 2007. In 2011, a Cherokee Nation District Court voided the 2007 
amendment but was overturned by the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court later that same year. 
 It was not until the exclusions of Freedmen impacted a run-off election for Principal 
Chief that the federal government stepped in. The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development froze $33 million in funding, and the assistant secretary of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs wrote a letter objecting to the ruling. The federal government, Freedmen descendants, 
and Cherokee Nation reached an agreement that allowed Freedmen to vote in the special 
election. However, this did not end the dispute surrounding tribal membership. Freedmen 
brought forth cases in federal courts in attempts to regain their treaty rights and recognition as 
citizens of the Cherokee Nation. In 2017, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
ruled in favor of the Freedmen and the Department of the Interior, which granted Freedmen full 
rights to citizenship. This was accepted by the Cherokee Nation, which amended the constitution 
and other legal doctrines to remove the words “by blood” in early 2021 (Kelly 2021). 
The idea of “blood” was deployed in a manner that restricted Cherokee identity to a 
biogenetic construction. This restricted Cherokee membership to those who could prove 
Cherokee identity through documentation on the Dawes Rolls, specifically those who had an 
ancestor that was Cherokee by blood. This restriction rejects any kind of social identity as a basis 
for Indigeneity but also attempts to make biological conceptions of racial inheritance part of 
Cherokee identity – something it was not historically. Colonialism’s impositions on identity in 
the past and present work to create instability in identity metaphors and categories. Identity 
categories are unstable because the past and present are in tension with one another. The strategic 
deployment of a blood-based identity, in this case, was done as an exclusionary act aimed at 
rejecting certain ways of being Cherokee along racial lines. The belief that Freedmen were not 
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Cherokee by blood, and thus not Cherokee, is not in line with historical parameters of kinship 
and belonging. Instead, it illustrates the power of essentialisms to be mobilized for both 
belonging and racism by the same people. The Freedmen’s relationship with Cherokee/Native 
identity is itself a reflection of the value of blood in determining membership, but also what 
happens when blood is not necessarily guaranteed nor enough, but they have a right to 
membership due to historical incorporation and, in a sense, a need for tribal accountability about 
the less desirable parts of Cherokee history: the fact of the practice of slavery by some 
Cherokees.  
 Unlike the Freedmen, there are those who claim Cherokee identity and seek political and 
legal recognition outside of the federally recognized tribes. These Cherokee-identifying people 
come together and seek recognition as Cherokees through governmental means, often resulting 
in the creation of state-recognized tribes rather than incorporation into a federally recognized 
tribe. Oftentimes, these state-level tribes consist of people who do not meet standards for 
enrollment in federal tribes yet nonetheless identify with a tribe. Many times, they are the only 
ones in their family who claim this identity, and they seek out those with narratives of ancestors 
and reclamation that are similar to their own (Sturm 2010). This is not a phenomenon unique to 
the Cherokees, although it is much more prevalent amongst Cherokees than other tribes. This is 
largely because Cherokees are understood as more phenotypically and culturally White in 
popular discourse, due in part to historical exogamy, a historical willingness to adopt “[W]hite 
standards of civilization,” and looser tribal membership requirements than other tribes (Sturm 
2010). Rather, many tribes have people who claim a tribal identity despite not being socially 
recognized nor enrolled. This creates tensions within tribes as the factors for membership are 
scrutinized by tribal members. What comes with the social professing of an identity that is based 
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in Indigeneity? Furthermore, it also begs the question of what identity reclamation is, what it 
does, by which processes does it unfold, and how it is understood and legitimated by different 
stakeholders.  
 
6. “You Are, Because I Am” 
As he did every time I visited, Papa asked me what I wanted to do for the day, 
“what do you want to get into today?” In my typical fashion, I responded by trying to 
make myself useful, “I don’t know, what do you have that needs done?”  
“Well, we can rake those limbs over there. The cows are all down there and I would hate 
for the calves to get hurt walking on a sharp one.”  
“Alright, let’s do that then.”  
We began by getting the little green tractor. I was driving it, and Papa drove the 
ranger. I was not as anxious this time, I knew how to drive a tractor to a place without 
complications, or so I hoped. Once we got to the little area where all the limbs are, Papa 
looked at me, “Now you hop down from there and I’ll show you how I want it done.” I 
got down and he hopped on to the tractor. He shifted it from neutral into high, lowered 
the rake in the back, and then drove around in a circle. Simple enough, I thought. After 
his run around and dropping it off in an empty patch of dirt, he had me hop back on to it, 
and do a few runs. Left, left, and another left.  
“You have to be sure to pick up some of the dead grass and stuff too, otherwise the 
limbs’ll just fall right through the rake.” Papa’s voice rang in my head. I habitually 
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checked behind me to see if I was doing it properly, looking to Papa as well to see if he 
was watching me. He was walking around picking up some of the bigger limbs that were 
lying around that were out of the way for the tractor. After I went around twice, dumping 
the piles right next to Papa’s, he had me get off and showed me how to make it into one 
larger pile, rather than a long line of limbs and dead grass.  
“Okay, now go around another time or two, and make sure you get all that over there,” 
he said, referencing the limbs that were right next to the trunk of the large tree. I picked 
those up, and as I began the U-turn to head back to the pile, the tractor stopped. It 
wouldn’t move. Papa didn’t notice. I started troubleshooting, hoping to fix the issue 
before Papa noticed it even existed. Last thing I needed was him thinking that I couldn’t 
operate a tractor, let alone this little one. I could hear his voice already, “how am I 
supposed to teach you to operate the big tractor if this little one is already tricky for ya?” 
If I was not capable of doing something simple, why would he let me work with an even 
bigger and more complex piece of equipment? I raise the rake. Back up a bit. Try again. 
Fail. Adjust my angle, turn a bit to the right. Give it a little gas. Fail. Right as I gave up, 
Papa noticed. The tractor didn’t want to move. He came over and directed me on how to 
get it in to four-wheel drive, which he insisted would fix the issue. Fail.  
“Well. Let me take a look back here.”  
“You see anything?”  
I wondered if I should get off the tractor, but Papa would probably tell me to just get 
back on, he could take care of it.  
“Alright try it now” 
71 
 
I gave the tractor some gas, and it moved a bit. Papa moved around some more 
branches and grabbed a big one I had apparently picked up somewhere along the way 
and resituated it in the rake. He raised his hand, signaling me to give it some gas. 
Success. The tractor kept moving. The rest of the limb raking continued as expected. Pick 
up limbs. Leave them at the pile. Neaten up the pile. Repeat. After about 20 minutes of 
this, using the same signals as earlier, Papa motioned for me to stop.  
“Alright I think that’s good. Let’s head back up to the barn.”  
I drove the tractor up to the barn, careful to not go over hills that were too high or too 
steep. I remember as a kid being told to be careful of that, as whatever vehicle we were in 
could flip if it was too steep and uneven. It certainly felt like the tractor could, but it did 
not. 
Papa hummed quietly, thinking about what we should do next. “Let’s go clean out 
the chicken coop and then be done for the day. I’ve never cleaned it before, but I’ve got 
an idea about how to.” Papa then loaded a shovel, hoe, and rake into the ranger. 
Together, we put the wheelbarrow onto the front end of the tractor, and then drove 
around the front yard to get to the gate for the chicken coop that would fit both the 
tractor and the ranger. We unloaded everything and then headed for the coop. Papa 
handed me the rake and took the hoe for himself. He used it to get the chicken manure off 
the top of the nesting box, while I took out all of the other stuff in the coop, except for the 
boxes. There was one on each side. Once he finished the right one, he switched to the left, 
and I started raking the right side. Much of this went on silently, with us working on our 
respective tasks. After raking, I shoveled everything into the wheelbarrow, and then 
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switched to do the other side while Papa took a brief break. After everything had been 
shoveled out, we went to grab hay.  
“You think one is enough? Or will they need two?” I asked.  
“I think two will be good, give the hens lots of cushion for their eggs.”  
Back with the two squares of hay, we set it out in the nesting boxes. Papa began 
coughing at one point, blaming it on the small pieces of chicken manure that were getting 
in his lungs. I laughed a bit and offered to finish up for him. He didn’t respond.  
“All right, that should be good.” The coop had been completely redone on the inside, that 
is if you consider redone to be fresh hay in the nesting box and an absence of chicken 
manure.  
Papa looked at me seriously as we stepped out of the coop.  
“Evan, you should be honored.” 
“Oh?” 
“You’re my first grandchild to ever clean a chicken coop with me.” He laughed and 
laughed over this for the next 5 minutes, and I laughed with him.  
His health had been deteriorating over the past few years, but never to the point 
where he couldn’t get around. I think having me around has made it easier for him to do 
some work, and at times I’m unsure. There are some things he doesn’t let me do. Not 
because I can’t do it, or it’s that much easier for him, but I think because it lets him know 
he can still do things.  
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“Let’s go get this stuff put up and be done for the day, you’re working me to the bone, 
Evan!” He laughs, and I laugh with him lightly, and we get started on getting everything 
put up. 
 
As I worked with Papa, I felt myself reconnecting not only with my grandfather as a 
person but also reconnected with how pivotal being Cherokee was to understand my experiences. 
I had not denied being Cherokee, but I had weighed it differently over the previous years. I was 
focused more on knowing myself in other ways and did not seek to question that which I already 
knew about myself. I took my Cherokeeness for granted. Yet seeing him, working with him, 
eating with him, and just being with him served as reminders of my own Cherokeeness, 
something he saw in me and did not question.  
In her work with “urban Marranos” in Portugal, Naomi Leite chronicles the relationship 
between the Marranos and Jews from around the world. The urban Marranos are descendants of 
Sephardic Jews who were forcibly converted and who went into hiding when the Portuguese 
Inquisition targeted people who were suspected of practicing Judaism in secrecy. In the present, 
urban Marranos were often not welcome into the local Sephardic community and have instead 
formed their own community based on their experiences of being descendants of Marranos, their 
ancestors who went into hiding. In finding belonging in the present, individual relationships 
often served as the basis for feelings of affection, love, and nurturance, which led to experiences 
of belonging. Having been rejected by local Orthodox Jews because neither their distant ancestry 
nor their desire to be Jewish make them Jews in Jewish law, their relationships with other Jews, 
those who validated their experiences and desires, but also validated their individual experiences 
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and sought relationships on an individual level, not just communal, were made much more 
important (Leite 2017).  
One such instance in which these actions fostered deep feelings of affection and love was 
when given a chance to officially be recognized as Jews; many could not afford the enrollment 
fee for classes and services for teachers that would teach them how to properly be Jewish. Many 
of the urban Marranos found a closer relationship with Ashkenazi Jews and not Sephardic Jews 
like their ancestors were. This eventually resulted in urban Marranos choosing to create an 
Ashkenazi congregation, not Sephardic, which was met with controversy by tourists and 
outreach workers. Yet, they did not arrive at this decision randomly. When they began to create 
their own congregation, the teachers who taught them were Ashkenazi, which was in part due to 
the willingness of those Ashkenazi who accepted them. To be taught, though, one had to pay the 
enrollment fee. This was a problem for many, as they could not afford the cost of the enrollment. 
When they revealed this mixed news to an American friend, the hope of being taught and 
moving forward in becoming officially Jews, they were met with an offer of funding. Their 
friend, a New York Ashkenazi Jew who had formed close relationships with the urban Marranos, 
did not hesitate to offer assistance, as he understood the distance from Jewish identity that they 
felt as descendants of Portuguese Jews and his as growing up in a secular house. Their desire to 
connect was also his, and in offering to pay for their enrollment, he saw it as a way of supporting 
those he had come to see as family. This sentiment was shared by urban Marranos as well, as one 
member, Catarina, posted online: “We thank our American cousins for that [gift]. We call each 
other that, cousins, and we ARE family… We are theirs, they are ours, we ARE one in that 
which matters” (Leite 2017, 239). Their expression of kinship is not something based on this one 
instance but instead is reflective of an affirmation of a kin relationship that has been built over 
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time. This gift was not the first, but it was meaningful due to the context in which it was offered. 
Love, family, gift, and closeness are ways of expressing the deeper emotional relationships that 
they had with their Ashkenazi family, it was a way of expressing their bond and validated their 
reason for pursuing an Ashkenazi congregation, as this was just one more instance in which their 
Ashkenazi family had welcomed and supported them (Leite 2017).  
Their feelings of support are part of their understanding of this kind of affection as kin, a 
form of kinship that altered how they saw themselves relating to the Jewish world of the present. 
Even though their ancestors were Sephardic, they felt that they belonged with the Ashkenazi 
Jews who had continually accepted their claims to Jewish identity. After years of meeting with 
tourists, forming long-lasting relationships with numerous Ashkenazi Jews who valued and 
validated their identification with Judaism and Jewish identity, they found experiences of 
belonging in those relationships and decided to become an Ashkenazi congregation as another 
way of expressing that belonging. Belonging for them was felt in the interpersonal relationships 
with other Jewish people, a particular type of Jewish people, and that made all the difference in 
how they articulated their Jewish identity.  
My experiences with Papa operate in a similar manner. I am the descendant of Cherokees 
who, over decades of federal and state policies that removed and disallowed Native people, 
became distant from epicenters of cultural Cherokeeness. I find a sense of belonging in my 
interactions with Papa. Papa teaching me how to drive the tractor and rake limbs is not just about 
me learning how to do that; it is about the shared experience, the experience of nurturing and 
being nurtured. That experience is part of what connects us. In cleaning the chicken coop, we 
both grapple with the relative abilities of the other, trying to work with the other in a way that 
lets us still enjoy the feeling of being together with another to whom we are close.  
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The title of this chapter is derived from a memory I have of Papa. I am not sure when it 
happened or the exact circumstances under which he said it, but years ago, when I was talking 
with Papa, I had asked him how he saw me as Cherokee. It was one of the bolder questions I 
have asked him, and I feared I had hurt his feelings in asking as if it reflected a desire to not be 
Cherokee. Instead, I was met with certainty in Papa as he looked at me and told me, “You are 
because I am.” When I work with Papa, when I look into his eyes as he insists on doing things 
his way, I understand what he meant by that. I am his grandchild, though it is not just about my 
blood relationship, but because in sharing meals, in teaching me how to drive a tractor, he 
affirms our bond and in it the quality of Cherokeeness that is imbued in it. By teaching me how 
to do what he does, he also affirms my being Cherokee. I am Cherokee because he is Cherokee.  
Yet, such a simplification is not sufficient. Even in Papa’s affirmation, there is ambiguity 
in the perceptions of others. We do not exist in a space occupied only by family memories and 
stories. Rather, there is a relationship between self and other, of interior and exterior, that 
provokes my asking Papa how he knew me as Cherokee comes from this place of interiority. My 
subjectivity is, at all times, constructed by my interior and exterior.  
In The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. DuBois defines “double consciousness” as a state in 
which “the Negro is… born with a veil, and gifted with second sight in this American world, - a 
world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the 
revelation of the other world” (DuBois 1903, 7). There is a sensation of twoness, of being both, 
but one never fully allowing the other to be realized. There is a clear power differential between 
them though, that puts White Americans above the rest.  
In thinking about double consciousness and White Cherokees, mixedness complicates the 
matter even further. Beyond the physical appearance of Whiteness and a particular blood 
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quantum, there are still the cultural markers of membership. Yet, none of these are solidified in 
criteria universally accepted, and White Cherokees maintain a position as both White and 
Cherokee. In my experience, I would argue that double consciousness is not present in the way 
that DuBois defines it but is nonetheless helpful in thinking about how standards of membership 
and aspirations are related to racial/ethnic positions. It is not that I have White society telling me 
I am Cherokee and Cherokee society telling me I am not, but I am receiving questions of 
membership on both sides. My membership may be secured in some ways, and in others, it is 
not. Rather than existing as Cherokee and White, two distinct categories that are supposedly 
irreconcilable, I exist as a unified White Cherokee. This means I am located between the two, 
juggling expectations of membership to both.  
This seems paradoxical at first, especially if Indigeneity is taken to be inherently non-
White. Yet, in a racial system that has been consistently marred by racial science’s insistence of 
Whitening and detribalizing Indigenous people so that they could be incorporated into the White 
body politic, the insistence of being both White and Indigenous has always been a possibility and 
reality. Yet, this goes beyond racial science. It involves the social and cultural practices and 
beliefs that we hold so that we are differentiated from those around us. But it could never be 
simplified to one or the other. It is both, always. Subjectivity means locating identities within and 
outside of a person in the interplay of interior and exterior. Where one struggles, and the other 
seems overdetermined, the opposite may, in fact, be true. Only in considering both do we get a 
more complete understanding of the impacts of settler colonialism on identity.  
   
7. Legalized Identity: Racial and Tribal Identity  
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 In Sturm’s ethnography Becoming Indian, she offers an interpretation of the identity 
processes engaged in by people she calls “race-shifters.” Although she defines race-shifters as 
those who change their racial self-identification on the U.S. census from non-Indian to Indian 
(Sturm 2010, 5), she also uses the term synonymously with “wannabe,” a term that Native people 
understand broadly as White people who appropriate a Native (or specific tribal) identity and 
misrepresent both people and culture. For Sturm, race-shifters are not just changing their 
identification on the census, but they are actively claiming Native and tribal identities, despite 
not being enrolled or recognized members of a tribe. Instead of using the term “race-shifter” 
following Sturm, I will instead refer to such people as “Cherokee-identifying” people, although 
this phenomenon is by no means limited to Cherokee identity. Race-shifting as an analytic 
reinforces the idea of an identity transformation that can be completed, that is, that they can 
become Cherokee as a finalized identity rather than something that is constantly in tension as 
they seek to be recognized as Cherokee by non-Cherokees and citizen Cherokees. However, as 
discussed earlier, Cherokee citizens run the phenotypical gamut from “appearing Native” to 
mixed (with various backgrounds), Black, and even White Cherokees. Citizen Cherokees are 
also spread across the globe, with varying proximity to epicenters of Cherokeeness, that is, the 
physical presence of Tribal headquarters in Tahlequah, Oklahoma, and in Cherokee, North 
Carolina, where the Eastern Band is headquartered. Whereas blood, blood quantum, and genetic 
markers become the biologized material for asserting a tribal identity, in this chapter, I focus on 
the ways that social and legal contestations complicate the processes by which Cherokee identity 
is constructed and validated.  
 Part of my rejection of the term “race-shifter” comes from personal experience. My 
blonde hair, blue eyes, fair skin, and other phenotypic features would squarely locate me in the 
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“White” category of the American racial system. Yet when I was younger, I firmly identified as 
Cherokee, as something I knew, something Papa made clear I could not forget, and an identity 
my mother reinforced in her own ways. It was not the sole identity I claimed, but I was much 
more outspoken and open about this identity than I am now. In 4th grade, I first met one of my 
best friends, who is mixed Kiowa, Seneca, Comanche, and White, and who presented as Native 
and identified as such. His proximity and claim to such an identity are greater than mine; of that, 
I had no question. This is why he rejected my claim when I told him I was Cherokee. It took me 
time to truly convince him of my Cherokee identity, beyond just the legal fact of the matter (my 
tribal membership card), and to establish that I did, in fact, have some relationship to a Cherokee 
identity that went beyond loose ancestry and legality.  In hindsight, his initial rejection is not 
surprising. There are many people who claim a Native identity despite not being enrolled 
members, and because I was not phenotypically Native, nor obviously to Nativeness through 
other means, my claim lacked many of the qualities that would have signaled it as legitimate. 
Being dismissed as somebody who is Cherokee identifying, a claim to Cherokee identity that 
does not necessarily hold up to certain criteria of authentication, invigorates a sense of 
legitimating my claim to Cherokee identity through means like documentation, family history, 
and my relationship with my grandfather. Each of these things does something to validate my 
Cherokee identity in a way that is intelligible to Cherokees and non-Cherokees.  The ability to 
claim a Cherokee identity is further complicated by the presence of those who claim it but who 
are not currently incorporated into one of the federally recognized tribes. Federally recognized 
tribal membership provides a basis for claiming a Cherokee identity but is not sufficient alone, as 
I argued earlier when discussing the power of blood. Cherokee-identifying people complicate the 
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role of ancestry as a means of identity validation within discourses of Indigeneity and Native 
identity.  
 I wish to focus on two parts of Sturm’s discussion of Cherokee-identifying people, 
namely, the way they narrate their connection to Cherokeeness and organize into state-
recognized tribes. What each of these does is give insights into how racial identity and tribal 
identity are often collapsed, how reclamation of identity is framed and understood, and the way 
Native identity is strategically accepted or denied based on one’s ability to document or 
legitimate it. Rather than viewing what Cherokee-identifying people are doing as immediately 
suspect, I instead want to approach this in a way that does not contradict their claims, as it is not 
my role to authenticate, validate, or agree with the people with whom Sturm worked. Rather, I 
approach them with a sense of empathy, as people who are intelligible to me through some 
shared experiences in identity reclamation, yet I have critical documentation to support my 
claim, and they do not. This is not to ignore or forget that those who make this claim do not 
necessarily possess the biogenetic material that is necessary for such identity claims, but to 
instead focus on the theoretical questions that come when we consider these claims seriously and 
as deeply related to the ways governance and documentation are used to assess and validate 
identity claims.  
 In claiming a Cherokee identity and ancestry, the Cherokee-identifying people that Sturm 
discusses often narrated their becoming Cherokee as related to the fact that their ancestors had to 
hide their Cherokeeness. Racial persecution justified their ancestors’ choice to engage in 
practices that resulted in their passing for White rather than Native. Oftentimes, this was told in 
tandem with a history of local laws that encouraged such practices. These laws often limited land 
ownership among Natives, or in some cases, birth certificates only allowed for individuals to be 
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marked as Black or White, obscuring the presence of Natives in the American Southeast (Sturm 
2010). Most Cherokee-identifying people in Sturm’s account narrated these stories with a sense 
of pain, reflecting on the loss of kinship and honest identity proclamations for the sake of passing 
was painful yet necessary. Sturm questions why they did not think of their ancestors’ choices as 
“a case of fortuitous physiognomy that could then be exploited for social gain or financial 
necessity…” (Sturm 2010, 39). Sturm argues this is to protect them from claims that their 
ancestors willingly exited Cherokee social systems; this would make their efforts at reclamation 
questionable. Although Sturm’s ethnographic descriptions are useful, I found it interesting that 
many of her arguments about Cherokee-identifying people were framed in terms of their 
defending their claims, making it harder to disentangle Cherokee-identifying people from a 
defensive standpoint. Her book, both explicitly and implicitly, highlights the relationship 
between reclamation and distance, be it temporal, phenotypical, or geographic in nature, and the 
complications that come with reclaiming an identity based on heritage.  
However, connecting these distances and narrations to the ways Cherokee-identifying 
people organize themselves, we see part of why Sturm argues that they are defensive about their 
position as Cherokees. Part of her choice in using the term “race-shifter” lies in her argument 
that these people are undergoing conversions in becoming Cherokees: “once settlers, now they 
are Indigenous; once socially alienated, now they are part of a tribal collective; once spiritually 
unmoored, now they have new moral convictions; and once culturally empty, now they are 
fulfilled” (Sturm 2010, 86).  Through practices like using sweat lodges, drumming, participating 
in festivals, talking circles, and more, Cherokee-identifying people strengthen their identity 
through repeated performances of Cherokeeness (Sturm 2010, Butler 1990). Although Butler's 
argument is about gender, the relationship between interiority and exteriority that she describes, 
82 
 
drawing on the work of Foucault, is important in producing a coherent subject: “however, it is 
clear that coherence is desired, wished for, idealized, and that this idealization is an effect of a 
corporeal signification. In other words, acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal 
core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying 
absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a cause” (Butler 
1990, 185). In applying this to Cherokee identity, we see that a Cherokee interior is produced 
through exterior performances. However, because Cherokee-identifying people locate their 
Cherokeeness in spiritual and biological essence, one that represents a Cherokee identifying 
person’s “true self,” these performances are understood as bringing one’s interior and exterior 
into congruence. In this sense, we can understand identity reclamation as being about producing 
a coherence between a felt interiority and one’s practices and performances; the repeated 
performance fosters belonging not just in their local community, that is within their tribe, but 
also to a more ephemeral kind of Cherokeeness, something they see themselves sharing with 
other Cherokees.  
Cherokee-identifying people not only become Cherokee themselves but also become 
socially and spiritually connected through an imagined connection to other Cherokees, reinforced 
by those near them locally. However, the connection they forge is not something I refer to as 
imaginary in the sense of being false, but in the way that Anderson describes in Imagined 
Communities: “It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion” (Anderson 1983, 6). Cherokee-identifying people do not think of 
themselves as separate from those Cherokees with federally recognized membership, but rather 
as enacting a form of Cherokeeness that is intelligible to them as such, something they believe 
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connects them with not only other Cherokees in the contemporary but also those Cherokees from 
whom they claim descent. Their reclamation of a Cherokee identity is one based on racial and 
ethnic comradery, one that is extended beyond the borders of the politically organized tribe and 
directly reinforces their emotional, physical, and spiritual experiences of belonging. Tribal 
recognition is itself a form of political organization, one that does not prioritize any one way of 
being Cherokee, as seen in the federally recognized United Keetowah Band, Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians, and the Cherokee Nation. Cherokee-identifying people connect themselves to 
this political diversity by creating state-recognized tribes, ultimately hoping for federal 
recognition. This political participation, as well as their cultural practices, connect them to 
Cherokees beyond their tribe, to a racial and ethnic understanding of being Cherokee.  
However, part of what they base their racial and ethnic claims on are essentialist beliefs 
about where Cherokeeness resides – claims similar to those made earlier about blood carrying 
the ability for one to participate in Cherokee society and culture in certain ways, that becomes 
less possible as one’s quantum becomes smaller and smaller. These essentialist metaphors are 
not accepted as fact but are instead ways of thinking about how identity is constructed and acted 
on. What is interesting about the essentialism deployed by Cherokee-identifying people is how it 
relates to Tallbear’s discussion of genetics and Native DNA that I discussed in the previous 
chapter. The people with whom Sturm talked seemed to be concerned with the way that genetic 
material and blood operate as means of connecting them to their Cherokee ancestors. It allowed 
them to feel the sorrow of removal and the pain of going into hiding (Sturm 2010, 41). What it 
also did, however, was allow many Cherokee-identifying people to locate a Cherokee essence 
inside their understandings of biology; it allowed them to feel Cherokeeness through their body 
and spirit (Sturm 2010, 42). This embodied connection to Cherokeeness is what validated, time 
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and time again, Cherokee-identifying people’s claim to Cherokee identity. Where it diverges 
from some of the essentialist claims I discussed with blood, however, is that the felt connection 
to other Cherokees is in one’s blood, rather than one’s blood helping locate them within 
networks of experience, history, and place. Rather than blood acting as a metaphor for 
connection, it becomes how one’s identity is validated. The perceived substance of blood acts as 
a legitimator for identity instead of acting as a means by which one can connect to one’s 
ancestors, kin, and history.  It detaches Cherokee identity from the social and cultural context in 
which it is embedded and places it solely in biogenetic inheritance. 
 This can be seen as contradictory to their desire to foster a personal coherence through 
interior and exterior congruence. If the interior is all that is needed to claim a Cherokee identity, 
Sturm’s account makes clear that many Cherokee-identifying feel their Cherokeeness comes 
from their subjective interior and biogenetic inheritance, their practices associated with 
Cherokeeness validate their claims but do not produce their Cherokeeness. These practices 
validate and connect them to other Cherokees, making them intelligible within discourses of 
Cherokeeness and Indigeneity. What this means for identity reclamation, however, is that it is 
not enough to have biogenetic inheritance. It is something that provides the ability to connect to 
a Cherokee, or Indigenous, identity, but alone is not sufficient. One must engage in practices to 
bring the two into congruence; if they are not felt or perceived as having congruence, then one’s 
identity comes into question as socially disingenuous. Identity claims are about personal 
connections to a category of social experiences and practices. However, these practices and 
experiences validate that connection and make it socially understandable and acceptable. 
However, not all Cherokees agree on a singular way of understanding Cherokeeness.  
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Part of understanding the different ways of being Cherokee is also taking into account 
how kin networks are deployed by Cherokee-identifying people as they make connections with 
those with similar stories of hidden ancestry and White passing, and these people become their 
kin. This differs from citizen Cherokees who locate kin in relationships of marriage, adoption, 
clan, descent, and participation. This is, however, a reflection of the ways in which Cherokee-
identifying people come to understand themselves as Cherokee as compared to citizen 
Cherokees, who have primarily understood themselves as Cherokee since a young age 
enculturated with that identity. In this sense, it would be unsurprising if the differences in 
establishing Cherokee kin networks broke down as state-recognized tribes grow and have 
families participating in Cherokee identifying social life across many generations.  
Cherokee identifying people highlight the role of governance in authenticating identity 
claims. The recognition of Cherokee identifying people as Cherokee by state governments 
challenges the legal authority of federally recognized tribes to authenticate tribal members 
according to their own standards. Although there are multiple federal tribes of Cherokees, each 
one has clear connections to the federal government’s registering of Natives on rolls in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. Federal tribes, although possessing their own (limited) sovereignty, 
are themselves authenticated by the federal government. Blood quantum is necessary to prove 
tribal membership, not necessarily a racial identity, and I would argue a tribal identity. What 
Cherokee-identifying people show is that legal recognition is not social recognition, although the 
two are popularly perceived as inseparable. Legal and social recognition is important for both 
citizen Cherokees and Cherokee-identifying people; even though they are being authenticated by 
different levels of government (federal vs. state), their social recognition comes from within the 
tribes. Thus, the issue regarding Cherokee identity arbitration is not in the social recognition of 
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identity. Neither citizen Cherokees nor Cherokee-identifying people find their identity in the 
validation offered by the other. The ability to be recognized by the other is itself a power 
relationship that resides in authority to recognize, something that citizen Cherokees do not give 
Cherokee-identifying people. The tension in Cherokee identity instead is in verification and if 
somebody is truly able to be verified as Cherokee. Verification is derived through numerous 
criteria, but the ways in which blood as a metaphor is understood, documentation is present, and 
cultural practices are framed all provide ways of understanding one’s social position in relation 
to Cherokeeness. That is the way in which one practices one’s Cherokee identity locates oneself 
within a discourse of Indigeneity. The articulation of this Cherokee identity is distinct to those 
identifying as tribal members and those who possess tribal citizenship. The legal distinction and 
history of the two groups help highlight how social and legal definitions of membership become 
entangled and complicate what it means to claim tribal membership.  
Cherokee identity has become highly associated with the legal context in which it has 
existed since the late 19th century, due in part to the ways in which cultural and legal identity 
have interacted since the imposition of blood quantum. In considering the ways in which 
Indigenous identity in the United States has undergone a process of legalization, I wish to look at 
Jan Hoffman French’s work on “legalizing identity.” Before I get into the components in which 
her analysis is useful to discussing Indigenous identities in the United States, there are certain 
aspects to keep in mind, as well as the ethnographic context in which she developed it.  
French’s ethnography Legalizing Identities (2009) is based on fieldwork she carried out 
in northeastern Brazil with the Xocó, an Indigenous tribe primarily composed of African 
descended individuals that, alongside over forty other tribes, gained recognition in Brazil after 
1970 (French 2009). However, she also worked with Mocambo villagers who sought out 
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quilombo recognition. Quilombos are communities that were established by fugitive enslaved 
peoples who created autonomous settlements in Brazilian hinterlands, and today is a legal 
recognition sought out by those descended from those who lived in quilombos. (French 2009). 
Both Indian and quilombo identities are tied to a particular historical relationship to the land and 
are the basis for a unique legal status in Brazil. For example, the 1973 Indian Law was originally 
used to justify colonizing the far reaches of Brazilian territory, but later became the basis on 
which Indians were able to legally assert their right to be culturally different, and that entitled 
them to land rights on which they can continue cultural practices. Likewise, the quilombo clause 
of the 1988 constitution was originally considered a symbolic gesture towards the Black 
consciousness movement but later became a means by which rural Black communities could 
secure land rights (French 2009). In both instances, we see what French calls postlegislative 
negotiation. Postlegislative negotiation is a process by which “the impact, consequences, 
interpretations, and even the meanings of any given law are often determined only after it is 
enacted” (French 2009, 6). A law can be passed with one intent but come to mean and be applied 
in completely different circumstances from what was intended.   
In considering postlegislative negotiation, French finds governmentality as key to 
understanding its importance to her legalizing identities framework. Governmentality looks at 
the processes by which social order, or governing, is produced by actors that are not the state. 
This means looking at the ways in which non-governmental organizations, the state, public 
practices and beliefs, and private entities all work together to produce social order (French 2009). 
Governmentality expands the ability of the state to govern without being directly involved 
(Foucault 1977). French notes that, ironically, in the Brazilian context, this meant that those are 
seeking recognition as a quilombo or Indian tribe often were looking to those authorized by the 
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state (anthropologists, non-governmental agencies, the Catholic Church, lawyers, etc.) for 
recognition so that they would be recognized by the state. This effectively reinforced the 
Brazilian state’s power while also empowering the state’s ability to verify identity claims in the 
first place. In light of the way this legislation was negotiated after its passing and how that is 
related to the various ways that state power is exercised in Brazilian society, we see that laws do 
not necessarily have the intended effects. 
Governmentality and postlegislative negotiation are fundamental to French’s legalizing 
identities analytic, as it plays on the fact that how a legal component is constructed is itself part 
of a social negotiation of the law. Likewise, the social is altered by the presence of legislation 
and how it is used to validate, authorize, or otherwise inflect the social with new power relations 
as altered by the law. The law and the social become understood as co-constituting one another. 
French’s analytic is based on five components that all rely on governmentality and post-
legislative negotiation to explain why the law and identities become understood through one 
another and produce unique relationships between the law and identity. According to French, 
these five components all occur simultaneously: 
1) There are revised or new ethnoracial identities in the lives of those who invoke rights 
based on the identity’s legal definition.  
2) The meanings of laws are shaped and reshaped through the assertion of these 
identities.  
3) Cultural practices are reconfigured.  
4) The meanings of the community are questioned and altered as identity is legalized, 
“legalizing identity is as much about those who choose not to participate as it is about 
those who do” (French 2009,15). For example, for the Mocambo villagers who chose 
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not to identify with the quilombo movement, their self-conceptions changed with 
quilombo status recognition. Their conceptions varied and often led to questions 
about whether conceptions of the community were being created through religious 
affiliation (a history associated with the word for “community” in Portuguese) or 
political entity. Who was, and was not, a quilombola went beyond arguments of the 
benefits that come with recognition, but also involved the ways loyalty to existing 
identities, local politics, and fears associated with identifying as Black within Brazil, 
where mixedness is a feature of national identity, it would impact one’s self-
conception. 
5) Even though the opportunity to identify a certain way may come from the law, 
identification comes from experiences of struggle. (French 2009, 13-15).  
French’s analysis is helpful in looking at how blood quantum was imposed in the late 19th 
century and how its imposition has redefined conceptions of blood and membership ever since, 
as I discussed in the previous chapter. The metrics by which blood quantum is imposed are now 
tribally decided, something that has led to the emergence of new tribal entities. The decision for 
the UKB to split off is in part based on a culturally conservative definition of Cherokeeness, one 
that requires a higher blood quantum. Blood quantum as the legal parameter of tribal identity, 
used both by sovereign tribes and the United States federal government, quantifies blood as an 
objective measure of identity, which has altered understandings of identity as well as how 
membership laws are implemented by certain tribes.   
 The latter three components of French’s framework are helpful in thinking about the way 
legal status affects tribal, and more specifically Cherokee, identity in the U.S.  Although the first 
two components are important, they have been discussed in various ways in earlier chapters. In 
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recognizing that legalization changes local practices, it is key to look at the ways ancestry and 
kinship are narrated by citizen Cherokees and how they work to validate their claims while 
maintaining skepticism of Cherokee-identifying people’s claims. The changing practices 
regarding kinship narration not only reflect how legalization has changed practices but also how 
it has complicated what it means to claim a Cherokee identity. Key to this is the role of oral 
history and documentation. Oral history is part of the claiming process for both citizen 
Cherokees and Cherokee-identifying people. However, citizen Cherokees can substantiate those 
histories with documentation, documentation that includes tribal registry cards, Certificate 
Degree of Indian Blood (CDIB) cards, family names on rolls, birth certificates, and more. 
However, in Sturm’s interviews, citizen Cherokees were hesitant to disrespect Cherokee 
identifying people’s oral histories due to the hypocrisy of validating and valuing their own oral 
histories while dismissing those of Cherokee identifying people (Sturm 2010, 123). Likewise, 
Cherokees and Cherokee-identifying people recognize that records are far from perfect, as many 
documents in the South would have listed both Native people and African Americans as 
“colored” (Sturm 2010).   
 The role of documentation, or its absence, is known to Cherokee-identifying people; they 
recognize that documentation is the only way to fully substantiate one’s claims. However, 
Cherokee-identifying people’s oral histories come with that knowledge. Many have stories from 
grandparents and great-grandparents about their Cherokee ancestors and the ways they chose to 
blend into White society. These stories are their oral histories, they validate their claims to 
identity, and they are recalled as Cherokee-identifying people frame their own identity as one 
that came about because their ancestors refused to be identified as Cherokee (or Native) yet kept 
that identity alive via familial stories. This was possible because, according to Cherokee-
91 
 
identifying people’s narratives, they were taught that they had Cherokee ancestry by their family, 
but that it was something to keep hidden to protect themselves from social retribution from 
dominant White society. They not only invoke notions of kinship, but they also give reasons for 
why they were cut off from kin networks by the constrained choices their ancestors made. These 
choices included the adoption of White names, adopting White cultural practices, documenting 
themselves as White in bureaucratic forms, and many more choices that incorporated them and 
their family into Whiteness. By choosing to blend into White society as a means of survival, their 
ancestors made their Cherokee identity something to keep inside the house, so to speak. The 
stories of being Cherokee are passed down from generation to generation, without living public 
life as Cherokee. Their inability to locate themselves in established citizen Cherokee networks is 
because their present situation is historically grounded in a reaction to colonial imposition. The 
refusal to be enrolled, the choice, or lack thereof, to integrate into White society, the lack of 
documentation that comes from these impositions, and constrained choices was purposeful as 
Cherokees were removed from the American South. Private stories of hiding, passing, and 
privately knowing oneself as Cherokee provides a means by which Cherokee-identifying people 
base their identifying as Cherokee in the present. Even with that history in mind, however, 
documentation is still the primary means by which one’s ancestry can be authenticated. Both 
citizen Cherokees and Cherokee-identifying people find meaning in oral history as a means of 
connecting themselves personally to their ancestors, yet citizen Cherokees’ concerns about 
Cherokees being both culturally and racially Cherokee (that is, racially Native) are intertwined 
with concerns about who is claiming a Cherokee identity. These concerns have reinforced the 
value of documenting one’s ancestry. Oral history as a practice of locating oneself in kin 
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networks is challenged when those historically cut off from kin networks, be it by choice or 
because of colonial policies, assert relationships that are not verified in writing.  
There are those though who are recognized Cherokees, often appearing visibly Native, 
and recognized as such within their communities, yet they differ from citizen Cherokees and 
Cherokee-identifying people in that they are in a middle area claiming Cherokee membership as 
a legal status, not as a social identity. Whereas Cherokee-identifying people are viewed with 
suspicion by citizen Cherokees because of their public proclamation of an identity despite 
lacking federally recognized tribal enrollment, recognized Cherokees are socially accepted as 
Cherokee despite lacking enrollment (Sturm 2010). Unlike Cherokee-identifying people, 
recognized Cherokees are those who are located in Cherokee social and cultural life, 
recognizable within kin networks and stories, but who lack tribal enrollment. Social acceptance 
does not hinge on legal documentation but is to an extent empowered by it due to the 
legitimating authority it possesses.  
However, White Cherokees challenge this conception as well. Although legally members, 
they are oftentimes separate from Cherokee cultural knowledge and practices but also appear 
phenotypically white. Legal documentation serves as a means of identity validation here, but it is 
not sufficient for social acceptance. Blood and blood quantum work together in contradictory 
ways here, as White Cherokees possess a blood quantum necessary to claim membership, yet the 
metaphorical value in Cherokee blood has been stretched thin as the blood quantum becomes 
smaller and smaller with each generation of marriage to non-Cherokees. Blood quantum 
challenges the value of blood as a metaphor in this instance. Because of the complex interplay 
between cultural identity and legal identity, which have both been affected by the imposition and 
regulation of blood quantum as well as changes in citizen Cherokee kinship authentication and 
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thinking regarding blood, it is hard to fully locate Cherokee identity in one or the other. Cultural 
practices of kinship have altered to authorize documentation as validating ancestry, which 
challenges the prestige oral history once occupied. Locating oneself in kin networks through both 
is, of course, preferred, but the ability to meet either or neither standard reflects one’s ability to 
claim a Cherokee identity socially and legally.   
Lastly, French’s analytic includes the fact that a way of identifying may come from the 
law, but that identification is understood in the context of struggle. For Cherokees, whether 
citizens, recognized or Cherokee-identifying, there is a narrative of struggle against settler 
colonialism. These struggles are contextualized within experiences of Cherokeeness. For citizen 
Cherokees, it includes but is not limited to stories of removal, boarding schools, discrimination, 
and struggles for recognition and rights. For Cherokee-identifying individuals, it is their struggle 
with personally-identifying as Cherokee considering their ancestors’ constrained choices to 
escape persecution. In both cases, there is recognition of a struggle that validates their 
identification. It is the ability of Cherokee identity to persevere because of, or despite, the 
experiences and choices of one’s ancestors. Part of what legalization does is validate the 
suffering of ancestors; it gives insights into how our position in space and time came to be. It 
gives meaning to ancestry that we live with inside of us.  
I would be remiss were I to discuss where others locate their Cherokeeness without 
addressing where I locate my own. For me, Cherokeeness is about bearing witness to the 
tragedies my ancestors went through. It is about seeing my grandfather, however often or rare, 
and knowing that he and I both became who we are because of the tragedies our great 
grandparents endured. It is about knowing the way my family was detached from Cherokee 
centers of identity because of allotment policies. Yet, Cherokeeness is also about locating myself 
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in the racial landscape we live in today. I learned to be in this world through the interaction of 
White and Cherokee parents and grandparents. My father’s Irishness rests in me much in the 
same way that my mother’s Cherokeeness does. However, my father’s family’s story is not one 
that is untold. It is the story of the American dream – of immigration following the potato famine 
in Ireland who, after generations of work and wealth accumulation, occupy a place in the 
American upper-middle class. My mother’s maternal story I do not know, as it was never 
recounted to me in any detail. However, my Cherokee ancestry I know better than the rest; I 
know the stories of Nancy, Joseph, Josiah, I know where they are buried, and I know the stories 
of visiting Tahlequah and memorializing the suffering they went through due to settler 
colonialism. This is in part due to my stronger ties to my mother’s family, especially Papa. 
Although I have some knowledge of my other family lines, my maternal grandfather’s line is the 
one I know best and is the family unit in which familial ties and stories are most present. I am 
located between these, and I feel as though I should not forsake my Cherokee ancestors and their 
stories simply because blood is “running thin.” Cherokeeness is not just in blood, as essentialist 
as it sounds, but it is also in my relationship with Papa, kinship, and culture. It is through him in 
particular, but also my mother that I understand myself as Cherokee. My choice to engage the 
question of Cherokee identity as something complicated and influenced by settler colonialism 
comes from my own position as the product of policies of removal and allotment that displaced 
my ancestors, but also as somebody who is still located in “Indian Country,” and is still 
entangled in the relationships between Indigenous people and settlers. Where Cherokeeness is 
located for me, for Papa, for citizen Cherokees, for Cherokee identifying people, are all part of 
disentangling legacies of settler colonialism, of locating one’s relationship not only with other 
Indigenous peoples but also with the land where they are located. The presence of so many 
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Indigenous tribes in Oklahoma is because they were removed here against their will. It is because 
of settler colonialism’s powerful impositions that identities are complicated by legality, land, and 
culture. The production of Cherokees like myself is not historical happenstance but is by design 
and part of the structuring framework of settler colonialism. 
 
8. Better Left Unsaid 
The wind brushed against my cheeks and bare hands, wicking away what little 
moisture was left in them. I kept my hands in the pockets of my hoodie in a futile attempt 
to keep warm from the wind; I would have to take them out soon enough in order to drive 
the tractor. It was the “little green tractor,” an accurate name given its petite form 
compared to the larger tractor parked next to it. Papa did not need to use the big tractor 
today, nor did he need to use it that often. Even then, he joked with me about how one day 
he would teach me how to drive it.  
Papa had to walk me through how to drive the tractor so that I could use it. I felt 
as if I was taking another driver’s test, albeit this one made me feel much more anxious 
about not doing it right. My sister-in-law once had to borrow an 18-foot trailer to move 
hay for her horses, and she had prayed to land on the hitch the first time she backed up 
so that he wouldn’t ridicule her. His ridiculing would have most certainly been about her 
being a woman and unable to do what needed to be done, regardless of if it were a 
presumedly meaningless and correctable task. In my own way, I felt similar. I felt that if I 
showed any anxiety, Papa would joke about how I “wasn’t even in control of that lil’ ol’ 
tractor.” It is not that I felt like my masculinity was threatened or that femininity was a 
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bad thing. Rather, to have my abilities be compromised and then demeaned when I knew 
that I was already being perceived as unable to complete them was nerve-wracking. If I 
was found to be even more incapable, Papa’s comment would insinuate that I was only 
not manly enough for him but that I was not enough to even be trusted with a simple task. 
I was caught in a purgatory of sorts: if I sought to embody a masculinity that did not 
come naturally, I felt like a fraud and disingenuous with Papa. However, if I did not do 
enough, I was incapable of tasks and would be ridiculed for that inability. After taking 
the tractor around in a little circle, my grandfather took the chain out of the cupholder, 
which I found odd considering the meticulously ordered barns he took care of and 
attached it to the front of the tractor. I found it hard to accept that everything had a 
place, and for some reason, the chain’s place was inside the tractor cup holder. The back 
attachment had lots of little teeth, which I assumed would not be relevant to moving the 
circle bale holders.  
“I’ll open this gate and leave it open. Now be sure when you go through it, you’re going 
completely straight because that back attachment is wider than the front.”  
“Ok, I’ll be sure to line it up good,” I replied.  
It’s odd thinking about the way I change my speech when I talk to him. My mom 
does the same thing. We slow down a bit, change up our syntax some, throw in a twang 
or drawl at times, but we mainly do it when we’re around this side of the family. 
As I pull through the gate and into the pasture, I see my grandfather standing next 
to the first of the four bale holders that need to be moved. Half of the herd has had their 
calves, and they need to move further down the pasture where there is more grass 
97 
 
available for them to eat other than the hay. As we go through the process of lining up, 
attaching the chain to the holder, and moving it, all communication is done through hand 
signals: “up,” “down,” “little bit more,” “turn around,” “back up at this kind of angle 
until you get there.” All of this is conveyed, and probably more, through vague hand 
signs.  
After finishing up the bales—without a single mess-up despite the ever-pervasive 
anxiety on my side—Papa comes back to me sitting on the tractor with the chain and 
looks at the front tire.  
“Does that tire look flat?” he kicks it a bit. Pushing his foot down into the rubber, feeling 
it give way to the force. “Sure, feels like it is. Alright let’s head back up to the shop and 
park it in front of the barn, that’s where my tools are.” I nod in acknowledgement and 
begin to slowly head that way. I could turn the speed up by moving the lever from ‘turtle’ 
to ‘rabbit’ on the tractor, but I don’t want to get ahead of myself and mess something up 
in that simple move.  
With the tractor parked in front of the barn, Papa opens the second barn door and 
turns on the air compressor. After looking at the tractor, he takes the front attachment, 
flips it back, and then pushes down, so that the front of the tractor is off the ground. He 
motions for me to lower the back attachment so that it provides a stronger base for the 
tractor’s weight.  
We begin the slow process of taking off the tire. It certainly wouldn’t have been 
slow had I known what I was doing, and Papa been more physically capable of getting 
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down to work on the tire. But we worked through our relative inabilities as he instructed 
me over the deafening roar of the compressor, and I slowly interpreted and acted on it.  
“Alright get this bar and loosen up each one, I can’t do it from up here, so you’ll have 
to.”  
I fumbled with the bar a bit, struggling to get it to line up perfectly with the lug 
nut, but by the third of six, I started to line it up faster. Pushing and pulling on the bar 
was weird. I’m not even entirely sure what it was called, all I know was whoever 
tightened this last time sure did tighten them far more than I could have. After the bar, I 
once again learned my way around the lug nuts with the compressor gun. One. Two. 
Three. Four. Five. Six. Each came off faster than the last, but still took me some time as I 
adjusted my footing to try to balance on my knee and foot while bent over.  
“We sure wouldn’t make it in a Nascar pit!” Papa said as he laughed, taking the lug nuts 
from me and turning the compressor off. We took the tire off the tractor and Papa 
inspected it. Spinning it, bringing it close to his face, pouring water on it. He could not 
find anything wrong with it.  
“I know a guy up in Wayne, we’ll need to take it to him to get it looked at. Are you in a 
rush for time?” 
“Nope, I’m good to be here for a few more hours.” 
“Alright, you put that in the back of the truck, and I’ll go get the keys and let Granny 
know. We need to head to Wynnewood at five o’clock, and it’s three now, so it’s best if 
we go ahead and go now.” He had to go to Wynnewood later with Granny for my 
cousin’s ball game, and to retrieve a cactus for her. He was already inside when I went 
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to meet him there. I had put the tire in the back of the truck and went inside to wash my 
hands and grab my water bottle before we left. 
“Linda, why do you need that cactus?”   
“Mike, you know I have been looking for a nice big one ever since I first saw em. They’re 
just so beautiful and blue,” Granny then looked towards me. “I saw one when I was out 
with Staci [my aunt], and it was so beautiful. I asked around to see if anybody owned it 
and nobody did, so I called the sheriff and asked him, and he said I was free to take it.”  
“Where are you even going to plant that thing,” Papa asked, making clear he was still 
paying attention. 
“I was going to put em in some of those buckets you picked up the other day.” 
“Why my new buckets? They’ll die just as quickly in the ones from last year.” 
I laughed a bit at this, and Papa looked at me to make sure I was laughing. He always 
checked to see if his jokes landed. I grabbed my water bottle and we headed to the car, 
saying our quick goodbyes to Granny. 
Driving to Wayne was a quick trip; we just make a right on the main street in 
Paoli coming from Papa’s, which turned into a highway on either side of the town. 
Throughout the drive, there was only the sound of the wind, the truck reacting to the 
inconsistencies of the highway, and Papa’s deep breathing. After a while he asks me 
about my spring break plans. I told him I had none, I was planning on doing schoolwork, 
some research, and coming to see him a few times. He smiled when I said I was going to 
come see him, and said he had plenty of work that needed to be done.  
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“You know that hotwire that’s up there on corner of the property? I need to run it on this 
other pasture further down. I also need to finish cleaning out and taking down that old 
barn. I bet that’s what gave the tire a flat. Calves’ll be done being born by then so we can 
do some other work there. Would you be ok with all that?” 
“Of course, if you’ll have me that is.”  
“Well of course I would! You’re my grandson. Oh, you see that big house over there? 
That’s my neighbor’s. He’s a good man, got lots of land and lots of cattle.”  
I nod in acknowledgement, unsure of what else to say. I smiled when he said of course, 
but then he switched gears to talk about his neighbor.  
Once in Wayne, we met with the man in the garage and gave him the tire. He got 
to work, and Papa and I stood outside the garage waiting. After a while the owner came 
out. While I was with them, I played a silent role in the background, moving with them, 
observing, not needing an introduction or explanation as to my presence. Middle aged 
with greying hair, the owner took a strong role in talking with Papa, but he did not 
interrupt. He had a strong demeanor; his tone was boisterous and his stride long. They 
got to talking about cattle. Each had calves, but still had at least halfway to go until 
calving was done. He got to talking about how big his Simmental bull was, showing my 
grandfather photos.  
I stood behind them both, a silent participator who may be called on at any 
moment., whether it be just as Papa’s grandson or his grandson who has been helping 
him out a lot lately. I was unsure in what manner he would introduce me if he were to, 
and I also wondered if I was supposed to introduce myself. After a few minutes of their 
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talking and my silence, I realized if Papa were to introduce me it would be at the end, 
and it would not matter what I thought of his introduction. He would introduce me how 
he saw fit. However, Papa never did introduce me. Had it not been for the work needing 
to be done by both men, I feel as if they could’ve talked for hours. Eventually the owner 
said he needed to get back to work and directed Papa to the front desk. He paid in cash 
and cracked a joke to the clerk about how “I bet you love handling money.” I sighed. She 
sighed a bit louder, then laughed lightly out of politeness, and handed him his change, 
“Well it is my job, sir.”  
If the drive there was uneventful, the drive back occurred in a vacuum. Devoid of 
all sound except the movement of air around the car and in and out of Papa’s lungs, we 
returned to the barn in Paoli. 
With the tractor still lifted, we restarted the air compressor, put the attachments 
back on it, and used it to put the tire back on. It looked good. He had me go park it back 
in the covered area. I was unsure how close to get, or what all was up there. I got as 
close as I could without looking up for assurance, then looked towards Papa, who gave 
me cues regarding the rest of the space I needed to cover. I parked the tractor, and we 
headed inside. 
 
My relationship with Papa has changed over the years. My unsureness and anxiety in the 
present are a result of the years of childhood wonder and affection followed by a purposeful 
distancing when I was a teenager; I realized I was gay. In my childhood, my younger sisters and 
I would visit him on holidays and other occasions throughout the year, but during the summer, 
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we would spend an entire week there with him, Granny, and our cousins. This week was not 
some odd chosen week, but the week that the Paoli Baptist Church had vacation bible school, 
arguably the week of the year in which I would receive my most concentrated education in 
Christianity. Granny and Papa were already the most pious of my grandparents; of that, there 
was no question. As a child, I did not have much of an issue with religion. It was something 
there, something I did for the adults in my life to make them happy. I did not necessarily believe 
any of it at the time but rather learned what was necessary to recount the classes of the day later 
and move about my life. Our home was more secular than Christian in practice. Papa’s 
Christianity was a means by which we know him and by which he liked to be known. He was a 
devout man then and remains so today.  
As I grew older, the fissures of suburban secular life and rural Christianity continued to 
widen, and I stopped visiting for that week in the summer. It was something I detested, Papa’s 
house became something I detested, and indeed Papa himself began to earn my scorn. I do not 
recall ever hearing anything from Papa to provoke my scorn at the time. I had not heard from 
him that he hated gay people, that he didn’t believe in what I was coming to understand as my 
right to equal protection and practices in American society. Rather, I knew how the church felt, I 
knew how my mom had felt, despite her efforts to change, and I projected that socially 
conservative view onto him. I was not wrong in this projection, I would later find out, but 
nonetheless, I came into an understanding of Christianity and queerness and how they fit (rather, 
did not fit) together, and how I felt hurt knowing my grandfather was not supportive of who I 
was. For these reasons, I detached from him, opting to stay home when possible, using excuses 
of school and other plans so that I could escape his questions about “co-eds” at school. To this 
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day, I have still not come out to Papa nor Granny, but I think there has come to be an 
understanding between us about who I am and how that is not going to change.  
This alone is not why there is an awkwardness in the air as Papa teaches and I learn. As I 
learned about the Church’s position on queerness, broadly defined, I saw the ways in which 
gender shaped my interactions with Papa. Papa wished to see me, along with his other male 
grandchildren, become a proper “man.” Queerness disqualified me from this, nor did I have any 
intention of pursuing the kind of manhood he wished to see me embody. Sports were never my 
thing; I much preferred the inside time with my aunt’s and female cousins chatting about any 
range of topics over being outside, checking on the cattle, and doing those things I had come to 
associate with masculinity. As I left the innocence of childhood, however, the insistence I 
conform to gender norms strengthened. The questions about girls and dating became more 
frequent, my bodily language was a target of scrutiny, and I felt myself turning inside out as I 
tried to make a space for myself somewhere between masculine and feminine, between his 
desires for me and that which I wanted for myself.  
As I considered the way in which I drove the tractor and the slowness with which I took 
the nuts off the tire, my gendered position became increasingly apparent to me. I had grown up 
surrounded by women, with an absent older brother, a father who was present half the year due 
to his work taking him outside the home, and a grandfather who came with baggage I did not 
wish to deal with, for fear it would weigh on my heart in a manner I could not bear. In looking 
back on my childhood and the years of my adolescence, I realize now I had purposefully 
removed myself from places in which I felt I would be harmed, not just out of a desire to protect 
myself, but also to protect the image of those who I felt would harm me so that Papa could 
remain Papa, and not become a man who wished for me to be somebody I am not.  
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In her book Landscape for a Good Woman, Carolyn Steedman recounts her working-
class childhood in 1950s London. Steedman focuses specifically on the ways in which she 
learned class and gender through her mother. Namely, Steedman narrates a relationship with her 
mother that is tumultuous, that is shaped by her desire to be a good child, to make up for the cost 
that she incurred simply by being in this world. She was made to feel a burden to her mother, and 
her mother reminded her of this fact as she reminded her that she was also a good mother. 
Steedman’s narration is not just for the sake of autobiography, though; it is an exercise in 
connecting her and her mother to working-class families within circumstances much like her 
own (Steedman 1986). Steedman’s understanding of her family life, of the way she is in this 
world, is shaped both by her understanding of history of placing her mother’s life within the 
context of class and gender. Her mother’s aspirations were shaped by class and gender, and 
Steedman paid a price of those aspirations, she knew the world through a feeling of desire that 
was unfulfilled, an unfairness in the treatment she received, which itself was born from her 
mother’s feeling of living in a world that treated her unfairly.  
The awkwardness between Papa and me, I like to think, is our reconciling. It is us trying 
to make up for the lost time. It is unlikely that either of us knows in full detail why the other is 
the way they are, but that is not the point of our coming together. It is a joint effort to move 
forward. As Steedman works through a persistent dream she has had since childhood, in which 
she is wearing the clothes she learned so early to desire, she states that “you’re nostalgic for 
childhood whilst it’s happening to you, because the dreams show you the landscape you’re 
passing through, but you don’t know yet that you want to escape” (Steedman 1986, 143). My late 
childhood was filled with a desire to escape, to escape the unfairness that my family and society 
were imposing upon me. It demanded from me a certain way of being, one that I felt was 
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unmanageable and unfair. I can say the same feeling most certainly resided in Papa and my mom 
at various moments in their life. Be it the political feelings of discontent Papa feels like a 
member of an older generation, surrounded by a world that demands rapid change from home, a 
change he is rarely given time to acclimate to, or my mother’s struggling with three children as a 
single mother in the 90’s after divorcing her first husband; both have had moments in which they 
feel society has forsaken them, leaving them holding a bag full of desires, yet lacking the means 
by which they could fulfill them. However, what I imagine they sought, much in the same way I 
seek it with Papa, is a sense of fairness, of acceptance, of belonging as they are.  
Subjectivity is, in part, defined by its multiplicity. Rather than subjectivity simply 
repurposing multiple identities into a singular, more inclusive identity with more categories 
expressed at once, in hopes of being a more complete, fair representation of a person, 
subjectivity takes those and puts them into a relationship with practices, place, emotions, and 
more. In doing so, nothing is guaranteed. Yet, subjectivity encourages us to focus on these 
relationships is part of why I do not use it in lieu of my examination of how White Cherokee 
identities came to be. Had I been able to interview and spend time with White Cherokees 
throughout Oklahoma, unimpeded by COVID-19, I would have been able to focus more on the 
relationship between subjectivity and other factors that impact how one identifies. Feeling a 
sense of racial and ethnic belonging is also related to one’s belonging in a gendered sense, or 
even religious. Because subjectivity encourages us to focus on the relationships formed between 
subjects, the places in which they are, and our senses of self, it is helpful in examining how 
belonging works in examining everyday life.  
 
9. Refusal in the Closet: The Politics and Ethics of Identity  
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 Settler colonialism’s production of various Indigenous subject positions is itself a reflection 
of its ongoing failures and maintenance. Seeking to incorporate Indigenous people into a White 
land-owning body politic is one of the fundamental goals of settler colonialism, and it is predicated 
on removal, citizenship, and recognition (Simpson 2014). However, recognition itself is predicated 
on certain power relations based on authorizing who one is and how one sees oneself (Simpson 
2014). Although the last two chapters have touched on the politics of recognition among 
Cherokees, I now wish to focus on the politics of identifying as Cherokee outside of Cherokee 
contexts. What does it mean to assert oneself as belonging to a sovereign nation that is located 
within the United States? What does it mean to assert belonging to a nation whose sovereignty is 
defined in relation to federal and state governments? What does it mean for phenotypically White 
citizens of both nations to profess to be tribal citizens and American citizens? What consequences 
come with a primary identity as a tribal citizen and a secondary identity as an American citizen? 
What are the politics of disclosing this identity, and when are they made relevant to those living 
in tension within their identities? These questions cannot be disentangled from the ways that 
Cherokees define themselves in relation to one another and is relevant to the way race operates in 
the United States.  
 When I was growing up, my mother had a gorgeous pair of beaded earrings. Gifted to her 
by Papa when she graduated high school, they are orange with details in black and white. As the 
primary color on the Cherokee Nation flag, the orange on her earring’s is meant to index her tribal 
membership, although it is not necessarily evidenced that is the intent in color choice by the artist, 
although my grandfather had the flag’s colors in mind in choosing earrings gift to her. My mother 
has had these earrings for almost 40 years; I rarely see them leave her jewelry chest. However, 
within the chest, they occupy a place of prestige with her other sentimental jewelry in the locked 
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drawer. She treasures them; they are her only piece of beaded jewelry and something she treasures 
as a connection between her and Papa and as a connection to her own Cherokeeness. Nevertheless, 
she identifies as Cherokee primarily. She does not reject her White ancestry, but she does not feel 
as connected to it. My maternal grandmother’s western European ancestry is not as well 
documented, and my mother was much closer to Papa’s family as a child. She was raised 
surrounded by Cherokee people and identifies as such. Her features are largely reminiscent of 
Papa, yet she also grew up around her mother, which also shaped how she presented herself. Her 
dyed blonde hair signals Whiteness, yet her skin has never been pale or fair; rather, it is a light 
golden brown. Phenotypically, I would say she appears mixed or White. However, she does not 
consider herself White and will typically inform others she is Cherokee if they presume she is 
White.  
 To add another layer to my mother’s identity, I also wish to consider her current work as a 
nurse practitioner for the Absentee Shawnee Tribe. When doing her clinical schooling in which 
she worked under another nurse practitioner, she worked at the urgent care clinic in Shawnee. 
After completing schooling and after receiving word of an opening and being recommended to 
apply by those she had worked with, she started working for the tribe. Working for the tribe has 
been an experience she has loved. The tribe has treated her well, she enjoys spending time with 
her coworkers, and it has brought her into greater proximity to other Indigenous people, but also 
social issues that affect Indigenous people.   
 Namely, she feels as though she better understands what has happened to Native people, 
not just historically but today. She has never lived in communities that are predominantly Native, 
nor has she seen some of the more immediate effects of the marginalization of Native people in 
Oklahoma.  Although she is not “coming home to it,” as she says, by working with Native people 
108 
 
as both patients and co-workers, her understanding has developed enough that she sees the federal 
government at fault for what has happened to Native people in the United States, namely, health 
disparities.  
 My mother did note that she has always identified as Native fully despite this distance that 
she has become increasingly aware of. Her identity has strengthened as she has interacted with 
more Native people. Patients will question at times if one of her coworkers is Native due to her 
appearing phenotypically White. However, my mother has not experienced this kind of question 
at all. Ironically, her coworker grew up in a Native community, whereas my mother grew up distant 
from hers. What my mother’s experience means, to me, is that it is never too late to connect with 
one’s community and that the means by which one feels connected are in flux as the circumstances 
of one’s relationship with community change.  
 Tribal identities cannot be disentangled from the political organization that gave way to 
them. With colonization, though, tribal identities are shaped in opposition to settler society and 
practices. In asserting a tribal identity, one is connected to histories of removal, dispossession, and 
the effects of policies deployed by the colonizing force. The creation of this kind of identity is tied 
to fights for sovereignty. In reimagining sovereignty through an Indigenous lens, Mohawk 
anthropologist Audra Simpson argues that sovereignty is not about a right to violence, exclusion, 
maiming, or killing in the name of maintaining jurisdiction and territory, which is how Western 
sovereignty has been conceptualized (Simpson 2014). This conceptualization of Western 
sovereignty is embedded in the historical development of Western nation-states, which differs 
greatly from the history that produced Indigenous sovereignties (Simpson 2020).  Instead, 
Indigenous sovereignty is framed as a form of relationality through families, clans, nations, and 
territory (Simpson 2014). This kind of sovereignty is based on kinship. Furthermore, this 
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sovereignty is nested within the sovereignty of the United States of America (and for some tribes, 
other colonial nation-states, such as Canada). Simpson’s work comes out of her work with her own 
community, the Mohawk of Kahnawà:ke, who live on an approximately 18.55-mile reservation, 
or “reserve,” in the southwest of Quebec, a largely French-speaking province of Canada (Simpson 
2014). However, despite federal recognition from Canada and the United States, the Mohawk of 
Kahnawà:ke refused citizenship of these two settler nations. Instead, they insist on the integrity 
and legitimacy of their own governance through the governing body of the Iroquois Confederacy, 
the Haudenosaunee. This also means refusing passports, refusing to pay taxes to these nations, and 
refusing to vote in these nations’ elections. Beyond questions of identity, they reject colonization 
by insisting on their right to remain politically Iroquois, separate from the settler polities that 
surround them.  
 What also comes with this refusal is an acknowledgment that colonization is ongoing in a 
settler form, however, “in this form, it fails at what it is supposed to do: eliminate Indigenous 
people; take all their land; absorb them into a [W]hite, property-owning body politic” (Simpson 
2014, 7-8). Simpson argues that ongoing debates over membership criteria exemplify this ongoing 
existence and failure. Although there are ways of knowing each other through practices that foster 
belonging, something I have discussed in my ethnographic vignettes, Simpson highlights that the 
issue is in how to codify membership rules so that Mohawk membership is preserved. This means 
considering not only the social and political processes that have altered membership thinking over 
time but also how it is practiced from a legal standpoint. This is done from a position that is 
constrained by the sovereignties of settler nations. Refusal, in this instance, is a refusal to have 
membership decided by outside authorities. It takes away the power of deciding membership from 
colonial authorities that have imposed upon and altered kinship practices over the preceding 
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centuries. This differs from recognition, which is predicated on an unequal power balance where 
one entity possesses the power to recognize, and the other is in the position of being recognized. 
Sovereignty, then, in this conception, is about where power resides in verifying and validating 
identity claims, with refusal and recognition being two options by which membership is 
understood, each reflecting a different power dynamic.  
 I argue that Cherokee identity, along with other tribal identities in the United States, is not 
squarely located in either refusal or recognition. This is because tribal identities as legal statuses 
granted by political entities are debated within nested sovereignty and culture. Because being 
Indigenous is not just a legal status nor a solely social/cultural identity, they exist in a space 
between the law and the social, where sovereignty decides not only what rights are imbued in 
Indigenous identities, but also how such identities are authorized and accepted. The ability to assert 
and validate Indigenous identity means locating an individual in discourses of history, culture, 
kinship, and political difference. Because it is an identity that has been legally defined and carries 
legal power, it can be contested through the law, as seen in the Cherokee Freedman controversy 
that I discussed in chapter 5. Yet, this recognition by law does not mean one is viewed socially as 
Cherokee. Yet, social acceptance is not enough for the legal status of being a tribal member 
because of the power of being recognized that was instated by the federal government but is 
upheld, updated, and maintained by tribal governments. Recognition and refusal operate together 
as a sociolegal apparatus in which identity can be refused in one moment and accepted in another.  
 Because Indigenous sovereignties are located within the sovereignty of the United States, 
they are limited and constrained. In expanding their own sovereignty, the sovereignty of the federal 
and state governments is reduced. Sovereignty assertions in one area of the law have wide-ranging 
ramifications for sovereignty in other places, and the United States government and tribal 
111 
 
governments both wish to see their sovereignty expanded. With the imposition of blood quantum 
and its subsequent revisions in tribal law, we see a negotiation between sovereigns in deciding 
tribal identity. The ability of tribes to set their own blood quantum criteria refuses to allow the 
United States to impose criteria for citizenship. However, the continued use of blood quantum in 
tribal membership reflects the power differential of tribes and the United States in recognizing 
who is and is not a tribal member. In the Freedmen controversy, I discussed in chapter 5, this 
ability for the Cherokee Nation to decide membership criteria on its own was rejected as it violated 
treaty rights, a reflection of the power of the United States to enforce membership criteria. 
Sovereignty regarding membership is thus limited and nested. Drawing on Simpson’s 
conceptualization of Indigenous sovereignty as kinship, we see that Indigenous kinship today is a 
set of practices that are limited and reside within greater Euro-American understandings of kinship. 
Because of its limited and nested status, Indigenous kinship is embedded in the political discourses 
of sovereignty; to be Cherokee is not to be Cherokee in ancestry and kinship alone, but also to 
occupy a political space of alterity within a settler-colonial society.  As such, claiming membership 
to a tribe is not just about asserting a personal identity but also connects one to cultural discourses 
of kinship, refusal, and resistance. Because of the intersections of so many discourses of identity 
(biological, legal, social, cultural, political, etc.), which are not necessarily discrete nor stable, it is 
helpful to understand how identity claims become embodied experiences that are negotiated in 
context, especially when considering White Cherokees.  
 In claiming a Cherokee identity, I connect myself to these discourses, and I argue that 
Indigenous identities cannot be disentangled from the political and social relationships they are 
embedded in. Yet, because I am primarily White, both phenotypically and culturally, yet still 
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identify with and locate myself on the margins of Cherokee identity, I find myself caught between 
two modes of representing my experiences. Thus, using the term  
White Cherokee, I hope to represent my own position. Rather than using it in a manner that would 
reject my claim of Cherokeeness (as is often the case in arguing for tighter blood quantum 
requirements), instead, I use it as a means of locating myself within these discourses. The 
Whiteness I embody and experience is based on my ability to blend in with and occupy spaces of 
Whiteness, often without external contestation. However, I find such a position untenable and 
uncomfortable. However, in voicing my Cherokee identity, something that presumably would 
remove me from Whiteness and White society, I locate myself in an identity that is frequently 
understood as racially Native, something that I do not fully claim. Furthermore, because Cherokee 
identity is understood as racially Native by most Cherokees and non-Cherokees, my claiming a 
Cherokee position is met with scrutiny, demands of proof, or even rejection. Thus, claiming a 
Cherokee identity as a White Cherokee is about locating someone within categories that seem 
impossible to occupy simultaneously.  
However, this is not a thesis on reconciling those feelings. It is about how to represent 
oneself when being faced with the way identity forms are constrained and pulled in different ways 
by different political forces and actors. In this sense, using the closet as a metaphor clarifies the 
ways White Cherokees negotiate ways of being known, as well as interrogating the ethics of 
identity declaration within certain contexts. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick describes “closetedness” as 
a “performance initiated as such by the speech act of a silence –not a particular silence, but a 
silence that accrues particularity by fits and starts, in relation to the discourse that surrounds and 
differentially constitutes it” (Sedgwick 1990, 3). The closet is constructed out of the lack of 
proclamation of an identity that has been determined to be different according to the discourse that 
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surrounds it. It presumes a known interiority that, if made public, places the individual in a 
stigmatized position predicated on a lack of knowledge (or rather, a different kind of knowledge) 
about who that person is in consideration of information being made knowable to those around 
them. This knowledge combines with what is previously known about an individual and is 
connected to greater societal knowledge about gender, race, sexuality, etc. Ways of personally-
identifying are always entangled with the social context and history that allows that identity to be 
produced, claimed, and known. It is in politically located knowledge that certain ways of knowing 
become understood as possessing a truth value that allows them to circulate as part of a regime of 
truth (Sedgwick 1990). Drawing on Foucault’s work, notably in Discipline and Punish, whereby 
a regime of truth is constituted by a collection of techniques, knowledge, and scientific discourses, 
which are formed and become entangled with “the practice of the power to punish” (Foucault 
1977, 23). A “regime of truth” refers to the ability of those in power to wield knowledge as a means 
by which they authorize their practices of power. This does not come from some knowledge form 
that is detached from power, as knowledge itself is produced within a field of power. It is in power 
to regulate knowledge that a regime of truth is built as it allows for the differential treatment of 
constructed others through knowledges that are predicated on truths that are meant to serve specific 
exercises of power, often benefitting those who are already regulating and practicing power.  
Ann Stoler has also explored the relationship between regimes of truth and their 
connections to articulations of race and racism over time. Stoler asserts that racial essences are not 
fixed nor finite. Rather, they are malleable and substitutable, able to “combine elements of fixity 
and fluidity in ways that make them both resilient and impervious to empirical, experiential 
counterclaims” (Stoler 2016, 239).  The racial formations of the present are themselves based on 
the formations that preceded them; they are renewed with each instantiation. This makes sense 
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when thinking about the movement from blood to blood quantum and then to genetics. In each 
instantiation, the racial essence is biologically located, but the way in which it is understood 
socially differs. But these understandings themselves are not linear nor weighted equally by all 
actors. Native people are much more likely to speak of blood and blood quantum than genetics, 
whereas somebody who purchases a commercial ancestry test in pursuit of Native DNA will 
prioritize genetics. These are all being produced by the existence of what came before and yet do 
not cease to exist simply because they have been altered. These ways of knowing, though, are 
always in dialogue with the phenotype of the person, as well as the legal and political ways in 
which identity is verified. Race is a social act, always entangled with the legal and political ways 
in which identity is verified. The ability to “verify” race locates race in both the seen and unseen 
of an individual. There is ambiguity, as exemplified in the previous chapters, in the relationships 
between what is seen as readily apparent and seen vs. the inner self, which exists in relation to 
what is seen as observable and objectified, but also what is felt in the realm of sensibilities and 
subjectivity (Stoler 2016).  
 These relationships, those of the seen and unseen, the externally observable and the 
internally experienced, are entangled in the operations of power. The way certain racial attributes 
are focused on in one historical moment is due to the ebbs and flow of racial thought; its fluidity 
is seen in the rejections and acceptances of different articulations (Stoler 2016). In rejecting full 
and mixed blood statuses but accepting blood quantum, the biological notion of an essence is still 
replicated, yet the mechanisms by which that is articulated have changed. This change, despite the 
biological essence’s resilience, gives an illusion of progress in racial thinking, when the reality of 
race has nonetheless persisted. When put into dialogue with hegemony, this thinking gives way to 
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a more complicated understanding of racial regimes of truth and also the closet as a metaphor for 
understanding ambiguous racial positions.   
A concept largely built upon by Italian Marxist political activist and intellectual Antonio 
Gramsci, hegemony is the idea of a social group being built on the incorporation of subordinate 
groups into a dominant group, of which the general interests of all groups and the life of the state 
as a whole are formed (Hall 1986). In his discussion of Gramsci’s relevance for studying race, 
Stuart Hall notes that hegemony possesses three distinct points in Gramsci’s formulation. The first 
is that hegemony is a particular moment in history in which social forces coalesce into a historical 
moment that is identifiable by its unique formation and persistence until the “crises” of that 
moment begin to appear, which marks the beginning of the unfolding of hegemony. Secondly, 
hegemony is multi-dimensional in that it encompasses not just economic life but also political, 
social, cultural, legal, and more. It becomes a way in which society fundamentally reorganizes 
itself around the belief in and perpetuation of certain truths. Lastly, each hegemonic formation will 
have its own specific social composition on which it is organized. These formations are not 
necessarily a unified dominant economic class, but rather a coalition of those from a portion of the 
dominant class (Hall points to finance rather than industrial capital, or national rather than 
international capital), along with various subordinate groups who have been won over through 
concessions and compromises, which in turn validate the role of the dominant group (Hall 1986). 
Hegemony is a means by which we can understand how people belonging to marginalized groups 
understand themselves as being in solidarity with those of dominant groups, despite there being 
various ideas by which their solidarity could be considered impossible. In connecting Foucault’s 
concept of regimes of truth with Gramsci’s hegemony, we see that knowledge becomes valued in 
the ways that it reinforces certain types of power exercises, often predicated on the formation of a 
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dominant group consisting of those from various classes of society. This group is built on a form 
of class solidarity that does not seek to overturn class inequality but rather is based on maintaining 
a particular form of inequality that benefits members of the dominant group in different ways. It 
is because of this that hegemony must be maintained as a coalition across multiple strata so that 
the dominant group can maintain its positions of power.  
The concept of hegemony and regimes of truth, including Stoler’s conceptualization of a 
racial regime of truth, are themselves interlocked as a means by which power structures are 
constructed, maintained, and then dissolved. In thinking about the closet, it can then be understood 
as a means by which hegemonic truths are disproven by an alternative way of occupying spaces 
that are perceived as inappropriate for people of certain identities. In thinking about the ways the 
closet is constructed around sexual identities, we see how a dominant heteronormative society 
excludes people from positions of power based on ways of knowing those who are marginalized 
for their sexual practices and made into socially distinct categories. Identity functions as a heuristic 
for knowledge and are then used to understand an individual when they come out. Thus, coming 
out as gay takes an entire set of knowledges about gay people and their practices and projects it 
onto the individual, often in efforts to validate, or reject, their belonging to that category. This 
belonging dictates their ability to speak from positions that are imbued with certain power relations 
as related to the knowledge system that produced them. Thus, a position created based on 
heteronormativity, the inclusion or empowerment of a non-heterosexual individual within that 
system, threatens to bring down the entire hegemonic regime of truth that is built around 
heterosexual norms. Exclusion and discrimination then are sociopolitical acts, at all times located 
within social and historical context, and predicated on knowing and recognizing certain kinds of 
difference and then acting on that knowledge in a manner that has political goals.   
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The closet then functions as a means by which these knowledges are mediated, which 
conveys a sense of knowing what awaits one on the other side of the closet when one “comes out.” 
With a speech act of silence constructing the closetedness that people with “hidden” identities 
occupy, one can also understand it as a way of passing as a member of the dominant group. The 
act of coming out is the opposite of passing, it rejects the idea that one passes and actively asserts 
one’s identity at every instantiation of coming out (Stratton 2000). The closet exists in a dichotomy 
with coming out. Whereas the closet functions as an imagined liberal utopia that is bound up with 
both essentialism (that is, a unified and evident identity) and individual privacy, something that is 
based on modernity’s construction of private and public as distinct spheres of life. As public and 
private life have become less distinct, especially in the rise of multiculturalism that came in the 
latter half of the 20th century, they have blossomed into new possibilities for the politics of identity 
in the 21st century as identities like sexual orientation have turned from something held privately 
in the closet to something that should be publicly proclaimed (Stratton 2000). Things that were 
previously held in private with those who are close are now expected to be publicly proclaimed 
under hopes of acceptance and in efforts at normalizing difference.  
Before I connect this metaphor to experiences of being a White Cherokee, I want to first 
connect it to my experiences as a gay person. I first realized I was gay in early middle school. The 
year was 2011, and the experiences of LGBT people were not only becoming known on a wider 
scale, but public opinion was rapidly shifting from disapproval to acceptance. Although this was 
built on the work of activists over the preceding decades, it all felt very immediate and fast for me. 
I was not gay alone, though, but was surrounded, both on- and offline, by other queer-identifying 
people. Early on in my time as a gay person, I encountered an opinion on social media arguing that 
coming out is not the burden of those who are queer. Rather, one should not have to explain oneself 
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to those who are unfamiliar, and that one should not feel as though one is hiding something by not 
disclosing something that is not the business of others. In hindsight, this is a privileged position to 
take. It presumes the ability to act without repercussion, the ability to either pass without as much 
issue and/or the ability of an individual to possess such a level of privacy, among other things, 
make the position untenable in the long term. Despite this, my personal circumstances allowed me 
to adopt this mindset, and I found it both liberating and confining. I was trapped between the closet 
and self-liberation. I was gay and had no issue admitting it to those with whom my relationship 
had no bearing on my life at home. Being gay in school was easy but being gay at home was 
different. Whereas school was a place where I only saw people for about seven hours a day, home 
was the place I grew up, with people I saw every day and whom I wanted to remain close to. Its 
permanency made preserving safety and comfort paramount. Personal safety, thankfully, was not 
a question due in large part to my older sister’s coming out as a lesbian in her late teens. Comfort 
occupied the central focus of my experiences within and outside the closet from that moment until 
my later years of high school.  
Comfort for me was based on two things. The first was the embodied experiences of shame 
that were provoked whenever gayness existed in opposition to the role I was understood to occupy 
and was to be avoided at all costs. The second was the desire to avoid explaining who I am. This 
can be understood as an avoidance of coming out, of making something implicit to my 
understanding of myself exist in other’s conceptions of me, in a way that would change rather than 
accommodate my current being. I had not changed my understanding of myself. However, things 
I did, or thought, would now be understood differently considering a new way of knowing me. 
Shame came, and with it, the feeling of boiling from the inside out, like I would combust at any 
moment, and that all I wanted to do was disappear from the current circumstances. Being judged 
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for something I was provoked a desire to hide it, to escape the social ramifications of simply 
existing as I am. Shame was an emotional and physical experience of pain that conditioned my 
way of existing. It showed me that I knew who I was and that I also knew being gay around certain 
people or in certain contexts was undesirable in order to prevent that feeling from reoccurring. 
Avoiding coming out, although related to experiences of shame, was also about controlling the 
ways in which I was perceived by those around me. It was more comfortable to be misunderstood 
as part of the norm than it was to have to deal with the awkwardness, ignorance, and probing 
questions into my life that would have come with coming out. Outside of my particulars, though, 
my experiences exemplify the role of the closet in mitigating painful and uncomfortable 
experiences by those who either can pass or choose to engage in behaviors in deliberate efforts to 
pass. However, upon coming out, it does not end. Once one realizes one belongs to an identity that 
is “passable” within society, there is a pressure to make that knowledge known to others, be it in 
intimate or public spaces.  
 In my experiences as a White Cherokee, the closet works differently for me in personal 
practice. Firstly, I do not experience shame in any regard to being Cherokee. I am not filled with 
the red-hot shame of being “outed” as Cherokee. Yet, because I understand myself as Cherokee 
on my own and as a member of my Cherokee family, I do not feel the need to occupy the space a 
Native Cherokee person would. Rather, I choose to make my position known as it becomes 
relevant. It helps me situate my opinions and experiences within discourses of Cherokeeness and 
Indigeneity. It helps me explain why I feel on the margins of both Cherokeeness and Whiteness. 
My experiences of both are impacted by the presence of the other. My ability to claim a Cherokee 
identity is complicated by my Whiteness, and my Whiteness is offset by the feelings of belonging 
and loyalty to my Cherokee identity. The ability to pass and engage in practices of passing is 
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largely due to comfort, not shame. It is not that I reject my Cherokeeness when in public, but rather 
it can needlessly complicate my social position at times that are inappropriate or inconvenient. An 
example would be me explaining a complex position and personal identity to a stranger who 
assumes I am only White which unnecessarily complicates simple interactions. My ability to 
choose reflects my passing within White society, but the moments of comfort and discomfort 
within White spaces highlight the role of Cherokeeness in impacting my subject position. 
Likewise, my discomfort in claiming a solely Cherokee identity is based on the knowledge that I 
am not representative of Cherokee culture. I am both White and Cherokee, and I experience spaces 
as somebody living within those identities.  My Whiteness and Cherokeeness both are felt 
internally but are suspect in their articulations, as my political identity as Cherokee puts me in 
opposition to White settler colonialism, and my phenotypic and cultural Whiteness distance me 
from fully occupying a Cherokee identity. 
 Part of it is also the burden of coming out, of revealing an identity that is not readily 
apparent. The concept of identity forces this question, asking you to explain what you are rather 
than being constructed as a relational subject. You are put in a position in which you must explain 
yourself, your presence, and more. This is something akin to what Twyla Baker, President of Nueta 
Hidatsa Sahnish College, a tribal college, calls “translation exhaustion,” which is the idea that a 
marginalized person must first explain historical context all the way to the contemporary, 
repeatedly, due to the lack of knowledge that the listener has. This is not just an individual issue 
but rather is emblematic of the erasure of Indigenous histories within school systems (Baker 2019). 
Because White Cherokees appear White, they are put in a position in which they must explain their 
relationship to Cherokeeness and Whiteness. This means, but is not limited to, presenting ancestry, 
asserting tribal membership, why you do not (or do) know Cherokee, why you do not “look” 
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Cherokee, and more. This experience is not guaranteed, but oftentimes one must prepare a defense 
simply to assert one’s “true” self. You become emblematic of the problems of settler colonialism 
and must be willing to resolve that problem by explaining your identity.  
 The closet exists because there is a hegemonic system present. Because hegemony is at all 
times concerned with the ways in which a dominant class’s power is preserved and exercised, it is 
also concerned with the regimes of truth that are present. Knowledges are indicative of one’s 
position in the hegemonic system, but hegemonic knowledge can also be used to undermine 
hegemony. One such instance is blood quantum. Originally imposed by the United States, blood 
quantum later was a means of greater tribalization, strengthening tribal identities. Rather than just 
being a way of knowing who was or was not a tribal citizen, it allowed citizens to articulate a 
distinct legal and political status, one based in Indigeneity and was how rights to land and financial 
entitlements could be articulated. What was once hegemonic later became counter-hegemonic. 
Even then, the status of blood quantum as an agent of hegemony or counter-hegemony is 
circumstantial and depends on the way in which it is being called upon. Rather than thinking of it 
as solely one or the other, it is more beneficial to consider blood quantum and other ways in which 
identity is proclaimed and verified as part of a discourse of racial and tribal sovereignty, in which 
there are moments that racial formations become clearer. These moments are clustered around 
ways of thinking about race: in one moment, it is blood quantum; in another, it is the presence of 
historical blood; and in others, it is their cultural knowledge that makes them privy to a particular 
identity. These are all places where power relations, based on historical and contemporary 
experiences of knowledge production and subjugation, are fought and defended.  
 Yet, White Cherokees seem to be presented with a multitude of options, shaped by their 
position as related to the social, legal, political, and biological parameters of identity. By this, I 
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mean that White Cherokees (presumably) possess the privilege to divulge their Cherokee identity 
whenever they see fit. Some may identify as Cherokee and Native and not recognize or reconcile 
with their Whiteness. Others may not recognize themselves as Cherokee at all really or may even 
only mark it in checking boxes on bureaucratic forms. In everyday experience, though, I would 
imagine there are two predominant ways of being a White Cherokee. I would call them Indigenous 
aligned and settler aligned White Cherokees. In no ways does this dichotomy claim to encompass 
all, nor do I seek to establish the two categories as inherently coherent, and I find it easily 
imaginable that some may claim one category and yet be recognized as participating in the other. 
The politics of people claiming tribal identities are not easily boiled down into two distinct 
positions either.  
 Indigenous-aligned White Cherokees articulate their identity as based on a politic of 
representation, inclusion, and justice. It is a coming-out based on explaining one’s views, setting 
right the information that is present about an issue, or thinking about ways in which Indigenous 
people may be better incorporated within a given institution or organization. There is, to varying 
extents, a reckoning with one’s Whiteness in ways that contextualize one’s position. In general, 
they understand themselves as aligned with the goals of their fellow tribal members and Native 
people more broadly. This does not, however, mean that they are involved in actions deemed 
explicitly political, nor does it mean that what actions they are engaged in are deemed beneficial 
by other Indigenous people. This kind of identity is, to me, defined in its critical engagement with 
social and cultural history of the United States and uses its position to articulate and go against a 
hegemonic history.  
 Settler-aligned White Cherokees, however, are not using their position in such a manner. 
These Cherokees can be better understood as those aligned with the hegemonic formation, which 
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is to say, the dominant White society. They usually come out only in times of asserting difference 
to legitimate a political position that aims to tackle the issues with Whiteness. I associate this with 
a defensive “well, I’m Cherokee, and I don’t have a problem with it.” Other times, they come out 
as Cherokee for the perceived benefits that come with being identified as such, namely in practices 
of employment and education where the boons of affirmative action are believed to operate to their 
benefit. Oftentimes, settler-aligned White Cherokees are agents of hegemony, utilizing their 
position to renew the power that Whiteness holds while utilizing Cherokeeness selectively to 
benefit their position.  
 Both positions are not evident in any White Cherokee person. They may indeed coexist in 
one subject, which selectively utilizes their Cherokee identity to be critical within spaces of 
activism while also utilizing it to further validate the position of White society in the United 
States. The closet as a metaphor allows White Cherokees to articulate their Cherokeeness and 
Indigeneity in manners that are embedded in the racial, political, social, and legal systems of 
governance within both tribal and settler contexts. In asserting an Indigenous-aligned White 
Cherokee identity, one is working against settler-colonial hegemony, which is predicated on the 
success of settler colonialism, that is, the erasure of Indigenous people (be it through 
incorporation or genocide) and the occupation of all their lands. Conversely, a settler-aligned 
White Cherokee identity is aligned with perpetuating that hegemony. The point of all of this is 
that the formulation of identity verification and validation is based on exercises of and 
differences in power and knowledge. They reinforce and challenge the way settler colonialism 
operates in the United States and challenge narratives of tribal cohesion and the notion of a 
unified subject experience within any identity. The choices to come out as or refrain from 
coming out and the context in which it is occurring all help locate White Cherokees within 
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relationships of power. Most importantly, though, this does not change the fact that all of these 
people still identify as Cherokee, with tribal membership, and feel that they belong.  
 
10. The White Man on the Fence 
This time when I was pulling into Papa’s, a congregation of cars confronted me. I 
recognized my dad’s and Papa’s, but the rest were strangers to me, probably from a lack 
of paying attention to who drove what from past family events. I got out of the car with 
my sisters. They came with me today, as did my parents in their own vehicle since we 
were late, and they refused to wait. My younger sister Allie was home from university on 
spring break and had not seen Granny and Papa since the holidays. My parents see 
Granny and Papa much more often than the three of us do, although that has changed as 
I have been doing fieldwork. Even then, they saw him once or twice a month, my sisters 
saw them a handful of times a year, rarely more than five or six.   
“Well how are y’all doing?” Papa greeted us as always, this time accompanied by my 
uncle, silent but still embracing each of us with a hug and a smile.  
“We’re doin good Papa, how about you?” I said, giving him the usual side hug.  
“I’m doin good, about to put up this hotwire, you all itching to help?”  
I nodded in acknowledgement, while my sisters declined respectfully and headed 
inside to see Granny and everybody else. The work group was made up of Papa, me, my 
father, my uncle, and two of my cousins, Beau and Moses. They were not coming now 
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since Moses had yet to arrive, and Beau was doing something else, but the two would 
come to help us out here before too long. 
We rolled the wire onto a spool that would make it easier to pull across the large 
swath of fence. Papa held the spool, I cranked it, my uncle assured everything went in an 
orderly manner, and my dad was unrolling the wire on the other end. A complicated 
procedure for something that I thought would be much simpler. They all assured me that 
it was much easier this way than any other way. I was the only hotwire newbie here.  
Papa and my uncle moved with a synergy about them, silently communicating 
what was next and so forth. My dad and I disrupted the synergy, me more than him 
certainly, mostly due to the lack of knowledge and having to be walked through 
everything. The rest of them had an understanding of how to do most things that they got 
through experiences over the years. I, however, did not have that, and thus took longer, 
knew next to nothing, and had to learn how to do it all. Terminology, methods, and more, 
each thing contributed to me slowly climbing up the learning curve of ranch work. After 
the spool was rolled, Papa grabbed insulators, and then we rode the ranger to grab the t-
posts. Papa and I loaded the t-posts, one after the other, until we had what he deemed “a 
fair amount.”  
“That should do us pretty good don’t ya think? We’re just going from the corner there to 
that other corner,” Papa said, pointing to the edges of the property that were obscured 
by equipment and trees.  
“I think so, if not somebody can always come back for another few posts.”  
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“I think so too, let’s head out there, Dan [my uncle] should be there with the tractor by 
now.”  
The tractor made putting the t-posts in easier, rather than having any one of us 
slam it in with specific equipment or a sledgehammer. The tractor’s front end was like 
that of a bulldozer, with the back end having three spokes for lifting round bales. Papa 
has two tractors, the big one and small one, respectively. They are a highly versatile 
piece of equipment, used to make any and every task as easy as can be. In this case, the 
front end was used to push the posts into the ground, removing the need for muscle work. 
However, the first post, for the “charger” as Papa called it, would have to be done by 
hand. It came to the two of us to do this task while my uncle and dad dispersed the t-posts 
to a spacing they found appropriate. I would hit the t-post with the sledgehammer, 
applying a force I could manage but make progress with. One, two, three, ding. With 
each ding, the sledgehammer would move the post further in the ground. When I seemed 
hopeless, Papa would try and hit the post in, making some more progress but never much 
more, and then I would try some more. By the time my uncle and dad had returned, Papa 
and I were found helpless and exhausted by both of our inabilities yet stubborn refusal to 
let the ground’s rejection of the post stop us. We finished, and they waited. Papa took 
pliers to adjust the post’s orientation, however miniscule, so that the solar panels on the 
charger faced the proper direction.  
“That should be good, now let’s get to grounding it. Evan, get that sandpaper out of the 
back of the ranger and let’s get some of the rust off this fence, that way it will conduct to 
the ground better.” I grabbed the sandpaper, and then walked over to the fence and Papa 
took the paper and started applying pressure to get the rust off, showing me how I should 
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do it. After I did it for a minute or so, my dad stepped over to me while Papa was 
distracted and showed me a “better” way of doing so. Papa noticed halfway. 
“That might work, go ahead and try it,” Papa said, as my dad stepped away. I tried it. 
The paper split in two. Papa and I made eye contact, silently laughing and ridiculing my 
dad for stepping in only to have his method not only not work but end up with the 
sandpaper ripping. I continued the way Papa showed me, and we went about setting up 
the fence. After the charger got set up, my dad and uncle ran the wire from the charger to 
the other end, where Papa and I were setting up the connecter to the barb wire fence that 
was already there. There was barbed wire already where the new hotwire was going, but 
this was to ensure that “the cows don’t go teasing the neighbors bull, since he’ll get over 
if he wants over.”  
It was at this point that Moses and Beau arrived. Had we seen each other in the 
barn or house, we would’ve nodded, said hello, asked how the other was doing. Being in 
the pasture, we acknowledged each other’s presence with a nod and continued. They got 
off the 4-wheeler and headed to where we were all congregated, giving a nod in 
recognition of arrival and response. Having finished the connecter, we now needed to 
make sure the wire was as taut as it could be. This required me, Beau, Moses, and my 
uncle to all pull on the wire as much as we could and hold it while Papa secured it. My 
dad was in the middle to make sure it was tight there as well, which one would think it 
would be, but he was there as a contingency plan, I assumed, for what, I do not know. As 
we held the wire barehanded, my hold started to weaken, and the rest pulled tighter while 
I adjusted my grip. Shortly thereafter, Moses as well. Then Beau. My uncle never needed 
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to fix his grip, I assumed he either had the callouses to make it not as painful, or he 
persevered through the pain that the rest of us obviously felt.  
“Alright, done.” We let go, and the wire stayed in place, tight as can be. We then began 
moving backward, each one of us attaching insulators in groups of two: Beau and Moses, 
me and Papa, and my uncle and dad. Papa and I, for some reason, had the daunting task 
of getting the glass insulators screwed into the tree with raw strength alone. At first, 
neither of us was able to mount the needed strength to break through the tree’s bark, but 
eventually, I got a footing and enough of a borehole that let me get the insulator in. This 
was then repeated for the other two trees that needed an insulator to house the wire.  
As Papa and I finished up, we headed to the charger so that we could turn it on 
once everybody had finished attaching the wire to respective insulators and posts. At one 
point, though, my dad and uncle had finished theirs, and Beau and Moses were the only 
ones working. “Evan, should I turn that charger on and shock ‘em?” He looked at me 
with a smile, his eye lit up, he knew what he was doing and knew it would be funny to see.  
“I don’t know Papa, that’s liable to hurt,” I said, knowing it was well outside of my 
power to get him not to shock them.  
“It’s not that bad! I’ll get ‘em real good.” Papa turned on the charger, and on the other 
end of the wire, we saw Moses jump back from the shock on his hand. Beau was also 
shocked, but it was through his long sleeve shirt, so he did not react as much. Papa 
turned off the charger through his laughter and the two gave Papa a look of disapproval 
and anger. As they headed up the wire, you could tell Papa was in for it from the two 
based on the look in their eyes. They were angry, but not furious, just enough to voice 
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frustration with Papa’s actions, yet not much more than that. He laughed and laughed 
and laughed, bragging about how he got them good.  
“That’s just mean Papa,” Beau said with Moses. Papa finished his laughing, trying to 
defend himself from the two’s judgment. Harmless fun, one could call it. Having had his 
fun, he got back to work, talking with my uncle and dad. No more than a few yards from 
us, Beau and Moses started looking back and forth at each other. Their plan was rather 
obvious to those paying attention. They lied in wait, Beau’s finger on the switch, 
watching Papa’s hand hover around the hotwire. He touched it, thinking it was safe to 
play with while making conversation, yet it was far from that. Beau and Moses flipped the 
switch, and almost as fast as they had jumped back earlier, Papa did the same. He waved 
his hand in pain, his body language reflecting the pain and frustration with Beau and 
Moses having shocked him.  
“This is why y’all are at the bottom of my list, Evan would never shock me like that! He 
also listens to me and doesn’t think he knows better!” 
“Sure thing Papa, that’s why we’re at the bottom of the list, as if you didn’t shock us 
first!” Beau responded.  
I laughed at Papa saying all that. I did, in fact, not know any better, nor would I 
shock anybody (at least I’d like to think so), let alone him. The laughter and back and 
forth between Papa and my cousins left as everybody started making moves to pick up 
and head back to the barn. When we returned, each man took upon himself to put away 
certain tools and equipment. I put up the sledgehammer and extra insulators, and a few 




 Identity categories are helpful insofar as they are in dialogue with the people they purport 
to represent. Yet, inside that same insight is the knowledge that identity categories never have, 
nor could, represent anybody perfectly. They are helpful as heuristics, an intellectual sleight of 
hand for more complex interactions. The existence of Indigenous implies that of Settler, White 
implies presence of non-White, and so forth. They are not necessarily dichotomies but 
nonetheless held in opposition and solidarity with other categories as necessary. Notably, there 
are histories and memories embedded in identity thinking. In reading about my family putting up 
a fence, it is not immediately necessary to think about the ways we locate ourselves in categories. 
Yet, despite being White or Native, we all choose to identify with Cherokeeness. Subjectivity is 
helpful in thinking about my family’s relationship with identity categories as we make places for 
ourselves in our surroundings.  
 As we put together the fence, our self-knowledge comes from different places. For my 
uncle and Papa, their sense of self comes from a distinct history of growing up on land, traceable 
from generation to generation back to removal and Cherokee homelands. Although the 
technology, methods, and animals worked with have changed, and it is now in Paoli, Oklahoma, 
not Sallisaw or Tahlequah or even Georgia or North Carolina; we know how and where this 
knowledge was built upon, by who, and that those people are Cherokee, just like we are. This is 
not an essentialist understanding, but one built on experience and feelings, of interaction and 
knowledge. My grandfather learned in part from his father, who learned from his, and so on.  
 In thinking back on Visweswaran’s discussion on history and memory that I discussed in 
my fourth chapter, I find that memory is what drives my understanding of history and my 
family’s relationship to it. We are the products of complex social processes, yet we are not 
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without agency in these processes. We can conjecture about how history may be different by 
posing questions from our memories, memories that are embedded in, shaping, and being shaped 
by history. How might things differ if my great grandfather, Daniel Henry, remained in Eastern 
Oklahoma? What if my family had relocated to Tulsa, or even Tahlequah, instead of Central 
Oklahoma? If we had continued to learn Cherokee and passed it down instead of favoring 
English? What are we capable of doing now to (re?) connect with our elders and ancestors? If 
history were to change, how would we change?  
 My family is not alone in this regard. Other families also have moments where questions 
could be asked that would come to shape the memories that they now have. One’s relationship to 
history is realized, I would argue, in the way that one locates oneself in it. Memories, practices, 
beliefs, places, and more all serve as ways of putting ourselves into dialogue with how things are 
and how they could have been. If we focus our efforts on predetermined identity categories, 
categories that are defined by their relationship to settler colonialism, we lose pieces of the 
puzzle, and ourselves, to that category. In looking at things through the lens of subjectivity, we 
retain our sense of self while also gaining clarity about the ways identity categories function and 
how they are embedded in exercises of political power.  
 Likewise, looking at practices of place-making and the relationships people have with the 
land that they are on helps to illuminate aspects of identity and subjectivity. It is a medium 
through which meaning is given to so much, and in turn, we use metaphors of space to discuss 
the ways we understand ourselves. Locating identity in practice, caught between two identities, 
both of these metaphors, amongst many others, evoke images of a spatial relationship. Although 
this was not the focus of my thesis, I find that spatial metaphors provide a helpful way of looking 
at identity thinking, which is part of what led me to pursue an analysis of land relationships and 
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placemaking. People do not exist outside of the relationships they form with the places they 
inhabit. Even when removed, new place relationships are forged, and older relationships are 
remembered.  
For my family, being Cherokee is about kin. It is about the every day, the small things, the 
feeling of belonging with those like you. The presence of formal or other modes of being 
Cherokee is merely verification but does not make me Cherokee. I am made Cherokee through 
the work I do with Papa, through the meals I eat with him, through the stories he tells me, in the 
ways he connects me to him, and to his father and mother, and their parents before them. I exist 
through these people, and their ways of being have resulted in the way I am today. The fact Papa 
lives and works on his own land is not something out of coincidence; it is part of an inherited 
way of being, something that goes back in his family to the Cherokee homelands. In putting up 
the fence, I see myself as connected to those ancestors, who were forced off their land, forced 
into U.S. citizenship and private land ownership, who then moved as they needed to so that they 
could provide for themselves and their families. Putting up the fence is not just about delineating 
where the cattle can graze, but also about marking Papa’s land, Papa’s land that he has acquired, 
managed, and taken care of, land that he intends on protecting from the White man, even if the 
Cherokees around him look like them.  
 
11. Epilogue 
 Deciding to focus my thesis research on White Cherokees came amidst a lot of turmoil. 
Socially and politically, the past year has involved a pandemic, the election of a new president, 
COVID diagnoses for many family members and me, and so many other things. Thankfully, my 
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family has managed to recover from their cases without long-term effects manifesting thus far, 
and my hope is that it remains so.  
 This research provided a sense of clarity about my own identity. Although I have always 
understood myself as Cherokee, my connection to it was at times, and other times strong. 
Although I discussed this some in previous chapters, I wish to reflect more now on how elements 
of place and metaphors of identity influence my own thinking, albeit in a more explicit manner 
than previously used.  
 My mother is a 5th generation Cherokee Oklahoman, beginning with Joseph Seabolt and 
Nancy Hair in the mid-19th century. Although Oklahoma only became a state in 1907, her being 
Cherokee has put her family here since before then. Oklahoma has always been home for her, 
and I find the same to be true for myself. In my childhood, due to my father’s military service, 
we lived in Florida and Virginia when I was one, up until I turned 7, in 2006. We would return 
for holidays, and each return carried with a mystical quality. We would stay with my maternal 
grandmother in south Oklahoma City but would always spend an entire day at Granny and 
Papa’s. My first memories of Papa involve the cold winter wind of Oklahoma chapping my 
cheeks as I got out of the family car and anxiously walked up to him, meeting a man I have 
supposedly met time and time again but am now remembering as my grandfather.  
 Papa’s “farm,” as we called it in childhood, unconcerned with the nuances of naming 
land and what it reflects, was a mystical place. It was large and nothing like anything we had 
seen before. His cattle roamed across the gated pastures, rotating between them so that each 
pasture could recover before their next turn to host the cattle. He had a bull named Curly, a red 
and white Hereford whose hairs on his head curled. He was larger than any animal we had seen 
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before and much closer. Curly lasted a few years before he was sold off, as is the nature of bulls 
on a ranch, but Curly was part of the excitement.  
 My mother would always tell us about being Cherokee. How Papa would load her and 
her siblings into the van with Granny, and they would go to Tahlequah and see the Cherokee 
Nation, learning about their family and tribe. She spoke of these memories fondly, and my 
siblings would reminisce with her about their own trips to Tahlequah. I looked forward to these 
trips with a sense of wonder that I would get to learn more about my family and tribe that I had 
been told about in-depth yet did not know in person as much. Oklahoma was the state in which I 
would learn and become connected with being Cherokee. In hindsight, I wasn’t wrong, but there 
was certainly more to it than just being in Oklahoma.  
 Returning to Oklahoma, we saw Papa more than ever before. In doing so, I identified 
more strongly with being Cherokee. It felt more “real” than before, in part because I was closer 
to people who saw me as Cherokee and who I also saw as Cherokee. I identified openly and 
proudly as Cherokee.  
 Yet, as I grew up and encountered more and more people who identified as Native, I 
struggled with this identity more and more. I did not feel secure in claiming it. It felt wrong, 
almost appropriative. My family’s usage of words like “Indian,” their comfort level with a local 
mascot being a “savage” with a headdress, and the ease in which they conveyed their desire to 
see the Indians win in a western film, each of these and more made me feel less secure in this 
identity and even at odds with my family. To this day, the latter two of these still make me feel 
odd inside. I understand now that this feeling is me grappling with the ways that my family’s 
position as Cherokees distant from cultural epicenters has affected them. They see icons that are 
offensive and find a source of historical representation and value in them. I think that we are 
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trying to reconcile being Cherokee in the spatial and cultural fringes, finding meaning and 
belonging where we can.  
 I understood myself as Cherokee more securely as I finished high school and began my 
studies at the University of Oklahoma in 2017. As I continued to live life and learn and change, I 
came to accept and understand the way my Whiteness and Cherokeeness contoured one another 
more fully. An almost paradoxical conclusion, I found myself identifying as both. Being 
Cherokee to me was something that did not overshadow being White, but I also understood that 
my experiences were very different from those who are racially Native. The two had felt 
exclusionary growing up, and in the discourses that I had access to, they were often spoken of as 
mutually exclusive. White Cherokees, however, have existed for a long time and are far from 
unique to Cherokees. I was only one in a pool of thousands, if not more. This produced for me 
more questions than answers, questions I reflected on as I spent time with Papa doing fieldwork. 
How does he see me as solely Cherokee despite my appearance? How am I Cherokee despite the 
only Cherokees I know being those in my family? What does it mean to be both Cherokee and 
White?  
 These questions guided my research, implicitly at first and later explicitly. Without 
knowing it, I had been asking questions, reading books and articles, and focusing on identity in 
my studies. My security in being Cherokee does not come from legal recognition entirely, 
although it certainly secures it in other ways, nor does it come from the relationship with the land 
that my grandfather has and taught me. It comes instead in the way I relate to my grandfather and 
other family members, in the way we understand ourselves as Cherokees and descendants of 
other Cherokees. The injustices that affected our ancestors, although distant in time, are no less 
relevant to righting the wrongs of this country. Our being in Oklahoma is not a coincidence, but 
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it is on purpose and was to make room in the southeastern United States for more settlers and 
economic expansion. We are in Central Oklahoma because of assimilatory policies aimed at 
dispossessing and fragmenting Indigenous populations in Oklahoma. In holding on to 
Cherokeeness, whether we know it or not, we defy these policies and recognize the importance 
of history in shaping the contemporary. This is possible because of the simultaneous fluid and 
rigid nature of identity.  The persistence of biological notions of identity makes it possible for us 
to adhere to our identity, yet the importance of a quantifiable amount of Cherokee blood and 
visually appearing as Cherokee are also important to claim this identity. These understandings 
come out of social negotiations, spatial arrangements, and political relationships.    
 As COVID vaccinations began to be distributed in 2021, my family decided to gather for 
Easter in early April. It was my first-time seeing Papa since March of 2020, a year earlier. Since 
our last meeting, we had chatted over the phone a few times, conveyed how we missed one 
another and hoped for the pandemic to end. In the course of a year, I was close to finishing my 
coursework for my degree, we had both been infected by and recovered from COVID-19, 
thankfully without complications. Papa had also started a small garden behind the barn, 
consisting of tomatoes, peppers, and other vegetables, although none were heritage seeds, a fact I 
found a bit funny, although unsurprising as he did not access the internet at all really, and would 
not have known about the Seed Bank at that point (although he does now). The small family 
reunion at Easter was a welcome event for all and a cause to also celebrate some of the good 
things that had happened, chief among them being my older sister’s engagement to her fiancée.  
 Papa did not seem to protest that she was engaged to a woman and welcomed her fiancée 
with open arms. Her fiancée, an Italian Jew from New York, brought another person with 
different experiences to be shared and understood.  Furthermore, Papa’s sister Diane, Aunt Di as 
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we called her, was also present. I had never met her, and she hadn’t seen Papa for a long time. As 
the day ended, she congratulated Papa on his big family and how he was blessed with all these 
people. Papa responded in a joking fashion, praising our family for its diversity, “We have all 
kinds of people down here, Choctaws, Cherokees, Irishmen, and Israelites,” he said, winking at 
my sister’s fiancée, who was seated directly across from him, and me. I rolled my eyes at his 
saying Israelites, a term I was not necessarily familiar with but knew was not appropriate. 
Granny chimed in, “and German!” to which Papa responded, “we ain’t got no Nazis!” which 
prompted another wink and stifled laughs from those around him. The stifling of our laughter, I 
think, reflects a general knowledge that the joke was funny for its sudden shift and 
inappropriateness in reducing Germany to one moment in history, albeit a tragic moment that 
still has consequences in the present.  
 What I think his praising of family diversity also does is showcase the resilience and 
value of identity thinking in the everyday. It is precisely because identity thinking is always 
shorthand for complex relationships and processes that it is fluid and resilient. The semiotic 
sleight of hand that is compiling hundreds, if not thousands, of years of history into one word is 
deceptively simple. Identity thinking is resilient in part because it is a shorthand for so many 
complex relationships, and it is in that shortening act that people are put on the margins of 
identities, negotiating a belonging that is felt but not seen or understood as readily. This does not 
mean that any identity claim is free for anybody to make. Rather, they must be understood as 
arising out of historical relationships and be afforded a certain amount of recognition. In 
examining cases like my own, on the margins of identity categories, there are insights to be 
gained in how identity thinking operates, and even clarity into the workings of settler-
colonialism, land, and how they continue to operate and influence the present. 
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